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Abstract 
 
The reign of Henry VII suffers from academic neglect, partly as a consequence of its 
existence on the threshold of the traditional divide between the medieval and the early 
modern periods. These are frequently regarded as distinct areas of study, each with its 
own historiographical traditions shaped by the differing nature of the sources for each. 
Consequently a significant gap exists in the historiography of the development of both 
the City of London as a capital city and the English monarchy, and in particular the 
relationship between them. This thesis seeks to address this lacuna.  
 
Using the records of the Crown, the City government and its institutions, this study 
focuses on the political interaction between the Crown and the City. The first two 
chapters explore the themes of expectation and political affiliation at the start of the 
reign and assess the changes and continuities from the Yorkist period. It is argued that 
Henry’s unfamiliarity with the capital and vice versa led to mutual mistrust which 
resulted in a confrontation which shaped Henry’s perception of the capital for the rest 
of the reign. Chapters Three to Five are thematic examinations of key aspects of the 
City-Crown relationship. Chapter Three explores the financial connections and argues 
that the relationship fundamentally changed when Henry became solvent and the City 
lost its leverage with the monarch, as medieval kings had traditionally relied upon 
finance from the capital. Chapter Four discusses the triangular relationship between the 
City, Crown and the livery companies. It is demonstrated that Henry favoured some 
livery companies and suggested that in so doing he sought to dilute the power of the 
mercantile elite. The mediums and means of communication between the Crown and 
the City are the subject of Chapter Five, with particular emphasis on key individuals 
within both the court and the City who facilitated communication between the two. The 
deaths of these individuals within a few years of each other arguably changed the 
character of City-Crown negotiations at the turn of the century and helped Edmund 
Dudley, a man with insider knowledge of the government of London, rise in the king’s 
service. The final chapter is an examination of the last years of the reign, with particular 
reference to the key question of the extent of Henry VII’s alleged ‘tyranny’. This thesis 
reappraises the traditional view that London was particularly targeted in the fiscal 
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exactions perpetrated by the king’s ministers, Empson and Dudley, and challenges the 
assumption that the subsequent persecutions were purely financially motivated. 
 
This thesis argues that this was a reign which saw the reassertion of royal prerogatives 
and evolution of extant administrative machinery, but little, if any, innovation, at least 
in the sphere of Crown-City relations. The relationship was pliable and reciprocal, built 
upon the foundations of mutual need and flexible enough to adjust to the changing 
demands of Henry and his ministers as they sought to extend the royal prerogative. 
Claims that London was volatile, particularly at the end of the reign, and likely to rise 
against the king cannot be sustained. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
Two days after Richard III had been killed on the battlefield at Bosworth by the army 
of Henry Tudor, the Common Council of London met in the Guildhall to decide their 
response.1 The meeting was uncommonly well attended and it was agreed that eight 
men would ride to the new king to offer the fidelity and support of the City.2 Two 
months later Henry entered his capital, escorted from its outskirts, according to 
tradition, by the mayor, aldermen and liveried citizens.3 This was probably only his 
second visit to the capital, his first having taken place during the brief readeption of 
1470-1 when he was a teenager.4 His knowledge of London was therefore 
predominantly second-hand, derived from conversations with fellow exiles familiar 
with the City. No English king since the conquest had been so unfamiliar with his 
capital.  
 
The subsequent development of the relationship between Henry VII and his capital is 
the subject of this thesis. The political relationship between the entities of the Crown 
and the City will be the primary focus of this study and through the exploration of 
Henry’s relationship with London, conclusions will be drawn about the king’s approach 
to governing his kingdom, the management of power-bases and his conception of the 
royal prerogative.  
 
This thesis aims to fill a significant gap in the historiography of both London’s 
development and the history of the English Crown. Urban and political historians alike 
have largely neglected the subject of the relationship between Henry and his capital. 
The reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly, the perpetuation of Francis Bacon’s 
seventeenth-century portrait of Henry VII as an administrator king has led to the 
perception that this monarch was, as William Stubbs was to put it some three centuries 
                                                 
1 Jo.9, f.84r. 
2 Jo.9, f.84r. 
3 Jo.9, f.85v-86. 
4 Ralph A. Griffiths and Roger S. Thomas, The Making of the Tudor Dynasty (Gloucester, 1985), 69-
73. 
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later, emphatically dull.5 Such sentiments do not inspire further study. Secondly, the 
reign suffers from what Steven Gunn has termed ‘liminality’, in that it stands on the 
threshold of the traditional divide between the medieval age and the early modern one.6 
The medieval era and the Tudor age tend to be seen by most historians as two separate 
areas of study, each with their own historiographical traditions shaped by the skill set 
each has developed in response to the differing sources historians are accustomed to 
using. Hence, the first Tudor king is frequently treated as ‘the coda to surveys of later 
medieval England or the prologue to studies of the Tudors’.7  
 
Gunn’s argument dovetails with that of Christine Carpenter, who states that the 
‘sources for Henry VII’s reign are essentially “medieval”, in that they are of the same 
kind as those for the previous two centuries’.8 Carpenter therefore attributes the lack of 
attention paid to the reign to laziness on the part of the Tudor historian, who prefers to 
devote his or her energy to ‘other better recorded reigns’ and the tendency of the 
medievalist to shy away from intruding ‘into an acknowledged post-medieval reign’.9 
A consensus exists that the sources for this reign present a challenge. Geoffrey Elton 
complained that this was an ‘ill-documented period of history’, one of his few 
statements about the reign his nemesis in print, J.P. Cooper, agreed with.10 Sean 
Cunningham, in his biography of Henry VII, concurs that this is not an easy subject to 
study, for though the sources are, in the main, the same as for any other fifteenth-
century king they are ‘scattered, more difficult to access, and harder to interpret… 
much of the material that does exist for his immediate predecessors has not survived.’11 
The problem of ‘liminality’ is also reflected in the secondary literature charting the 
development of the City of London: the invaluable surveys of medieval London 
                                                 
5 Francis Bacon, The History of the Reign of King Henry VII, ed. Brian Thompson (London, 2007); 
William Stubbs, Lectures in Medieval History (Oxford, 1886), 334-353. 
6 Steven Gunn, ‘Henry VII in Context: Problems and Possibilities’, History, lxxxxii, (2007), 301. 
7 Gunn, ‘Henry VII in Context’, 301. 
8 Christine Carpenter, ‘Henry VII and the English Polity’, in B. Thompson ed. The Reign of Henry VII, 
HMS, v (Stamford, 1995), 12. 
9 Carpenter, ‘English Polity’, 13. 
10 G.R. Elton, ‘Henry VII: A Restatement’, Historical Journal, iv (1961), 1-29; J.P. Cooper, ‘Henry VII’s 
Last Years Reconsidered’, Historical Journal, ii (1959), 103-29. 
11 Sean Cunningham, Henry VII (London, 2007), 3. 
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undertaken by Caroline Barron and Sylvia Thrupp terminate in 1485 or 1500 and few 
articles have addressed the subject.12 
 
Yet this period has been identified as one of transition and evolution for both the Crown 
and City. David Grummit observed that ‘there is a sense that the political culture of 
early Tudor England was fundamentally different to that of its Yorkist and Lancastrian 
predecessors’, in other words, the England of 1509 was a different place to that of 1485, 
but, he laments, ‘identifying the precise nature and chronology of this change has … 
proved elusive.’13 In London the change was equally marked, as Caroline Barron 
observed, in that the late fifteenth century was ‘the apogee of London’s success… in 
its ability to exercise effective self-government’, but any moves made by the capital 
towards autonomy were checked by the ‘centralising authority of the Tudors’.14  
 
The overarching aim of this thesis, then, is to identify and assess changes wrought in 
the Crown-City relationship during this time of transition. Did the ‘centralising 
authority’ of the first Tudor king arrest the progress of London towards autonomy? 
Was the authority of the City’s ruling elite compromised by the Crown? And if so, was 
this a by-product of a wider policy to extend the royal prerogative or a deliberate 
attempt to curb the capital? What does the Crown-City relationship tell us about 
Henry’s rule on the one hand and the City’s expectations and ambitions on the other?  
 
This introductory chapter will explore the Crown-City relationship in the late fifteenth 
century and examine its historiography. It will consider London’s place within the 
kingdom and relation to other urban centres and the historiography of the reign of 
Henry VII. An outline of the main sources employed in this thesis will follow and lastly 
the structure of the thesis will be briefly outlined. 
 
                                                 
12 Caroline Barron, London in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 2004); Sylvia Thrupp, The Merchant 
Class of Medieval London, 1300-1500 (Michigan, 1962, repr. 1989). 
13 David Grummit, ‘Household, politics and political morality in the reign of Henry VII’, Historical 
Research, lxxxii (2009), 393-412. 
14 Barron, London, 305. 
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1.1. London and the Crown 
It was only from the late thirteenth century, claims Derek Keene, that London can be 
said to have been England’s capital city in the modern sense of the term, though London 
was before that date a place of prime importance for the Crown.15 An essential part of 
the process was the development of Westminster as the centre of bureaucratic, legal 
and administrative government and frequent base for the royal household. After brief 
migrations to York necessitated by the Scottish and Welsh wars of the thirteenth and 
early fourteenth centuries, Westminster had become the permanent home for the courts 
of the Exchequer, Common Bench, King’s Bench and Chancery by the 1360s.16 
Increasingly in the course of the fourteenth century Westminster became the venue for 
meetings of parliament until, after 1339, it was rare for parliament to be held 
elsewhere.17 The king, too, found it increasingly suited his purpose to be resident in 
Westminster, and consequently the royal council met frequently at the palace.18 
 
As the government of the country became less peripatetic and the houses of royal 
household servants and lords temporal and spiritual came to be built in the space 
between London and Westminster, so the two urban centres began to become more 
closely entwined.19 Large merchant houses rivalled the houses of the ecclesiastics in 
size and splendour, many eventually becoming London residences for magnates as the 
nobility realised the advantages of having a property in the City, or hostels for visitors 
engaged in business in the City.20 Westminster may have been the administrative centre 
but it was not equipped to fulfil the role of capital city, being simply too small and too 
                                                 
15 Derek Keene, ‘Metropolitan Comparisons: London as a City-State’, Historical Research, lxxvii 
(2004), 471. 
16 G. Rosser, Medieval Westminster, 1200-1540 (Oxford, 1989), 16-32, 36; D.M. Broome, ‘Exchequer 
Migrations to York in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries’, in Andrew Little and Frederick Maurice 
Powicke ed., Essays in Medieval History Presented to Thomas Frederick Tout (Manchester, 1925), 291-
300. 
17 Rosser, Westminster, 39-40. 
18 Rosser, Westminster, 40. 
19 Caroline Barron, ‘The Later Middle Ages: 1270-1520’, in Mary Lobel ed. Historic Towns Atlas: The 
City of London from Prehistoric Times to c.1520 (Oxford, 1989), 49; Barron, ‘Centres of Conspicuous 
Consumption: The Aristocratic Town House in London, 1200-1550’, London Journal, xx (1995), 1-16. 
20 Historic Towns Atlas, 63-99. 
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under-populated to become the reflection of the king’s magnificence that his foremost 
city was expected to be.21 
 
The proximity of Westminster to London meant that the City and its immediate 
surrounds were where the king, his family, council and nobility spent much of their 
time. Kings were crowned at Westminster and Londoners were required to provide the 
requisite pageantry and acclamation of the new king. Citizens of the City would 
regularly trek to Westminster to lobby influential figures or parliament, seek redress of 
grievance in the courts there, attend meetings with the king and his council or attend 
state occasions.22 To the inhabitants of London the king, royal family and magnates of 
the realm were not distant figures but familiar ones, frequently to be seen riding on 
their streets, travelling on the river and attending masses at their cathedral.  
 
The Crown and City had expectations of their relationship that had changed little since 
Londoners obtained the right to elect their own mayor from King John in 1215.23 He 
needed it to be a peaceful, well-governed, law-abiding city; it needed to be a clean and 
healthy environment, not just for display purposes but as the occasional abode of the 
nobility and the royal family. The king needed also a capital capable of supplying his 
court with luxury goods and the basic needs of sustenance for those employed both in 
his administration and his household, which comprised hundreds of people.24 It was 
also required to be capable of reflecting the magnificence of the person of the king, 
through elaborate displays and pageants, to impress and overawe foreign dignitaries 
and embassies. Most importantly, the king wanted access to the ready finance that the 
City mercantile community was able to provide, particularly in times of political 
turmoil or military need.  
 
                                                 
21 Rosser, Westminster, 18-27. 
22 Rosser, Westminster, 27-29. 
23 Liber Albus: The White Book of the City of London, ed. and trans. H.T. Riley (London, 1861), 119; 
Barron, London, 30. 
24 For the likely numbers and composition of the household of the Yorkist kings see A.R. Myers, The 
Household of Edward IV: The Black Book and the Ordinance of 1478 (Manchester, 1959) and Rosemary 
Horrox, Richard III: a Study in Service (Cambridge, 1989), 226-238. 
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The City also had its requirements of its ruler, other than justice, good governance and 
leadership as desired by all subjects. It wished to preserve its right to self-govern and 
elect its own officers; it wished for royal support in the maintenance of law and order; 
and it needed the maintenance of its legal and economic privileges that allowed it to 
hold its people accountable and trade unimpeded.25  
 
These expectations had been forged over the course of an occasionally difficult 
relationship. The privileges and liberties that the Londoners held so dear had been 
acquired through centuries of wrangling and negotiation. Henry I granted the City the 
right to elect its own sheriffs for London and Middlesex in return for an annual farm of 
£300 in 1131.26 In the same charter the right of the City to hold its own court, that of 
Husting, once a week was confirmed, though the court itself had existed since before 
the Conquest.27 Every medieval king thereafter confirmed and enlarged upon the 
privileges contained in the charter, some more than once. Henry III, in the course of 
his long reign, confirmed no less than nine charters for the City.28 In May 1215 
considerable progress towards self-government was made when the Londoners 
acquired from King John the right to elect their own mayor.29 The grant of these 
privileges did not stop kings from interfering in City elections: Henry III did so 
regularly, rejecting the Londoners’ choice of mayor in 1240, 1245, and 1254. In 1323 
Edward II replaced the elected candidate with his own choice and Richard II made 
known his choice of mayor in six elections in the 1380s in a blatant contravention of 
the liberties of the City.30 The office of mayor gradually grew in power and stature: in 
1327 he became the royal escheator in the City and also was appointed to be one of the 
royal justices assigned to hear and deliver prisoners held in Newgate Gaol. In the 
fifteenth century these powers were further enhanced, as the mayor became a justice of 
the peace with the power to hear and determine cases in the aftermath of the artisan 
protests of 1438-44, an empowerment confirmed by royal charter by Edward IV in 
                                                 
25 Barron, London, 30-42. 
26 Liber Albus, 114; C. Brooke, G. Keir and S. Reynolds. ‘Henry I’s charter for the City of London’, 
Journal of the Society of Archivists, iv (1973), 575-76. 
27 Liber Albus, 115. 
28 Liber Albus, 120-4. 
29 Liber Albus, 119; Barron, London, 30-1. 
30 Barron, London, 31-32. 
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1462.31 Caroline Barron summed up the paradox at the heart of the Crown-City 
relationship, in that ‘this was a City that demanded self-government and yet turned to 
the Crown to authorise the means of achieving this’.32 
 
The City was well aware that the Crown had the power not only to give but also to take 
away. Henry III deprived the City of its liberties over ten times for its support of the 
rebel barons under Simon de Montfort.33 Edward I withdrew the City’s charter and 
imposed his own government upon the City for thirteen years, with a royally appointed 
warden taking the place of the mayor.34 His son, apparently ‘bent on prising every 
privilege and penny’ out of the City, commissioned, in 1321, a six-month investigation 
into the running of the civic government resulting in the dismissal of the mayor and the 
appointment of another royal warden to take charge of the City.35 The action taken by 
Edward I and Edward II forced the City to become more professional in its 
administration. The position of the Recorder was created in response to the need for 
legal expertise within the civic administration after the removal of wardens appointed 
by Edward I to administer the City in April 1298.36 The civic bureaucracy was 
formalised in the charter of 1319. In partnership with the Crown this document 
provided a framework for municipal government, including detail about the means of 
obtaining the freedom of the City, the custody of the common seal, the administration 
of London Bridge, and the selection and duties of some of the City’s chief officers, 
including the chamberlain, common clerk and common sergeant.37 Much of the 
charter’s content ratified customs that had evolved over the previous decades, but 
official recognition in charter form amounted to an effective constitution for the City. 
 
                                                 
31 Barron, London, 34. 
32 Barron, London, 34 
33 Williams, Medieval London, 234-236. 
34 Williams, Medieval London, 254-5; Michael Prestwich, Edward I (London, 1988), 265; Barron, ‘The 
Later Middle Ages’, 42. 
35 Michael Prestwich, The Three Edwards: War and State in England, 1272-1377 (London, 1980), 97-
98; Barron, London, 33. 
36 Williams, Medieval London, 264-5. 
37 Williams, Medieval London, 282-3, Barron, London, 34. 
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Edward III, in the 1354 parliament, defined the circumstances that would lead to a 
revocation of the City liberties, presumably to reassure the citizens that such arbitrary 
action would not be taken without just cause. Richard II saw this statute merely as a set 
of procedures to be followed when he saw fit to take the City ‘into the king’s hand’ 
after the refusal of the City to make further loans to him in 1392. The court was briefly 
removed to York and liberties confiscated, recovered only once the City agreed to a 
fine of £10,000, proffered a further loan of 10,000 marks and held a spectacular pageant 
of reconciliation.38 Never again was the City taken into the king’s hand though the fact 
that the king could do this remained long in the City’s collective memory: when 
Protector Somerset felt his grip on the realm to be threatened in 1547, he ensured that 
the citizens of the Common Council were reminded of the penalty for disloyalty to the 
king as paid by their forbears: ‘The liberties of the City were taken away [and] strangers 
appointed to be our heads and governors’.39  
 
Arguments between the Crown and the City in Henry VI’s reign centred mainly upon 
the favouritism demonstrated towards alien merchants by the king and the royal 
monopolisation of civic offices. A series of anti-alien riots was perpetrated by the 
apprentices and servants of merchants belonging to the Mercers’ Company, who were 
resentful of the privileges enjoyed by members of the Italian mercantile community.40 
The unrest contributed to the decision of the royal family to abandon the capital for the 
midlands in summer 1456, which in turn made it harder for the civic government to 
impose effective law and order.41 In May 1459 the king was prompted to threaten the 
City with suspension of its privileges after riots in Fleet Street, this time directed against 
the Inns of Court and lawyers therein.42 It is perhaps not surprising that City loans to 
                                                 
38 Nigel Saul, Richard II (London, 1999), 259 & n.86, 343; Caroline Barron, ‘The Quarrel of Richard II 
with London, 1392-7’, in F.R.H. Du Boulay and Caroline Barron ed. The Crown and Local Communities 
in England and France in the Fifteenth Century (Gloucester, 1981), 178, 199 and ‘Richard II and 
London’, in Anthony Goodman and James Gillespie ed. Richard II: The Art of Kingship (Oxford, 1999), 
150-3. 
39 Richard Grafton, Grafton’s Chronicle, or History of England, 2 vols. (London, 1809) ii, 523. 
40 R.A. Griffiths, The Reign of Henry VI (Stroud, 1981), 790-1; J.L. Bolton, ‘The City and the Crown’, 
London Journal, xii (1986), 1-24. 
41 Griffths, Henry VI, 795. 
42 Griffths, Henry VI, 796. 
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the king in 1455-60 were little more than a quarter of those of 1450-55.43 Thus it is 
apparent that the City-Crown relationship was one of necessity and, therefore, co-
operation was profitable to them both. 
 
The relationship between the Crown and the City functioned on a variety of levels. 
Semi-autonomous household and administrative departments had relationships with 
London citizens that existed independently of political Crown-City intercourse. The 
Great Wardrobe, which sourced and stored many of the goods used in the royal 
household, purchased luxury and other items in great quantities from London artisans 
and merchants. Situated since 1361 by Baynard’s Castle in the west of the City, it was 
managed by a ‘Keeper’ who was ‘assigned to kepe [his] office continually in London 
among merchauntz and artificers’.44 By the end of the fifteenth century the Keeper, and 
the deputies he appointed, were in charge of the Wardrobe’s budget, accounts and staff, 
and therefore functioned as an autonomous department within the royal administration 
with little political significance.45 Similarly the Royal Mint also functioned as an 
autonomous part of the royal administration. Unlike the Great Wardrobe, though, the 
vast majority of the workers employed by the Mint came from only one company, the 
Goldsmiths, who benefitted from their close working relationship with the royal 
official, usually a senior courtier, appointed to oversee the Mint.46 The merchant 
community of London would also have been familiar with the personnel of the 
Exchequer, whom they, or their servants, would have visited in Westminster to receive 
payment for goods or repayment of loans. A formal role in civic ceremonial was 
accorded to the Barons of the Exchequer, before whom the sheriffs and mayor swore 
their oaths of office.47 The clerks of the Chancery would have been familiar figures to 
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members of the civic administration as frequent communication took place between 
this administrative department and Guildhall.48  
 
The intimacy of the City and Crown relationship is reflected in rhetoric employed by 
both during the fourteenth century. London was referred to as the ‘king’s chamber’, an 
allusion to the qualities it shared with the king’s Chamber within the household. As 
such the capital functioned as a place of peace, refuge and security for the king as well 
as an entity that could be utilised for financial provision and administration, 
entertainment and material support.49 The metaphor of the chamber, states Christian 
Liddy, was exclusively employed in times of political stress to invoke the intimate bond 
between the two entities, a reminder that theirs was a bond of necessity as well as 
proximity.50 In imitation of the capital, York and Coventry both appropriated the 
metaphor of the chamber after the king’s court temporarily took up residence within 
their walls in 1392 and 1456 respectively.51  
 
The City of London, in comparison with many of its counterparts on the continent, was 
a stable entity. It was rare that major incidents of unrest originated within its walls and 
threats of violence usually came from outside, rather than inside, the City. Both Steven 
Rappaport and Ian Archer have considered reasons for this stability in the late sixteenth 
century and compared Elizabethan London to its European peers, but similar 
comparisons have not been undertaken for the London of a century earlier.52 One 
reason for its stability may have been the centrality of the City to the English state; it 
was unequivocally the first city of the realm without competition from other regional 
centres for Crown attention, as was the case in the Low Countries.  The structure of 
London’s civic administration also contributed to its stability. The civic bureaucracy 
comprised a well-defined hierarchy: a court of twenty-five aldermen (including the 
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aldermanry of Portsoken, held ex officio by the prior of Holy Trinity) was headed by a 
mayor chosen from their number. Each alderman administered a ward of the City with 
the help of a staff of ward officers, usually comprising a beadle, constables, scavengers 
and rakers who would assist in law-keeping and keeping the ward presentable.53 The 
livery companies also had a role in peace-keeping, for they had the ability to impose 
discipline upon their members by dispensing reprimands and penalties to members who 
failed to maintain craft standards or who behaved in a manner contrary to the honour 
of their craft or company. Watches, called by the Common Council at times of likely 
unrest, were usually arranged through the companies, with each contributing an allotted 
number of men.54 Every person living within the City was near to a unit of civic 
administration. Three bodies of City government stood at the heart of the civic 
administration: elections took place within Common Hall, legislation within the City 
was made by the Common Council and executive decision and decrees were made in 
the Court of Aldermen.  
 
The relationship between London and the Crown is a topic that would merit its own 
monograph. Very few studies have been undertaken upon the subject of interaction 
between the capital and any individual medieval monarch. The most extensive 
scholarly examination of London and the Crown in the medieval period is to be found 
within Caroline Barron’s London in the Later Middle Ages, notably the first two 
chapters which analyse the needs and expectations the City and the Crown had of each 
other.55 Gwyn Williams’ Medieval London: From Commune to Capital provides a 
chronological march through the development of the City’s institutional and corporate 
structures with emphasis on the period between the Magna Carta and the start of the 
Hundred Years War, characterised by Williams as London’s ‘age of iron’, for it was 
when the City’s social and political structure ‘assumed characteristic and distinctive 
form’.56 
 
London in the late fifteenth century suffers from particular academic neglect, especially 
the reign of Henry VII. Though the study of London itself has become more widespread 
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in the last thirty years, facilitated by the publication of many primary sources, most 
surveys of the medieval capital cease in 1485. The London Record Society has a 
disproportionate number of publications dedicated to London in the Middle Ages and 
yet still the London of the first Tudor reign lacks the scrutiny accorded other periods. 
On the other side of the 1485-1509 divide, John Oldland’s work on the wealth of the 
London merchants in the early sixteenth century highlights how prosperous the City 
had become with the emergence of ‘super rich’ individuals, many of whom started 
trading during Henry VII’s reign.57 Guy Gronquist’s thesis on City-Crown relations in 
Henry VIII’s reign is a broad-brush overview of some of the issues that the Crown-City 
relationship faced at that time, though information about the relationship that Henry 
VIII inherited from his father is almost entirely absent.58  
 
Post-Reformation London is far better served. Susan Brigden’s revisionist monograph 
on London and the Reformation not only considers the religious change within London 
at material and social levels, but also the relationship between the civic government 
and the Crown, or its representatives, during the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI and 
Mary. What is apparent from her analysis is that London always remained acutely 
aware that what it gained from the Crown could always be taken away, for in the reigns 
of Edward and Mary the fear that the City could be deprived of its liberties was very 
real.59 The works of Archer and Rappaport, as mentioned, argue the case for and against 
the stability of the capital respectively during the second half of the sixteenth century 
whilst that of George Ramsay maintains a fairly narrow focus upon the economic 
importance of the City in political relations at the accession of Elizabeth.60 
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Biographers of medieval monarchs have rarely yielded much space to a consideration 
of the Crown-City relationship and scholarly literature on the Crown-London 
relationship tends to take the form of essays narrowly focused upon particular events 
rather than a macro view of the relationship. Caroline Barron updated Ruth Bird’s work 
with a couple of articles focused upon the reign of Richard II: the first considered the 
quarrel between the king and the City that erupted during his reign and the second 
considered the relationship Richard II had with his capital more generally.61 Discussion 
of the relationship between the Crown and the City in the fifteenth century has centred 
upon the role of the City in the dynastic wars that blighted the century. James Bolton 
and Caroline Barron both considered the relationship between the City and the Crown 
during the crisis that led to the seizure of the throne by Edward IV.62 Barron saw the 
divisions within the City as mainly social, with the ruling mercantile elite often at odds 
with the unfranchised masses, or ‘mob’, whose propensity for destruction often swayed 
the affiliation of the civic government, as when they demanded that the City continue 
to support the Yorkists in February 1461.63 Bolton challenged this, stating that political 
divisions were not aligned with social strata, for the mercantile elite of the City were 
partisan in the ‘politics of trade which were so vital to the well-being of the City and 
to their own prosperity’.64 Bolton’s article appeared to further the arguments of Charles 
Ross, writing a decade earlier, who observed that the Lancastrian government had 
‘alienated some sections of London society by its commercial policy’, a policy which 
had favoured Italian merchants at the expense of native businessmen.65 Bolton argued 
that a number of discontented merchants, after failing to receive redress of their 
grievances through parliament, orchestrated unrest within the City. The existence of 
such political divisions within the ruling elite of the City made it unlikely that the 
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deliverance of the City to the Yorkists in 1460-1 was purely a consequence of the 
violent demonstrations of the political preferences of the ‘mob’.66  
 
The extent to which political agency came into play in London’s involvement in matters 
of high politics is important. London’s ruling elite were, in the fifteenth century at least, 
rarely overtly factious for the City fathers sought to speak in concert and demonstrate 
a unity of action where possible, as is the nature of all corporate entities. It is impossible 
that political differences did not exist amongst the rich and powerful of the City, yet 
they were politically astute enough to realise that overt demonstration of political 
loyalty was unwise. The manifestation of such political feeling will be explored in this 
thesis, with the obvious caveat that the identification of covert political action is, by its 
very nature, difficult, if not at times impossible, especially if it was unsuccessful.  
 
1.2. London, the Crown and other Urban Centres 
Henry was fortunate in that the City of London was a docile entity compared to the 
towns and cities of the continent, where urban strife often took extremely violent forms, 
sometimes with the aim of overthrowing the established order.67 It was, perhaps, after 
witnessing the struggles endured by Maximilian, king of the Romans, with his cities in 
Flanders, that Henry Tudor became determined to be the master of his own capital, the 
only city in his realm capable of offering a sustained challenge to his rule.  
 
The worst uprisings in London tended to be little more than the brawling of apprentices 
and unruly young men; serious threats to the peace of the capital (as in 1381 and 1450) 
usually came from without, not within. London’s comparative stability when compared 
to its continental counterparts, apart from the reasons already listed, is partly 
attributable to the very different natures of England and her European neighbours. The 
diversity of laws, language, customs and trading ability even within polities governed, 
at least in name, by a single ruler resulted in a concentration of power within enlarged 
urban areas in many continental areas. The Burgundian polity, for example, comprised 
seventeen provinces in the mid-fifteenth century.68 Consequently England’s experience 
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of city and state formation was very different to the European one, as it enjoyed a unity 
of culture and language and enjoyed a stability partly attributable to its geographical 
situation.  
 
Derek Keene considered the question of whether London could be considered a city-
state by comparing it to other European metropolises.69 He concluded that though 
London did not fit the definition of a city-state, that is a city that had obtained a large 
degree of autonomy and regalian rights with the ability to directly influence foreign 
policy, as the principal cities of medieval Germany and Italy did, England’s capital did 
display some characteristics of city-states. It exercised a high degree of informal 
influence over a wide area and its size and wealth was considerably larger than other 
English urban entities.70 This authority was conferred by the Crown through rights and 
privileges both granted by charter and embodied in statute, and therefore the City never 
had the potential to accumulate powers that would challenge the authority of the king.71 
This view is similarly expressed by Steven Gunn, David Grummitt and Hans Cools in 
War, State and Society in England and the Netherlands, 1477-1559 with the claim that 
the city-state was a continental phenomenon, common in areas where autonomous 
principalities and duchies were the norm, such as Italy, Germany and the Low 
Countries and therefore London never had the potential to join their ranks.72 
 
In this London was perhaps more akin to Paris which, as effectively a royal creation, 
had never demonstrated any city-state aspirations.73 Paris, as was expected of a capital 
city, was used as a mirror to the magnificence of the king through the provision of 
extravagant pageantry to celebrate royal occasions, impress visitors or entertain other 
state-heads.74 It maintained this function through the brief occupation by the English, 
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hosting elaborate celebrations in 1420, 1424 and 1431.75 Paris, like London, had a civic 
government dominated by the mercantile classes and the same linear divisions in 
society between merchants and artisans as were apparent in the English capital.76  
 
London was the only English city of a size to rival its near European neighbours with 
nearly 50,000 people living within its jurisdiction in 1500; the next largest English 
urban centres, Bristol, Norwich and perhaps Newcastle provided a home for only 
10,000-14,000.77 By comparison, the Netherlands alone had five sizable cities: 
Antwerp (population 90,000), Amsterdam (30,000), Bruges (35,000), Brussels 
(40,000) and Ghent (50,000).78 Moreover, England was a more centralised state than 
its counterparts on the continent and therefore London was able to rise as its 
unchallenged capital, free from the competition and jealousy experienced between rival 
urban entities across the Channel. Hence London’s development and experience in the 
middle ages was markedly different to that of other European cities.79 
 
Perhaps more relevant for comparative purposes are recent studies of other English 
cities and towns. The publication of many source materials and the profusion of extant 
civic records pertaining to York in this period have led to a concentration of studies of 
this city.80 Bristol, Southampton, Coventry and Norwich have also received academic 
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attention.81 The publication in 2000 of The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, vol. 
I, 600-1500 provided a comprehensive critique of the themes of the study of urban 
England, yet relations between English towns and the Crown figured in it only 
incidentally, mostly in the context of the granting of charters.82 Though much has been 
written on towns and cities in England, both individually and collectively, as well as 
urban development in England on the whole, no modern book existed on the subject of 
the relationship between towns and the Crown until the publication of Lorraine 
Attreed’s study in 2001.83 This book outlined and developed the traditional argument 
that the relationship between towns and the Crown pivoted upon the interplay between 
‘finance’ and ‘privilege’, that is that the Crown would exploit urban wealth and 
resources in return for the confirmation and/or extension of charters of corporate 
liberties. Towns and cities prioritised their survival and protection of both their material 
goods and liberties and privileges above all else, runs the argument, and thus insulated 
themselves against outside political influences, particularly in time of turmoil, acting 
only when a sure winner was apparent.84  
 
Vanessa Harding’s essay on ‘The King and the City in the Fifteenth Century’ is broadly 
in agreement with Attreed’s argument. This study provides a valuable synthesis of 
views upon the relationship that English kings had with their larger urban entities.85 
Harding identifies three themes: firstly the Crown’s commitment to the reciprocal 
relationship between itself and its towns; secondly the contribution towns made to the 
Crown’s finances and lastly the way in which towns secured recognition of their 
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interests in the policies of government.86 Harding takes for granted that the towns were 
willing supplicants to the Crown, viewing themselves as suitors desirous of patronage. 
It is precisely this view that Christian Liddy, in his 2005 book sought to challenge. 
Instead, Liddy theorised, though a case might be made for the existence of the 
traditional interdependent relationship in the fifteenth century, the argument on the 
whole was reductive, failing to take into account the complicated political affinities and 
economic priorities harboured by urban areas.87 He instead stressed that the Crown and 
its towns shared a number of common goals, which they worked together in partnership 
to achieve and their relationship was hence based upon ‘an underlying belief that 
government should be broadly collaborative and consensual’.88  
 
The relationship London had with the Crown, though, defied such characterisation and 
cannot be seen as merely a partnership or patronage arrangement, though it was, at 
times, both of these. No other English town had the multiplicity of relationships with 
the departments of royal household and government that London and its citizens had. 
Crown and City shared a truly inter-dependent relationship, entwined as they were 
economically, socially and politically, and therefore they had an accord entirely unique 
within the realm if not within the entirety of Europe.  
 
1.3. Henry VII 
This thesis will necessarily engage with key debates concerning the reign of Henry VII. 
It is indicative of the scholarly neglect of this reign by academics that the standard 
biography of Henry VII was written in 1972.89 Stanley Chrimes wrote in detail about 
the administrative process, particularly with reference to fiscal and legal developments, 
but almost entirely omitted the politics of the era. Sean Cunningham, publishing his 
biography in 2007, provided a much needed, largely chronological, portrait of the reign, 
but his references are frustratingly abridged as is common in books written for the 
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popular, rather than the academic, market.90 Between the publication of these two 
works only a pamphlet-sized biography produced by Alexander Grant in 1985 can be 
said to approach academic standard.91 Of value is Steven Gunn’s biography of Henry 
VII in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: written to give a summary of the 
reign rather than provoke historical argument, it reflects Gunn’s considerable 
scholarship in this area, particularly with regard to the personnel of Henry’s court.92 In 
2012 a new biography aimed at the popular history market was published, Thomas 
Penn’s The Winter King, which focused on Henry’s last years.93 One other monograph 
of note is Paul Cavill’s recent work on English Parliaments.94 Only seven parliaments 
took place during Henry VII’s reign, leading many historians to conclude that Henry 
sought to undermine the authority of this institution, a theory that Cavill refutes, stating 
that Henry just simply had not the need to call parliament. The prominent personnel of 
Henry’s court have received notable academic attention, especially from Margaret 
Condon and Steven Gunn.95 
 
Henry’s reign has provoked two famous, long-standing historiographical debates, both 
of which connect with the aims of this thesis. The first, whether or not the advent of 
the reign of Henry Tudor can be said to have heralded a ‘New Monarchy’, has been the 
subject of argument since the end of the nineteenth century with the publication of J.R. 
Green’s Short History of the English People in 1874.96 Green defined this new 
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monarchy as a more authoritarian style of rule that saw the country emerge from 
medievalism to become a modern nation-state, a process that started with the advent of 
Edward IV’s second reign in 1471. Wilhelm Busch corrected the start of the ‘new 
monarchy’ to the start of Henry Tudor’s reign and his view was reinforced by Frederick 
Dietz’s claim that the evidence for a ‘new monarchy’ was to be found in administrative 
changes wrought by Henry, which saw a complete break-away from the medieval 
model and the initiation of an innovative, more modern financial solution to the 
problems of an unwieldy Exchequer by displacing it with the Chamber.97 This view 
predominated until it was summarily dismissed in 1938 by K.B. McFarlane’s 
pronouncement that the only ‘New Monarchy’ experienced in England occurred in 
1066.98 Geoffrey Elton agreed with McFarlane on this point, asserting that Henry 
adopted a plan already initiated by the Yorkists whereby the king’s Chamber became 
the centre of royal finances once he discovered that the ‘creaking machinery’ of the 
Exchequer was unfit for purpose. England did not emerge from the medieval age, he 
expanded, until the onset of the Reformation and implementation of administrative 
reforms by Thomas Cromwell.99  
 
More recently the debate has centred upon whether the bureaucracy surrounding the 
Crown was indicative of a new style of government and whether reforms of the 
functional departments of the Crown, namely those responsible for financial and 
practical administration as well as those of the royal household, and consequent 
transition from medievalism to the early modern era, were initiated by the Yorkist 
kings, Henry VII or his son. Notions of ‘New Monarchy’ thus were discredited. 
Thereafter Henry was depicted as a typical medieval monarch and the focus of 
scholarly debate centred upon his competence, usually with reference to his 
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management of the localities.100 Anthony Goodman resurrected the idea of a ‘New 
Monarchy’ in the late 1980s, casting the distinction not in terms of administrative 
reform or innovation but vision, claiming that Henry Tudor’s government brought a 
‘new sense of mission’ and a renewed determination to solve long-standing 
problems.101 John Watts took this a stage further and claimed a new ideology marked 
this as a new era, epitomised by the writings of John Fortescue.102 David Grummitt has 
recently revisited the topic of administrative reform by arguing that Henry’s 
renovations of extant governmental machinery were innovative and support the notion 
of a New Monarchy. Though the roots of his financial restructure can be found in 
Edward IV’s reign, Henry evolved the Yorkist model into a more effective machine, 
vital in assisting him to become England’s first solvent king.103 Further progression 
into modernism came with Henry’s redefinition and extension of the role and function 
of the royal household, an innovation noted and promoted by David Starkey in the 
1980s.104 This contributed to the creation of a new ‘political morality’ in that loyalty 
was owed to the king rather than abstract concepts of the Crown and Commonweal 
which overrode the traditional ties of service and so paved the way for the factional 
politics manifest at the court of Henry VIII.105  
 
The second debate, the extent to which Henry can be accused of subjecting his realm 
to tyranny and persecution for predominantly financial ends, has not generated as much 
controversy, for it had been widely accepted that the latter years of Henry’s reign were 
blighted by his avarice, since Vergil wrote about it in his account of the reign published 
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soon after the king’s death.106 Geoffrey Elton, writing in the mid-twentieth century, 
was the first to question this established view and put forward the theory that not only 
had Henry’s alleged persecution of his subjects been overstated, but that though 
oppressive it had been legal.107 His view was vehemently attacked by J.P. Cooper who 
claimed that Henry’s tendency to tyranny had, if anything, been understated and 
perversions of justice had prevailed in the last years of the reign.108 So aggressive was 
Cooper’s attack that a defensive Elton felt obliged to issue a justification for his view, 
though not a retraction, a few years later.109 The publication, in 1972, by C.J. Harrison 
of Edmund Dudley’s petition, a document that purported to demonstrate Dudley’s 
remorse for the plethora of unjust persecutions he implemented on behalf of his royal 
master, led to a reestablishment of a consensus among historians regarding the 
widespread oppression of Henry VII’s last years.110 Henry’s harsh treatment of his 
subjects has not been questioned since; in fact the opposite has happened in that the 
picture of the Machiavellian prince has been perpetuated. Christine Carpenter, Dominic 
Luckett, Mark Horowitz, Penny Tucker, James Ross and Sean Cunningham, have all 
provided case studies supporting the argument for Henry’s tendency towards wide-
scale oppression and fiscal tyranny in his later years.111  
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Crucially, Henry’s treatment of his capital has often been examined in isolation from 
the behaviour of the citizens of the City, thus depriving the student of this period of a 
holistic view of cause and effect. Instances of persecution have been cherry-picked to 
illustrate Henry’s heavy-handedness with the City without a full consideration of 
motives beyond the obvious financial one. Elton, Cooper, Helen Miller, Mark Horowitz 
and Thomas Penn employed case studies from the City to demonstrate that Henry VII 
was the perpetrator of a kind of fiscal tyranny.112 All attributed Henry’s persecution of 
prominent London citizens to avarice; only Anne Sutton has questioned whether Henry 
may have had deeper motives for his actions towards London’s civic authorities in his 
later years, theorising that the actions of the mercantile community in the late 1480s 
created in Henry a desire for both vengeance and control.113  
 
Other aspects of the City-Crown relationship during the reign have received scant 
scholarly attention. Though in the last ten years a number of studies have examined 
Henry’s treatment of the localities there has been no comprehensive comparable study 
of Henry’s rule in London.114 DeLloyd Guth tackled the important question of how 
Henry, a usurper with a tenuous blood-claim to the throne, was initially received by his 
capital and in doing so drew the surprising conclusion that ‘the City could now begin 
to relax for the first time since Edward IV’s death’.115 Sean Cunningham disagreed, 
and drew attention to the possibility that the sweating sickness, brought by the victor’s 
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army to the City which killed hundreds of Londoners within a month of Henry’s victory 
at Bosworth, was considered ‘to be God’s second thoughts about a Tudor victory.’116 
Paul Cavill’s thesis on Henry VII’s parliaments considered London’s relationship with 
this institution, and Matthew Davies’ essay on the lobbying activities of the London 
Livery Companies highlighted the growing political sophistication of these interest 
groups towards the end of the fifteenth century.117 The triangular relationship between 
the City, the livery companies and the Crown has been a theme in much of Davies’ 
published work and consideration of this topic forms an important strand of this 
thesis.118  
 
This thesis aims to address the historiographical void outlined through the 
consideration of the reception of the new king by his capital, the expectations City and 
Crown had of their relationship at the outset and an examination of London’s role in 
the establishment of his rule. The evolution of the relationship will be charted with 
particular reference to the themes of expectation, change and continuity.  
 
1.4. Sources 
Steven Gunn’s argument that the reign of Henry VII is a victim of ‘liminality’ is most 
apparent in the transitional nature of the sources for the period.119 Predominantly the 
sources are ‘medieval’, but the gradual emergence of document series relied upon by 
scholars of the early modern period gives the impression that Henry’s reign heralded, 
if not a new beginning, then perhaps a milestone in the development of governmental 
bureaucracy.  
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Of the traditional or ‘medieval’ sources for the history of government, Issue Rolls, 
essential to the historian of the early and high Middle Ages, cease to exist entirely by 
this reign. Exchequer accounts, where they survive, are less complete than for the rest 
of the fifteenth century because of the emergence of the Chamber as the royal financial 
instrument of choice. The series of Patent, Fine and Close rolls continue uninterrupted 
throughout this reign but the Pipe Rolls, the staple of the student of the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries, fail to contribute as full a picture for this period. The Tellers’ Rolls 
for Henry’s reign are numerous, though not quite complete. The extant records of 
Henry VII’s council are also, unfortunately, far from complete and are scattered in a 
variety of places and archives, though a selection of cases were usefully collected into 
a single volume, albeit an unfortunately slim one, in the middle of the last century.120  
 
The literary sources suffer the most for this reign, as many of the late medieval 
chronicles peter out before the end of the fifteenth century. Consequently very few full 
ones exist for this period, potentially presenting a hazard to the student of this period 
by necessitating a reliance, possibly an over-reliance, upon Fabyan’s Chronicle and, in 
particular, The Great Chronicle of London, the latter being the most detailed of the 
reign.121 Matthew Payne has recently proved that the Great Chronicle, whose 
authorship has been much debated, was composed, for the period covering the years 
1439 to 1512, by the Draper Robert Fabyan, who served as an alderman for much of 
the reign.122 The section covering the reign of Henry VII appears to have been written 
at two different points in time. The first, ending in 1496, was quite possibly written in 
1503/4, and the second, ending in 1512, was probably written not long after the events 
it describes.123 The second section appears far more critical of the government than the 
first, and this may possibly be attributed to Fabyan’s close association during this 
period with many of those who suffered from the attentions of Edmund Dudley and his 
henchmen in London, in particular William Capell.124 The chronicle in BL Cotton MS 
                                                 
120 Select Cases in the Council of Henry VII, ed. G.L. Bayne and W.H. Dunham, Seldon Society, lxxv 
(London, 1958). 
121 GC; Robert Fabyan, The New Chronicles of England and France, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 1811). 
122 Matthew Payne, ‘Robert Fabyan’s Civic Identity’, in Hannes Kleineke and Christian Steer ed., The 
Yorkist Age, HMS, xxiii (Stamford, 2013), 275-86 
123 GC, lxvii-lxviii. 
124 GC, 258, 336. 
  36 
Vitellius A XVI, transcribed and published by Charles Kingsford, contains much of the 
same information as the Great Chronicle, with occasional useful variations.125 
Otherwise the other chronicles of the time are brief and contain much of the same 
material. The non-London chronicles are useful, if partisan. Polydore Vergil’s account 
of Henry’s reign, commissioned by the king himself, contains the occasional error but 
is comprehensive in its coverage of the realm, containing snippets of original 
information acquired from the participants in the events related.126 The later 
compositions of Hall, Grafton and Stow drew heavily upon the works of Fabyan and 
Vergil, rendering them of use only when their original source is lacking or a historical 
perspective is required.127 The volumes of the correspondence of gentry families, such 
as the Pastons, Plumptons, Stonors and Celys, are diminishing by the opening of this 
reign.128 
 
To compensate for the gradual demise of source material usually available to students 
of the fifteenth century is the emergence of new sources. The Chamber books are a 
valuable source for the reign, easy to use and satisfying in their detail, though they do 
not cover the entire period. These contain the expenditure and receipts of the king’s 
Chamber which became more active as an instrument of financial administration as the 
reign progressed. Five complete payment books, covering between them October 1495-
April 1509, and three receipt books survive, together with one payment book for the 
Chamber accounts of Queen Elizabeth of York.129 The receipt books are rather patchy 
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in their coverage, encompassing between them the periods of July 1486 to September 
1487, October 1489 to October 1495 and October 1502 to October 1505, though given 
the slenderness of the volumes it is unlikely that these were comprehensive.130 
Elizabeth’s Chamber book covers only the last year of her life, March 1502 to March 
1503.131 Information from earlier Chamber books exists only as a list of payments 
extracted by the nineteenth-century antiquary, Craven Ord, from both the five surviving 
books and others dating from 1491 not now known to exist.132 The yields from these 
sources encompass not just the financial minutiae related to the king’s personal 
expenses, but also memoranda that the king wanted to keep close at hand. 
Recognisances, debts, obligations and general memoranda usually consume 50 pages 
or so in the back of each payment book.  
 
Ambassadorial papers and letters also begin to emerge, and though not as informative 
or as numerous as later in the sixteenth century they do shed light on life at Henry’s 
court. Those of the Italian ambassadors in particular grow in number through the course 
of the reign, as perhaps one would expect given the king’s known enjoyment of their 
company.133 The Spanish papers give insight into the protracted negotiations that 
surrounded the marriages of Arthur and Katherine, the young princess of Aragon, and 
her treatment after the demise of her husband.134 
 
Numerous legal records survive. Whilst these records are essential for piecing together 
grievances and unrest they can be problematic for precisely that reason. The nature of 
the evidence means that records are generated only when instances of grievance or 
unrest arose, giving the impression that such occurrences were widespread. The records 
of the King’s Bench are of particular interest, not only as it heard cases pertaining to 
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matters of special concern to the king, but also as this was the criminal court of first 
instance in Middlesex and had appellate jurisdiction over the lesser courts. Many bonds 
have survived, so many in comparison to other reigns that it would be easy to conclude 
that Henry utilised this instrument of control on an unprecedented scale. He might 
indeed have done so, but the only in-depth analysis of these is to be found in Sean 
Cunningham’s thesis, which concentrates heavily on their application in the North-
west.135 Unsorted boxes of bonds of the period pack the store rooms of The National 
Archives, and their storage facility in Cheshire, which means that our current 
knowledge of Henry’s bond policy is based upon merely a small sample of those 
extant.136  
 
The London sources for this reign are as problematic as the Crown ones. The records 
of the Sheriffs’ and Mayor’s Courts, save for those equity cases summarised in the 
Journals of the Common Council, have been entirely lost for the reign.137 The accounts 
of the Chamber of the City have been lost for the entire medieval period, though 
something of its activities may be construed from information in the Journals and the 
Letter Books. The Letter Books of the City had ceased to be depositories for all 
information pertaining to the government of the capital near the beginning of the 
fifteenth century. By the opening of Henry VII’s reign they had been relegated to being 
merely fair copies of selected information; usually the items entered in their pages were 
done so at the behest of the person or corporation it concerned, and they therefore 
primarily consist of recognisances, provision for orphans and livery company 
ordinances. Letter Book L, which ends in 1497, is the last to have been calendared and 
printed by R.R. Sharpe.138 Letter Book M, which covers the period 1497-1515, contains 
very little material not in either the Journals or the Repertories.139 
 
The records of the proceedings of the Common Council and the Court of Aldermen 
were to transfer in the course of the fifteenth century from the Letter Books to the series 
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of Journals of the Common Council, which commenced in 1416, and the Repertories, 
which started in 1496.140 The term ‘Journals of Common Council’ is misleading, as by 
the late fifteenth century the proceedings of the Common Council comprise barely a 
fifth of the bulk of the relevant volumes. As the Common Council met, on average, 
only around a dozen times a year and each meeting usually yielded only a couple of 
paragraphs, the Journals would be slim volumes indeed if this were their sole content. 
The rest consists mainly of brief summaries of proceedings in the Mayor’s Court, 
recognisances, arrangements regarding the care of orphans, livery company petitions 
addressed to the mayor and aldermen and, until 1496, the activities of the Court of 
Aldermen. The Journals are almost exclusively written in Latin in a manner that suggest 
that items were written up in haste: the civic clerks do not have the neatest of 
handwriting and employ a shorthand, particularly for regular business, that is peculiarly 
their own. The Journals and Letter Books fail to yield as much detail about both civic 
and national politics as they do for events earlier in the fifteenth century, as Caroline 
Barron has demonstrated.141 The obvious conclusion to be drawn is that the Journals 
expanded during the course of the second half of the fifteenth century to encompass 
more of the day-to-day business of the Guildhall. The expansion of information therein 
eventually necessitated the creation of a new series of books. In 1495/6 a new series, 
the Repertories, commenced, and almost exclusively recorded the decisions of the 
Court of Aldermen, which usually met on a weekly basis, leaving the Journal as a diary 
of City business. The same shorthand found in the Journals is also employed in the 
Repertories, but the meetings of the aldermen tend to be recorded in English rather than 
Latin. 
 
Caroline Barron found that the content of the majority of the Journals for the 
Lancastrian and Yorkist periods consisted of the proceedings of the Court of Aldermen. 
Examination of Journals five and seven, which cover the middle of the century, confirm 
that the nature of the information recorded in the Journals appears to have changed by 
Journal nine, which starts in 1483.142 The reason that the City records became more 
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laconic is open to conjecture. It is possible that the civic authorities became generally 
more wary about committing to paper information that might prove incriminating. The 
fear of the aldermen that the content of their discussions might be disseminated to their 
detriment is apparent in a meeting of the Court of Aldermen, 23 January 1509, when 
all present were sworn to keep the court’s secrets and not disclose anything spoken 
therein for the commonweal of the City.143 The discretion of the Journals predates this 
meeting, though, and therefore might also in part be attributable to the preferred 
practice of the Common Clerk of the City, Nicholas Pakenham, who was appointed to 
that role in February 1490.144 
 
Many of the livery companies of the City have surviving records of some kind from 
this period, including many for the lesser companies that fail to survive for earlier 
reigns. Apart from charters and deeds of title, this mostly takes the form of account 
books, which are little more than annual summaries of expenditure and receipt and vary 
in the depth and quality of information they offer. Only the Mercers’, Tailors’ and 
Goldsmiths’ Companies have extant minutes of the meetings of their courts. That of 
the Mercers survives only as a much-edited sixteenth century transcript yet it is by far 
the most comprehensive, giving valuable detail about the company’s response to 
political situations.145 It is arguably more useful in gauging responses within the City 
to national events on most occasions than the records of the corporation of London. 
The surviving Tailors’ court minutes cover only 1486-1493 and give little detail on 
matters not immediately concerning them. They give an insight into the day-to-day 
business of a company, its relations with other companies and Guildhall and occasional 
glimpses of their lobbying activities, ceremonial duties within the City and the 
admission of honorary members.146 Lastly, the minute books of the Goldsmiths’ 
Company are, misleadingly, not true minute books but rather a series of annual reports. 
These are selective in reporting matters of interest and financial transactions. In 1492 
a new, more detailed, minute book was created which ran in tandem with the original 
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book until 1499, but even that gives little information about the discussions that may 
have taken place within the company meetings.147 The Livery Company accounts 
supplement the information to be found in the civic records and occasionally provide a 
citizen’s view of Crown-City negotiations.  
 
1.5. Approach and Structure 
Two main themes underpin this thesis. The first of these concerns the expectations 
which the City of London and its inhabitants on the one hand, and the Crown on the 
other, had of each other, for they provide the yardstick by which the success of the 
relationship can be judged and compared to other ruler-city relationships. This thesis 
will ask what these expectations were, whether they reflected the traditional 
relationship between the two and the extent to which these expectations were met or 
adjusted during the course of the reign. Not since the Conquest had an English monarch 
and his capital city been so unacquainted at the time of accession. Henry’s expectations 
of his capital may have been shaped, in part, by his experiences in exile. As a spectator 
of European politics he would have been aware of the conflict between the city-states 
of the Netherlands and Maximilian, king of the Romans.148 The City, as a corporate 
entity, may therefore have been perceived to represent a potential danger, an over-
mighty subject in urban form, an entity in need of a firm hand.  
  
The Londoners would have been similarly ignorant about their new king, perhaps 
knowing only that the support he enjoyed at Bosworth included only a few members 
of the nobility. The citizens may have surmised that Henry, as a usurper with little 
support, would have been in a vulnerable position upon his accession to the throne in 
his need for the financial resources that the capital city could provide: could the 
Londoners perhaps have anticipated an opportunity to acquire not only confirmation 
but enhancement of their privileges and liberties in exchange for financial assistance? 
Might they also have been somewhat wary of a king unfamiliar with their needs, 
especially their commercial concerns? Henry had obtained the throne with French 
sponsorship: did this represent a threat to profitable trade with the Low Countries, or 
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the promise of an end to the interruptions of foreign trade that seemed ominously 
present in the last years of the Yorkist kings? 
 
The expectations the Londoners ordinarily had of their monarch were not very different 
to those held by the rest of the polity. Though individual works of the ‘mirror of 
princes’ genre of literature differed on the finer detail a consensus largely existed over 
the desirable qualities of a king. ‘Mirrors’ served as exemplars for rulers, purporting to 
reflect the ideal mode of behaviour for a king towards his subjects and other nations. 
John Fortescue, a chief justice of the King’s Bench writing in the 1470s, retained the 
traditional requirements of a king laid out in mirror literature, albeit with some 
adjustment to accommodate lessons learned in the recent civil strife.149 The king was 
required to be able to defend his realm against external and internal military threats, 
dispense justice, pay wages and rewards, cover the costs of his own household from 
his own coffers and deck himself, his court and his buildings magnificently so as to 
enhance his prestige.150 Fortescue added that the creation of over-mighty subjects was 
to be avoided, obviously with the earl of Warwick in mind. Fortescue also considered 
it the duty of a king to make his realm, and his subjects, rich: ‘it is dishonour when he 
hath but a poor realm of which men will say that he reigns but upon beggars,’ he wrote, 
adding, ‘Nothing may make his people rise but lack of goods or lack of justice’.151 John 
Watts has argued that Fortescue’s work reflected a permanent shift of thinking 
regarding the powers and responsibility of the king. As Fortescue’s work was not 
merely an updated Mirror made relevant to the circumstances of the time and was of 
the same practical mind-set that was later to be adopted by Edmund Dudley in his Tree 
of Commonwealth, Watts states that it can be construed that Fortescue was conveying 
commonly held views rather than composing a conceptual work.152 
 
                                                 
149 John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Anglie, ed. S.B. Chrimes (Cambridge, 1949), ch. 13; Twenty-
six Political and Other Poems, ed. J. Kail (London, 1904), 55; Henry V: The Practice of Kingship, ed. 
Gerald Harriss (Gloucester, 1985), 10-11. 
150 John Fortescue, The Governance of England, ed. C. Plummer (Oxford, 1885), 116-9, 122. 
151 Fortescue, Governance, 138-9. 
152 Watts, ‘A New Ffundacion of is Crowne’, 31-54; Edmund Dudley, The Tree of Commonwealth, ed. 
D.M. Brodie (Cambridge, 1949). 
  43 
Fortescue, as a medieval commentator, enunciated the needs of the kingdom in his 
treatise and his instructions for the rule of the kingdom reflected a widely accepted 
ideal. The merchants of London would have expected a ruler to wish to help increase 
their prosperity, for a prosperous nation enhanced the glory of the monarch as well as 
the more practical consideration that increased trade led to increased customs revenue 
for the Crown. The London mercantile community would therefore have hoped that the 
new king would maintain diplomatic relations with the rulers of the countries it traded 
with and police the seas around English shores to ensure the safety of its merchandise. 
The citizens also, like the rest of the kingdom, desired a strong monarch, able to enforce 
the law and subdue faction, reducing the likelihood of a return to civil war and its 
consequent disruption of commercial enterprise. Most of all, they wanted the 
preservation of their privileges and liberties which they held so dear. All the large towns 
sought regular confirmation of their charters of liberties, but few had their prosperity 
and livelihoods depend upon them to quite the same extent. This was an area of 
potential conflict between the City and the Crown, as much depended on what the 
monarch thought these liberties should encompass and whether he felt them to encroach 
upon his prerogative.  
 
The second theme relates to the ‘New Monarchy’ arguments outlined earlier. For Henry 
VII’s accession to herald the advent of a ‘new monarchy’ the reign would have had to 
have witnessed the implementation of new thinking in matters of administration, policy 
and/or governmental practice. Is there evidence of a new approach in the Crown’s 
management of the relationship with the City? Was there a lasting change in the 
relationship as a consequence of deliberate action on the part of either the Crown or the 
City during the reign? Or is there more evidence of continuity, an acceptance, perhaps, 
that the relationship was once of interdependence that required the cooperation of both 
parties?  
 
At the outset of the reign the relationship was one that defied characterisation. It was 
not a partnership, as Christian Liddy saw town-Crown relations in the fourteenth 
century, though the City and the Crown were able to cooperate in partnership on 
occasion towards common goals.153 The relationship was also not merely a patronage 
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arrangement, as Lorraine Attreed saw Crown relations with urban centres in the late 
medieval period.154 Rather, the relationship was entirely unique within England, if not 
within Europe. It contained functional elements between autonomous departments of 
the royal administration and sections of London society, particularly regarding the 
provision of goods to the royal household. Though this did not directly influence the 
political relationship between the two entities the knowledge that City and Crown were 
intimately entwined encouraged a spirit of cooperation. 
 
Political upheaval altered the equilibrium of the Crown-City relationship. The dynastic 
struggles of the previous fifty years had arguably altered the priorities harboured by the 
king by placing the security of his own regime above the commonweal. The king’s 
alteration of priorities, together with the experience within living memory of Crown 
instability, led to an adjustment of those of the City. A desire to escape possible 
retribution for overtly supporting the wrong faction in political struggles became of 
paramount importance, though this did not exclude the possibility of occasional covert 
action. The London that Henry Tudor came to rule, then, was a place accustomed to 
working in partnership with its king towards common goals but also familiar with the 
selfish nature of kingship that subordinated the commonweal to personal ambition and 
self-preservation. The relationship was pliable, a consequence perhaps of its necessity, 
able to adapt to the individual personalities of the monarch and prevalent political, 
commercial and diplomatic currents. ‘The relationship was reciprocal but not static’, 
observed Vanessa Harding, ‘even the financial relationship was characterised by 
negotiability and accommodation.’155 How did the relationship adapt to the personality 
of Henry VII and the character of his government? Did the Crown attempt to steer the 
relationship or approach it in an innovative manner?  
 
Henry and his ministers were keen to reinforce, and in some cases resurrect, the 
hereditary rights the king acquired along with the throne.156 Royal prerogative rights 
that had lapsed over the course of the fifteenth century were reinstated, though as these 
drew on the resources of the king’s subjects they were unpopular and thought unjust as 
                                                 
154 Attreed, King’s Towns, ch.4. 
155 Harding, ‘King and the City’, 314. 
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their fathers had not been subject to them. Agencies were created and specialised legal 
personnel employed to investigate the king’s rights. Such appointments became 
formalised in the course of the reign: Richard Empson headed the Council Learned, the 
post of Master of the Wards was created for Sir John Hussey in 1501, whilst towards 
the end of the reign, Edward Belknap and Robert Southwell became Surveyor of the 
King’s Prerogative and Surveyor of Crown Lands respectively.157 Did Henry’s 
reassertion of his prerogative rights affect his relationship with his capital? Did this 
assertion of royal rights fundamentally alter the Crown-City relationship at all? 
 
Lastly, it is necessary to address the issue of how Henry’s alleged avarice, displayed in 
the last years of his reign, affected the City. A king was expected to act for the 
commonweal, for, Fortescue wrote, ‘when a king rules his realm only to his own profit 
and not to the good of his subjects he is a tyrant’.158 ‘Tyrant’ seems a rather strong word 
when applied to the rulers of England, as it implies a rule of cruelty, illegality and 
despotism such as one associates with the likes of Caligula, Nero or, more recently, 
Stalin and Hitler. English kings were, since Magna Carta, subject to the law; they 
upheld the law rather than stood above it. To the English medieval observer, then, a 
tyrant might well be as Fortescue described: a monarch who acted illegally ‘to his own 
profit’ at the expense of the commonweal. Given that Henry VII was accused by his 
contemporaries of avarice was he also, therefore, considered a tyrant? It would be easy 
to gain the impression from secondary writing that the fiscal exactions of the last years 
were particularly heavy in London. Was this the case? Did London suffer as much as 
the rest of the realm? Was there a noticeable change in government in the last years of 
the reign as far as the capital was concerned? Were there consistencies with the rest of 
the realm in relations with the capital during the last years? Change and continuity in 
the Crown’s relationship with the capital is therefore the second theme of this thesis. 
 
This thesis will, through necessity, be selective in its approach and concentrate on the 
political interaction between the Crown and the City, defined in this context as the 
interaction between politically active entities and individuals within the Crown and the 
City. The political relationship was driven by a variety of factors, mainly connected to 
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the needs of the City and the Crown already outlined. These needs were not, in the 
main, conflicting or mutually exclusive, but often required balancing and negotiation. 
The forms this negotiation took comprise a key part of this study. This thesis is not 
intended to be an extension of the comprehensive survey of medieval London, 
completed by Caroline Barron in 2004, which has become a standard textbook on the 
subject, and nor will it seek to explore the lives of the citizens of the capital as Sylvia 
Thrupp did so expertly in 1948.159 Hence issues concerning trade, health and 
maintenance, care of the poor and orphans, religious provision and law will only be 
addressed when they are pertinent to the City-Crown relationship. In matters pertaining 
to the City, the focus will be upon those within London who had a political voice: the 
freemen, or citizens, of the City. As the freedom of the City was usually obtained 
through the completion of an apprenticeship and subsequent admission to one of the 
livery companies only around 3,000-4,000 men were freemen from a population of 
perhaps as many as 50,000 in 1500.160  
 
The word ‘City’ will be capitalised when used to signify the municipality of the City 
of London but not when used in any other context. Similarly, the term ‘Crown’ will be 
capitalised when used to denote the king, his council, household and his courtiers 
engaged in administrative duties concerning the government of the realm. The 
medieval court was a nebulous body, the definition of which has provoked much 
historiographical debate.161 For the purposes of this study it will be defined as the 
immediate surroundings of the ruler, consisting of those who attended him. This is not 
to be confused with the royal household, the raison d’etre of which was to look after 
the immediate needs of the person of the king. The court was where the king feasted, 
entertained and dispensed patronage. Court and council were intertwined. The council 
was the body that ordinarily dictated policy. Councillors were also courtiers by virtue 
of their proximity to the king and therefore the court was understood by contemporaries 
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to be wherever the king and his advisers were in residence, and whence the government 
of the realm emanated.  
 
This thesis falls into three parts. The first, into which this and the second chapter fall, 
will explore themes of expectation and political affiliation. This part will explore the 
expectations that the capital and the king had of each other after Bosworth. The 
relationship that the City enjoyed with the Yorkist kings will be briefly considered in 
order to provide a context and a contrast for the reign of Henry VII. Did Henry arrive 
in the capital in October 1485 with fully formed expectations of his capital, or did they 
develop as he became acquainted with the City? How did these expectations differ from 
those held by his predecessors? James Bolton’s argument that London merchants could 
not afford to be politically apathetic will be tested through its application to a 
comparison between the attitude of the Londoners to the Yorkist kings and to Henry 
Tudor during the first years of his rule with the intention of ascertaining whether any 
manifestation of political affiliation was apparent in the summer of 1485, or whether 
London’s acceptance of the new king was entirely passive in acceptance of political 
reality. The battle of Stoke in June 1487 was a testing ground for Henry VII, being a 
large pitched battle against his rebels, aided by foreign mercenaries, in which he 
triumphed with the aid of his magnates. Did his victory have any effect upon the 
attitude of the Londoners towards the king? Did confidence increase in the royal 
government after Henry’s victory? 
 
The second part of the thesis, comprising Chapters Three to Five, is a thematic 
examination of the relationship. Chapter Three focuses on the financial relationship 
between the City and the Crown. To what extent did the relationship change as the 
king’s financial needs changed? The chapter will also assess the overall financial 
contribution the City made to royal coffers, through trade customs and taxation. 
Chapter Four examines the triangular relationship between the livery companies, the 
government of London and the Crown which, unusually in the study of early Tudor 
Crown-City relations, has received a reasonable amount of attention from historians. 
Arguably this is partly because an interest in the origin and development of the livery 
companies has always been sponsored and promoted by the companies themselves, and 
research into this area is aided by the amount of extant company accounts. What has 
not been studied in as much detail is Henry’s relationship with individual companies: 
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did he favour some companies over others, and if so, why? Chapter Five explores the 
channels of communication between the court and the City, both official and unofficial. 
These have been contemplated by researchers only as a by-product of other studies on 
diverse topics both connected and unconnected to Henry’s rule, but not as a theme in 
itself. What form did communication take during the reign? What instruments, 
institutions and individuals facilitated such communication in both ordinary and 
extraordinary circumstances? Did any changes in the method or form of 
communication occur during the reign? 
 
The last part of the thesis examines the last years of Henry VII’s reign. Tradition, 
originated by Henry’s contemporary official biographer, Polydore Vergil, has it that 
Henry indulged in a financially-motivated persecution of his subjects during this time. 
As already discussed, a consensus exists amongst historians that the persecution was 
widespread and the claim by the London chroniclers and Vergil that this was motivated 
by the king’s avarice is unquestioned. As the extant sources for the reign are weighted 
towards providing evidence of widespread persecution, not just geographically but 
throughout the English polity, this is hardly surprising. The known expansion of the 
bond system by Henry and his government has left a paper trail that indicates the 
imposition of widespread financial burden upon all levels of society.162 Hence it is not 
difficult to find evidence of persecution if one seeks it, or contemporary accounts 
condemning his greed. Did this persecution represent a policy of fiscal tyranny 
motivated by avarice, or was it a politically-motivated suppression of specific targeted 
opponents? Can a consistent purpose be identified in the selection of ‘victims’? 
 
The concluding chapter revisits the themes of expectation, change and continuity. It 
will address the historiographical questions regarding ‘new monarchy’ and ‘tyranny’ 
and assess the changes that took place in the Crown-City relationship over the course 
of the reign. 
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Chapter 2: The Accession of Henry VII and the 
Establishment of Power 
 
The Crown-City relationship started, at the outset of Henry VII’s reign, with both 
parties in a position of comparative ignorance about the other. Mutual expectations 
already existed, built over hundreds of years of institutional intimacy; the variable in 
1485 was the person of Henry Tudor, whose style as ruler would have been entirely 
unknown and unknowable. This chapter explores the expectations Henry and London 
had of each other and assesses the relationship London shared with the Yorkist kings 
so an evaluation of change under Henry VII might be undertaken. Had the dynastic 
struggles of the last fifty years affected the institutional power of the Crown, or was it 
sufficiently strong that the monarch warranted obedience regardless of his background 
or the circumstances of his accession? This chapter will assess the extent to which 
London’s mercantile community was divided politically and ask whether the king’s 
victory at the Battle of Stoke effected a change in the attitude of the Londoners towards 
Henry’s rule. 
 
2.1 London and the Yorkist Kings 
The support of the Londoners had been influential in the dynastic wars of the fifteenth 
century. The size and wealth of the City conferred a political power upon it that had to 
be handled carefully by the Crown. The governors of the City were generally cautious 
in times of political strife, for the consequences of supporting the wrong side were 
considerable. By the time Henry Tudor seized the throne the City’s policy of visible 
caution had been well-established, ensuring that the City was, in appearance at least, 
as non-partisan as possible. Knowledge of the development and implementation of this 
policy enables a better understanding of the City’s reception of news of Henry’s 
accession.  
 
2.1.1. Accession and Readeption. 
The decision of the City of London to admit the earls of Warwick, Salisbury and March 
and their armies in July 1460 was one ‘born of realism and self-interest, not of 
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principle,’ according to Caroline Barron.1 In other words, it was not a demonstration 
of preference or affiliation, but rather a practical response to an army at the gates. The 
natural inclination of the ruling elite of the City in times of political stress was to 
respond with ‘conservatism and caution’, but they could be overpowered by the ‘mob’ 
in times of unrest.2 This ‘mob’ comprised the 10,000 or so unenfranchised, lower 
echelons of society: the apprentices, servants, vagrants and day workers.3 The 
Londoners were not, therefore, a homogenous mass, but comprised different strata of 
society, with horizontal divisions across London’s population, ‘separating the wealthy 
from the poor, merchants from artisans, citizens from the unenfranchised.’4 Hence the 
ruling elite, who had demonstrated their loyalty to the Lancastrian regime throughout 
the 1450s with a series of loans, only changed allegiance when circumstance and the 
demands of the ‘mob’ put the collective back of the Court of Aldermen against the 
proverbial wall. London’s civic government was then obliged to continue to support 
the Yorkist cause not only for fear of reprisals by a potentially victorious and vindictive 
Lancastrian government, but also by the wholehearted Yorkist affiliation of the 
‘commons’.5  
 
Professor Barron’s argument presumes unity within the two identified strata of society, 
a premise which Professor James Bolton sees as simplistic and unrealistic. The City 
authorities, comprising as they did the great merchants and businessmen of the capital, 
were not ‘political eunuchs with neither will nor opinion of their own’, willing only to 
follow the politics of expediency: they could not afford to be, as the politics of trade 
were essential to their continued prosperity.6 These arguments are not entirely mutually 
exclusive. Though Bolton’s refutation of Barron’s argument that the City did not 
become Yorkist until 2 July 1460 is compelling, there is no denying that divisions 
between poor and rich co-existed with those apparent within the mercantile community.  
 
                                                 
1 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’. 
2 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 90. 
3 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 89. 
4 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 89. 
5 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 90. 
6 Bolton, ‘City and the Crown’, 12. 
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However, Barron’s conclusion that ‘in 1461 the aldermen were Lancastrian and the 
mob was Yorkist [and] in 1471 the aldermen were Yorkist and the mob largely 
Lancastrian’ is open to question.7 The basis for her argument is the reluctance of the 
aldermen to fully embrace the Yorkist cause in 1461, as demonstrated by their 
preparations to send supplies to the queen’s army in February 1461, a design 
overthrown by the actions of the ‘commons’. Barron’s assertion that the ‘commons’ 
referred to by the Great Chronicle were the unenfranchised masses is by no means 
certain.8 The Great Chronicle states that the mayor and the commons favoured York 
over the Queen’s party, but does not specify who the commons were. Gregory’s 
Chronicle claims that carts of supplies intended for the queen’s army were taken by 
‘men of London and comyns’. Could not the ‘men of London’ be merchants, or 
prominent citizens rather than the unenfranchised?9 The chronicles do not speak with 
the derision usually reserved for the lower sectors of society when referring to the 
commons, and one might conclude that this was merely a collective noun employed 
when writing about men of the City not individually influential.  
 
Similarly the aldermen cannot be said to have been uniformly Yorkist in 1471. A 
faction that was Lancastrian in its loyalties asserted itself under the auspices of the 
disgraced alderman Thomas Cook and dictated the actions of the civic government 
during the readeption crisis of 1470-71.10 Cook and his supporters wielded power 
within the City ‘to the hurt and Indempnyte of such as he knewe bare any favour unto 
kyng Edward.’11 Once news of Edward’s imminent return was circulated within the 
City Cook and his followers were quickly ousted. It is inaccurate to state that all 
                                                 
7 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 91. 
8 A variety of spelling appears, such as ‘comons’. ‘comyns’ etc. For similar statements see 'A Short 
English Chronicle: London under Henry VI (1422-71)', Three Fifteenth-Century Chronicles, ed. James 
Gardiner (London,1880), 58-78. 
9 The Historical Collections of a Citizen of London in the Fifteenth Century, ed. James Gairdner 
(London, 1876), 210-239. 
10 For the prosecution of treason against Cook and other prominent Londoners see M.A. Hicks, ‘The 
Case of Thomas Cook, 1468’, in his Richard III and his Rivals: Magnates and Motives in the Wars of 
the Roses (London, 1991), 419-27; Ross, Edward IV, 99-101; Anne Sutton, ‘Sir Thomas Cook and his 
‘Troubles’: An Investigation’, Guildhall Studies in London History, iii (1978). For a purported eye-
witness account of events see GC, 213-4. 
11 GC, 214. 
  52 
aldermen were Yorkist in 1471, and the episode illustrates how the civic government 
could be manipulated by a small power-group when faced with difficult political 
circumstance. 
 
2.1.2. Edward IV 
The trading activities of Edward IV led to an unprecedented alignment of Crown 
financial and mercantile commercial interests.12 Edward’s interest in trade, which 
encompassed the trade in goods such as wool and tin, was one shared with other 
members of the nobility; his mother, the duchess of York, was granted a licence to 
export 775½ sacks of wool annually for two years and thereafter 258½ sacks a year 
free of duty to the Mediterranean.13 John, Lord Howard and Richard, duke of 
Gloucester, owned at least two ships each which were used to carry freight to the 
markets in the Low Countries.14 Edward promoted English ship building and 
demonstrated an interest in developing new markets for English commerce, 
encouraging merchants to trade with the Barbary Coast of North Africa, where the 
Portuguese enjoyed a monopoly.15 It was he, not Henry VII as has been claimed, who 
introduced the practice of ‘wafting’, whereby royal ships were used to provide 
protection for English commercial vessels, and his government made a concerted effort 
to curb piracy in the English Channel.16 Edward’s efforts in this regard were further 
supported by the Mercers’ Company, which gave a gift of 100 marks to the king for 
the safekeeping of the seas in 1472.17 Hence a partnership with the mercantile 
community was formed whereby the Crown and the City worked towards the extension 
of commercial enterprise. 
 
Not that the mercantile community always believed that Edward acted in their interests. 
The chronicler John Warkworth commented that ‘many men said that King Edward 
                                                 
12 M.E. Mallet, ‘Anglo-Florentine Commercial Relations, 1465-91’, Economic History Review, xv, 
(1962), 257- 260. 
13 Mallet, ‘Commercial Relations’, 260. 
14 Acts, 63-64. Rosemary Horrox, ‘Richard III and London’, The Ricardian, lxxxv (1984), 323. 
15 Ross, Edward IV, 353. 
16 Ross, Edward IV, 353, 366-7. 
17 Sutton, Mercery, 268. 
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had much blame for hurting merchandise.’18 In response to anti-alien feeling in the 
City, Edward attempted to pressure the Hansards to allow London merchants reciprocal 
trading privileges in their territories. Edward might have succeeded but for the decision 
taken in 1468 to arrest and ransom all Hanseactic merchants in England in response to 
the seizure of four English vessels by the Danish.19 The Hanse retaliated and trade with 
the league ground to a halt and only resumed after the readeption, though reciprocal 
trading terms were never satisfactorily established.20 
 
Relations between the City and the Crown during Edward’s reign were not always 
harmonious. At a meeting of the General Court of the Mercers’ Company in June 1478, 
the assembled men were informed that the king ‘was gretely displeased with the Maire 
and the Citie for a fraye late made betwene certen of his household seruauntes and 
diuers parsons of this Citie.’21 The intervention of the Queen and the Lord Chamberlain, 
William, Lord Hastings, helped restore cordial relations between London and Edward, 
and ‘caused nowe the Kyng to be oure good and gracious lorde’.22 At a meeting of the 
Common Council soon afterwards the mayor dictated that no citizen was to provoke 
any member of the king’s household or the household of any other lord in order to keep 
the king’s peace.23 That the mayor had to make such a warning is suggestive of 
continuing tensions between the men of the royal household and the City. 
 
Edward himself had no hesitation in raising any grievances he had with the London 
citizens. In September 1479 he voiced his suspicion to the mayor and aldermen that the 
merchants of the City sought to defraud him of customs paid in the Port of London. 
The mayor summoned the wardens of the livery companies with members within the 
Fellowship of the Adventurers and it was agreed that every man should ‘bryng yn his 
bill or treu content uppon his othe’.24 A format for these bills was agreed at a meeting 
                                                 
18 A Chronicle of the First Thirteen Years of the Reign of King Edward the Fourth by John Warkworth, 
Warkworth, Chronicle, ed. J.O. Halliwell, Camden Society, x (1839), 12. 
19 Ross, Edward IV, 365. 
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22 Acts, 106-7. 
23 Acts, 106. 
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of the Court of the Adventurers and further advice sought from the barons of the 
Exchequer.25 The creation of a pro-forma for the declaration of customs is suggestive 
of an awareness of accounting difficulties, as were the subsequent fines imposed by the 
Adventurers and the Mercers upon their members for false accounting.26 The king 
demanded recompense of £2,000, though this was reduced to 2,000 marks after the 
intervention of the Queen on the Adventurers’ behalf.27 The king had further cause to 
complain again when, in 1483, attacks on Dutchmen in the City disturbed the king’s 
peace. The mayor charged all the wardens of the fellowships to disseminate this 
information to their companies ‘for that no parson shuld be excused of ignorance’.28 
 
These events illustrate the nature of the relationship between the City and the Crown. 
Whereas both entities, for the most part, cooperated towards the achievement of 
mutually desirable goals such as the safety of the seas, promotion of commerce and 
stability of the City and the wider realm, the king’s political and diplomatic needs and 
desires usually prevailed. The king had the right to demand co-operation and admonish 
merchants when he saw fit; the merchants could only petition the king and his court for 
redress when they felt the need, without confidence that their concerns would result in 
a favourable outcome. It is therefore evidence that the City and the Crown relationship 
was very far from being one of equals. Edward’s determination to enforce customs and 
protect his income was not dissimilar to that displayed by Henry VII twenty years later. 
 
As Edward remained reliant upon financial aid from the Londoners for the majority of 
the reign, and utilised members of their community in his trading activities, it remained 
in his best interest to maintain good relations with them. Charles Ross claimed that 
Edward was well aware of this and so ‘courted, honoured, flattered and rewarded the 
leading London merchants more assiduously than any king before him.’29 Between 
1461 and 1471 he knighted eighteen London citizens, whereas only eleven had been 
knighted before, the last of them in 1439. Five London aldermen were created Knights 
of the Bath at the coronation of Elizabeth Woodville and a further eleven, plus the 
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29 Ross, Edward IV, 353. 
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mayor and the Recorder, were knighted following the City’s successful resistance to 
the attack by the Kentish army under the Bastard of Fauconberg.30  
 
Unprecedented levels of interaction between the court of Edward IV and the citizens 
of London paved the way for further interaction in subsequent reigns. Edward famously 
entertained the mayor, then William Heryot (who also served as his factor in his Italian 
trading enterprises), the aldermen and certain leading citizens on a hunting trip in 
Waltham forest.31 Intermarriage between members of the nobility and the City became 
more common, as well as less formal liaisons between the king and certain wives of 
the mercantile community.32  
 
By the end of the reign Edward had become more autocratic in his dealings with the 
merchants and they, in turn, had become somewhat disenchanted with him. Edward’s 
fury with the French king’s alliance with Maximilian and dismissal of the terms of the 
treaty of Picquigny resulted in a royal embargo imposed upon trade with France and 
brought with it the possibility of war, an event looked upon with dread by the 
mercantile community.33 The discontent of the merchants, combined with a possible 
weariness of benevolences, was reflected in the difficulties Edward suddenly 
encountered in raising funds. 34 In February 1483 there was difficulty in collecting an 
agreed loan to the king of £2,000 by the aldermen and eighty commoners. Each 
alderman was to give 50 marks and the commoners, £15 each. Eleven commoners 
refused to pay and their names were forwarded to the king upon his demand.35 Arguably 
eleven out of 104 men in total is not a large number of defaulters. Even so, the event 
shows that individuals were prepared to demonstrate their discontent with the monarch, 
though the governors of London sought to present a united front. 
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2.1.3. Richard III 
The reign of Richard III lasted barely over two years, yet is probably one of the most 
studied in English history. Charles Ross, in his 1981 biography of the king, claimed 
that ‘something has been written about [Richard III] in every single generation since 
his death almost five hundred years ago’ and the growth of the corpus of literature on 
the subject has, since then, gained further momentum.36 Yet though the historical 
sources of the reign have been picked over time and again the relationship this monarch 
shared with his capital is usually accorded only a passing reference. This is particularly 
surprising as the two most debated events of the reign, the usurpation of Richard and 
the disappearance of his nephews, were played out in the capital and had a profound 
effect upon the citizens. Richard’s lack of popularity in the City is emphasised in the 
contemporary chronicles and is listed as a staple reason for his ultimate downfall in 
undergraduate essays on the subject, yet the reasons for this unpopularity are seldom 
subjected to scrutiny. Why would London not welcome the accession of a full-grown 
man, proven military commander with unquestionable royal blood rather than a young 
boy raised in the Welsh Marches by the parvenu Woodville family?  
 
Paul Murray Kendall, in his rather romanticised biography of Richard III, stated that 
Richard was unknown to the Londoners at the time of his accession and his preference 
for northerners made the City hostile towards him.37 Rosemary Horrox rejected this, 
and also dismissed the idea that Richard was unfamiliar with the City prior to his 
accession, revealing a number of contacts he had enjoyed within the capital as duke of 
Gloucester.38 He had spent much time in the capital as duke when his, and his brother’s, 
political needs demanded. He owned at least two ships, and therefore may have 
engaged in business with members of London’s mercantile community.39 He was 
acquainted with the man that the City selected to act as their Recorder, Thomas 
Fitzwilliam, who took office on 19 June 1483. Fitzwilliam was a Lincolnshire lawyer 
who had had contact with Richard as duke of Gloucester through his previous 
employment by the duchy of Lancaster and possibly also through his wife, who was 
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perhaps a kinswoman of one of Richard’s followers, Sir James Harrington.40 That the 
City selected a man acceptable to Richard, argues Horrox, illustrates that the civic 
administration were aware of the practical benefits of courting Richard’s favour.41 
Horrox also noted the connections Richard had with the livery companies of London, 
forged during his brother’s reign. The Tailors, ever with an eye to the future, initiated 
Richard and his brother George into their fraternity in 1462. In 1473 Richard had 
investigated, in his capacity as Constable of England, a matter of variance between two 
Goldsmiths, which the Goldsmiths’ Company eventually had remitted to themselves to 
solve.42  
 
Richard’s initial mishandling of the problem of piracy in the English Channel led 
directly to its increase and may have lost him support amongst the mercantile 
community. The government of Edward IV had some notable success in tackling the 
problems of piracy but early in Richard’s reign it became a problem.43 Pirates based 
mainly in Devon and Cornwall seized the opportunity presented by the change of 
monarch and took to the seas with devastating effect. The channel became more 
dangerous to mercantile shipping when Richard, alarmed by the support offered by the 
Breton Duke Francis to Henry Tudor, commissioned several privateer ships to attack 
ships from Brittany and France.44 English acts of piracy led to retaliation by marauders 
from Brittany, France and the Netherlands and inevitably the occasional merchant ship 
was plundered. Richard made matters worse when he issued orders to mayors, sheriffs 
and port officials in London, Southampton, Bristol and London to seize ships from the 
places of origin of pirates that attacked English shipping, including the Netherlands.45 
Richard was later to take vigorous action against privateers, but the initial escalation of 
the situation had been in part a consequence of his own actions and policy.46  
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In addition to the pirates, trade with the Low Countries was blighted by the civil wars 
that had wracked the area in the aftermath of the death of Duke Charles the Bold in 
1477. The situation became so dangerous that the Merchant Adventurers actually 
imposed its own embargo on trade with the Low Countries in August 1484 on its 
members.47 The letters of William Cely, based in Calais, to his employers in London 
convey a mounting sense of panic. In May 1484 he wrote that war was imminent not 
only with France but also with Flanders, for ‘many man fear that Flanders will not be 
our friends long’.48 The restraint upon trade ended after a couple of months when the 
Adventurers, with Richard’s support, sent embassies to the cities of Ghent and Antwerp 
to negotiate safe conduct for their merchants.49 With the prospect of war disrupting the 
business of the Merchant Adventurers and Staplers alike, it is possible to see that the 
foreign policies of Richard’s government might not have been popular. 
 
That Richard was personally unpopular within London is so widely reported in the 
contemporary, or near contemporary, evidence that it is rarely disputed. The duke of 
Buckingham’s recital of Richard’s claim to the throne before the livered citizens 
gathered at the Guildhall, according to the Great Chronicle, was given with rare 
oratorical skill but received only subdued acclamation. When the assembled citizens 
were exhorted to acclaim Richard as their king the few that did shout their approval 
acted ‘to Satysfye his myend more ffor fere than for love’.50 Thomas More recounts 
the same episode, stating that the monologue was greeted with a stunned silence.51 The 
assembly of Londoners was aware of Richard’s claim already, for Ralph Shaa, the 
brother of the mayor, had preached Richard’s right to the throne at St Paul’s Cross two 
days previously.52 The citizens might well have been bemused, given the lengths to 
which Richard had gone to assure the mayor and aldermen of his loyalty to Edward V 
beforehand, even ensuring that the text of the oath the protector and his council had 
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sworn to the young king was read to the City fathers.53 The civic government could 
have been forgiven for wondering what Richard’s oath was worth and how far he could 
be trusted. That this came after the illegal executions of Woodville, Grey and Hastings, 
which would have shocked the citizens of London, may have contributed to the 
unpopularity of Richard’s claim. William, Lord Hastings, was a well-known and 
popular figure in the City, described by the Mercers as ‘oure verrey good speciall 
lorde’.54 London was where he socialised and did business. More than one prominent 
citizen would have grieved for him. 
 
A state of confusion existed in the City in the months after Edward IV’s death which 
would not have endeared Richard, as protector or king, to the City inhabitants. Rumours 
of a ‘crewe of men arerid in the North’ set to march on London would have struck fear 
into the citizens, though Richard did attempt to reassure the Londoners by restricting 
the number of men in magnate retinues within the walls.55 George Cely’s note of June 
1483 conveys some of the confusion and panic felt within the City: ‘Ther ys grett romer 
in the Reme…Yff the Kyng, God safe his lyffe, wher dessett / The Dewke of Glosetter 
wher in any parell / Geffe my Lorde Prynsse, wher God defend, wher trobellett / Yf my 
Lorde Haward wher slyne’.56 The rumours of the deaths of the sons of Edward IV 
which were apparent in August 1483, which would be augmented the following year 
with rumours that Richard had poisoned his wife and intended to marry his niece, 
further damaged Richard’s reputation in the eyes of the citizenry.57  
 
Richard’s apparent lack of popularity ensured that by the time it was well-known in the 
City that Henry intended to claim the English throne ‘the gentlemen and men of honour 
[knew] not which party to lend to’.58 Yet Richard still managed to raise considerable 
funds from the City during his short reign. Two corporate loans were made by the City. 
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The first, in August 1484, was a loan of £2,400, to which the aldermen contributed 
£100 each. The following March the king requested remittance of repayment until the 
following Michaelmas, which the City granted.59 In June it was agreed in Common 
Council that a further £2,000 would be lent for the ‘defence of the realm against his 
rebels’, to be raised by a tax of a fifteenth on the wards.60 Neither of these loans was 
ever repaid. The Croyland Chronicler implied that many loans of this nature gathered 
around this time were not necessarily given voluntarily, but were little better than the 
benevolences levied by Richard’s late brother.61 
 
In addition to the corporate loans a series of individual loans were requested and made 
in amounts ranging from £40 to £100, with collateral given for their repayment.62 The 
pledges, according to the Great Chronicle, were delivered by a ‘pryst namyd Master 
Chatyrton’, probably Edmund Chaderton, Richard’s Treasurer of his Chamber. It is 
likely that many, if not the majority, of these loans were paid into the king’s Chamber, 
for which we lack records, rather than the Exchequer. From the extant records it is 
apparent that Edmund Shaa lent at least £233 6s 8d and probably more, and also bought 
plate from Richard for £550 13s 4d.63 Other aldermen who lent money include Thomas 
Hill (£100), Henry Colet (£50) and William Martyn (£45).64 Richard Gardyner lent 100 
marks secured on a salt of gold, a pledge redeemed on Henry VII’s behalf by John de 
Vere, earl of Oxford.65 Other pledges offered were a heavily decorated helmet formerly 
owned by Edward IV, some cups of gold and twelve silver-gilt apostle spoons.66 Giving 
pledges as collateral was not a novelty, and nor can it be read as indicative of the 
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merchants’ regard for Richard’s credit-worthiness; Edward IV had offered similar 
collateral for loans raised from syndicates of merchants in the late 1460s.67 For their 
financial help the City was rewarded with a gold cup with a cover decorated with jewels 
and pearls.68 This cup was later recorded as being in the keeping of Hugh Brice when 
he sought indemnity against its loss or theft.69 
 
The timing of these loans is debatable. Anne Sutton claims that the Great Chronicle is 
wrong to date these loans to late 1484-5 as they were made just after the rebellion of 
the Duke of Buckingham, a view shared by Paul Murray Kendall.70 However, while it 
is true that the chronicler misdates the rebellion to 1484 rather than 1483, his dating of 
the loans is probably correct for three reasons. Firstly, there are no records of these 
pledges being redeemed during Richard’s reign, as they might have been had the loans 
been made in 1483. Secondly, the chronicle states that the remittance of the £2,400 
loan made by the aldermen happened at around the same time, if not before, the loans 
made by individuals upon pledges. This remittance, we know from the City records, 
happened in March 1485.71 Thirdly, Richard arguably had a greater need for the funds 
in 1485 than he did in 1483. Sutton’s arguments appears to hinge upon the timing of 
the giving of the cup mentioned in the Great Chronicle, whereas it seems likely that 
this was merely one of at least two gold cups given by the king for the use of the 
commonalty at Guildhall.72 The other was given to the mayor, Robert Billesdon, at 
dinner on 6 January 1484.73 At the same dinner Richard had made the extraordinary 
gesture of promising to the City the borough of Southwark and a gift of £10,000 
towards walling the new acquisition.74 That it took a week for the City to note the grant 
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in their records, and that no evidence exists that the City sought to further the claim, 
perhaps indicates that they never took the grant seriously. There is no mention of such 
a grant in the royal sources and the king had not the means to honour it, for Southwark 
was subject to several jurisdictions and the Crown had not £10,000 to give, facts the 
citizens would not have been in ignorance of.75 Horrox speculated that the grant was 
so infeasible that Richard may have been drunk when he made the offer.76 Even so, 
perhaps this episode proves that the will, if not the means, existed to please the citizens.  
 
The perception that Richard was morally dubious, northern, unable or unwilling to 
engage in diplomacy helpful to the mercantile community, and unable to keep peace 
within the capital, kingdom or on the seas, may well have undermined support for 
Richard within the City. Elements within the mercantile community might have 
thought their interests better served with Henry Tudor upon the throne, who, though 
unfamiliar with the English polity and not blessed with a wealth of magnate support, 
could at least be expected to secure trade with France for the next few years. 
Expectation might also have been that a usurper would be greatly in need of the ready 
finance London could provide to bolster his position, which in turn could be expected 
to offer the City an opportunity to bargain for enhancement of trade privileges and 
liberties. Conversely, it could be argued that Richard’s desperate need for funds 
provided an equally good opportunity, but he had already made the Londoners doubt 
his trustworthiness. Richard’s attempt to purchase goodwill with empty promises 
would have done him no credit in the eyes of the Londoners. The prospect of a new 
king may have offered possibilities and opportunities; it is only with hindsight and 
knowledge of the personality of Henry Tudor that we know this was not the case. 
 
The relationship the City had with the Yorkist kings demonstrates that the king had the 
upper hand in the relationship, even when in debt, both morally and financially, to the 
City. Crown and City shared common goals and the relationship was adversely affected 
when their goals were not aligned. While Edward shared the trading interest of his 
merchants their commercial needs would be placed at the forefront of policy. When the 
king’s own interest took priority, as they did in his seizure of Hanse vessels in 1468, 
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then mercantile interest was ignored. Similarly, Richard’s policy of harassing Breton 
shipping to induce Duke Francis to give him Tudor made the seas unsafe for 
commercial shipping. The London that Henry Tudor was to inherit, therefore, was 
accustomed to working with the monarch towards common goals, but familiar with the 
selfish need of kings for security which often demoted their needs. 
 
2.1.4. Possible Early Support in the City for Tudor 
Margaret Beaufort, Tudor’s mother, was committed to the care of her husband, 
Thomas, lord Stanley, and narrowly escaped attainder in the parliament of 1484 after 
being found guilty of conspiring against the king. The parliamentary indictment against 
her accused her, amongst other things, of making: 
 
chevissancez of greate sommes of money, aswell within the citee of London as in other 
places of this roialme, to be employed to the execucion of the said treasoun and 
malicious purpose. 77 
 
The mercantile community of London, being a source of ready cash, was the obvious 
contributor to Margaret’s fundraising. The language of the indictment also suggests 
mercantile involvement. Chevissances (variously referred to as ‘chevisance’ or 
‘chevance’) were, strictly speaking, financial bargains, though the term was often used 
to refer to arrangements whereby interest was to be paid.78 The question is, then, with 
whom did she make these bargains? As the merchants were the richest men in the City 
it is not unlikely that some of their number were amongst the sponsors, though it is to 
be asked whether those merchants who gave money to this cause did so wittingly, and 
if so, why? And who were they? On what terms: as loans or as gifts?  
 
Reynold Bray was in charge of the conspiracy to bring Tudor to the throne, according 
to Vergil, and therefore it is valid to suggest that he also played a major part in raising 
the requisite funding.79 Thanks mainly to the scholarship of Margaret Condon, Bray’s 
                                                 
77 2 Ric.III, c.6. 
78 K.B. McFarlane, England in the Fifteenth Century (London, 1981), 75-77; OED, s.v. ‘chevisance’. 
79 Polydore Vergil, Three Books of Polydore Vergil’s English History, ed. Henry Ellis, Camden Soc., 1st 
ser., xxix (London, 1844), 196, 215-6; M.M. Condon, ‘Bray, Sir Reynold (c.1440–1503)’, ODNB. 
  64 
network within London after Henry’s usurpation is known, but his contacts within the 
mercantile community prior to that can only be speculated upon. It is likely that he was 
familiar with many members of the Calais Staple, for his wife, Katherine Hussey, 
whom he married sometime in the mid-1470s, was the daughter of a former victualler 
of Calais.80 He also was acquainted with the aldermen Henry Colet and Thomas Hill, 
who had regularly supplied Margaret’s household with goods.81 Colet was, or at least 
became, a close friend of Bray’s and served as one of the executors of his will of 1502.82 
Colet acted as Bray’s occasional feoffee and was involved with him in many business 
transactions.83 Henry Colet is one of the few merchants listed in the Exchequer Receipt 
Rolls as a lender to the Crown in 1484.84 This source, though, is not representative of 
either the number of merchants who lent funds to Richard or the amounts involved, for 
as previously mentioned most loans were paid directly into the king’s Chamber. As 
well as being a friend of Bray’s and acquainted with the household of Margaret 
Beaufort, Colet may have more reason than most to bear a grudge against Richard III, 
as he would have been made a Knight of the Bath at the coronation of Edward V.85 
Colet, a Mercer, had been an alderman since 1476, though he was excused from his 
office for a year, from February 1482 – February 1483, owing to his continual absence 
in Calais.86 
 
That Colet is a likely candidate as an early supporter of Tudor is further suggested by 
the fact that he was honoured, with four other prominent merchants, on 6 January 1486 
at Westminster by being knighted by Henry VII. The other four rewarded that day with 
Colet were Robert Billesdon, a Haberdasher who had served as mayor in 1484-5; John 
Broun, a Mercer, Adventurer and Stapler who had served as mayor in 1481-2; Broun’s 
cousin, John Fenkill, a Draper who served as an MP in the 1484 parliament, and finally 
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the Draper, William Capell.87 No-one else was knighted with them, no big celebrations 
or feasting to honour the City took place and the event completely escaped the notice 
of the London chroniclers.88 All five of those knighted in 1486 were senior within their 
crafts, having served or soon to serve as masters of their companies. All five were 
Staplers and aldermen, with two having already served as mayor. Therefore they were 
all politically engaged, commercially active, wealthy men with interests in English 
foreign and economic policy. It is plausible that they were being rewarded for funds 
given to Henry’s cause before Bosworth, though this cannot be proved.  
 
Beaven dates their knighthoods as 6 January 1487, but this can confidently be corrected 
to a year earlier, as from that time they are consistently referred to by their titles in the 
civic records.89 The other honour of note distributed this day, significantly, was to the 
Breton, Philibert de Chandée, who was created earl of Bath for his assistance to Henry 
whilst in exile.90 The charter creating Chandée an earl lists as present a rather illustrious 
crowd, including the archbishops of Canterbury and York and the bishops of Worcester 
and Exeter, all of whom held office in Henry’s new administration; Jasper Tudor, duke 
of Bedford; John de la Pole, duke of Suffolk; John de Vere, earl of Oxford and Thomas 
Stanley, earl of Derby.91 Thus it seems likely that this was a day of reward and 
remembrance of past deeds.  
 
The evidence to support the involvement of Colet, Billesdon, Broun, Fenkill and 
Capell in Bray’s fundraising efforts is circumstantial at best, but enough exists to 
warrant conjecture. John Broun’s family had suffered from Richard III’s continuation 
of the war with Scotland. Originally from Northumberland, Broun’s will made 
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provision for the payment of the ransom of two of his cousins, captured and held by 
the Scots.92 Fenkill, as Broun’s cousin, may also have had links to Northumberland 
which might explain the grant to him of the keeping of Newbiggin in Northumberland 
in November 1485.93 There is scant evidence of any further rewards given to these 
men: Colet received a grant in April 1486 of the free warren of six manors in Norfolk 
and Northampton, and at around the same time Capell was granted licence, with 
William Heryot and some merchants of Genoa, to export wools paying customs of 
only four marks per sack.94 
 
Knighthood was an easy reward for Henry to grant. It cost the king nothing, and to a 
rich London merchant it conferred honour and was a sign of royal favour.95 While it is 
possible that these London merchants were rewarded for giving funds after Bosworth, 
there is no extant evidence to support this. It is possible that any sums received from 
these men went straight into the Chamber, in which case records of such payments are 
lost to posterity. However, loans and gifts from other merchants are recorded in the 
Exchequer records.96 It is conceivable, therefore, that these men were being rewarded 
for giving funds before Bosworth. 
 
Circumstantial evidence exists to suggest two other prominent members of the 
mercantile community might have offered support to Tudor before his accession. Hugh 
Brice and Edmund Shaa, both prominent Goldsmiths who worked within the Royal 
Mint, supplied goods of their trade to the court and were well connected within the elite 
of the City and the royal household, both had possible reasons to favour Tudor over 
Richard III.97 Both worked closely with Lord Hastings when he was Master of the Mint 
and Brice and Shaa served under him as Master-Worker and Engraver respectively.98 
Brice’s friendship with Hastings is evidenced by his commission from William Caxton 
of a book entitled The Mirror of the World, which he gave as a gift to the 
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Chamberlain.99 In a career that served as a prototype for that of John Shaa some decades 
later, Brice was a royal servant some years before he undertook civic duty. He went on 
foreign embassies for Edward IV.100 As an individual he was one of the largest lenders 
of money to Edward IV, at around £3,800, not including his involvement in various 
syndicated loans.101 Between 1468-70 he appears to have orchestrated at least three, if 
not four, loans to Edward IV from a syndicate of London citizens, mostly Goldsmiths, 
and perhaps served as a conduit for more.102 He was rewarded for his generosity with 
the position of collector of the customs of tonnage and poundage in the port of London 
in the 1470s, a position which perhaps offered him some security on the loans he had 
given.103 He served on diplomatic embassies for Edward IV in 1473 and 1478 and 
served as paymaster on some of the king’s building projects.104 There is no evidence 
that he served Richard III in the same way. 
 
Brice was elected mayor 13 October 1485 and was inaugurated, according to tradition, 
on 28 October. On that same day, at the coronation of Henry VII, he was knighted, 
perhaps even inaugurated as a Knight of the Bath.105 Was the individual or the City 
being honoured? This was some decades before mayors were habitually knighted in 
their mayoral year, or even usually so honoured on royal occasions. It was not without 
precedent to create Londoners Knights of the Bath, for Edward IV had made five 
Londoners such at the coronation of his queen in 1464.106 Brice’s friendship with 
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Hastings, affiliation to Edward IV and subsequent reward arouses suspicion that he 
might have worked covertly to bring about Henry’s accession. 
 
Edmund Shaa was a fellow Goldsmith and colleague to Brice at the Mint, and therefore 
would also have been well acquainted with Hastings. Shaa is usually assumed to have 
been a supporter of Richard’s, for he is described by Thomas More as an ambitious 
man who saw in the situation his own advancement, which indeed happened when he 
was invited onto the king’s council.107 Whether Shaa actually did serve on the council 
cannot be ascertained from the extant evidence; he certainly played a prominent role in 
the usurpation of Richard III, but as mayor he had had little choice. Whilst true that he 
was rewarded for his role in the usurpation with a knighthood and that he lent large 
amounts to Richard, he was not necessarily a heartfelt supporter of the last 
Plantagenet.108 Shaa’s loyalties are apparent from at his will. One of the executors was 
his ‘right especiall and tender loving frende’ Reynold Bray. As this will was made in 
March 1487, a mere 18 months after Bosworth, it suggests a longer-standing friendship 
than one formed since Henry came to the throne.109 Moreover, provision is made in 
Edmund’s will for prayers to be said for Edward IV, Edward’s sister Anne, duchess of 
Exeter, and Lord Herbert.110 His connection to the duchess and the Lord Herbert is 
unclear, but his loyalty to Edward is evident. Deposition of Edward’s sons and the 
execution of a distinguished associate, if not friend, may have put him in the camp of 
Tudor’s supporters. 
 
The men named above, arguably, had not only commercial reasons to want a new 
government, but personal ones too. These men were well acquainted with each other, 
were involved in business ventures together and served as aldermen together. The 
kinship of Fenkill and Broun has already been mentioned. Shaa and Brice were well 
acquainted as fellow goldsmiths, joint lenders to the Crown during Edward IV’s reign 
and colleagues at the Mint. Broun’s son married Shaa’s daughter.111 Both Brice and 
                                                 
107 More, Richard the Third, 68 
108 TNA, E401/950, June 1484, m.6 - £100; Jan 1485, m.8 - £133 6s 8d. 
109 TNA, PROB 11/8/183. Though the will was made in March 1487 when he was mortally ill he did not 
die until early the following year. 
110 TNA, PROB11/8/12. 
111 Reddaway and Walker, Goldsmiths’ Company, 287. 
  69 
Billesdon were closely acquainted with Dr Thomas Jane, dean of the Royal Chapel, 
who acted as executor for both of them.112 Bray served as a common denominator 
between Colet and Shaa. 
 
Whilst this evidence is circumstantial it suggests that a division in political feeling 
between members of the mercantile elite was not only possible, but probable. If one 
accepts Bolton’s argument as applied to the situation in London in the 1450s that the 
London mercantile elite were not politically apathetic but capable of political action, 
albeit of a covert nature, then it is valid to look for such partisan behaviour in 1485. 
 
The continental connections of the London mercantile community meant that the 
capital would have been aware of Henry Tudor’s aspirations. It is likely that they were 
also aware of his failed invasion of November 1483. Calais Staplers would have 
brought news of the defection of Sir James Blount, steward of Hammes Castle in the 
Pale of Calais, and his prisoner, John, earl of Oxford, to Henry.113 Staplers and 
merchants who had traded with France and Brittany may have gathered news about the 
exile which could have been disseminated in the capital. Morton had spent part of his 
exile in Flanders and may have met with merchants there. It is possible, in this way, 
that the collective intelligence of the mercantile community exceeded that of Richard 
and his spies.  
 
2.2. The Accession of Henry VII 
The first few years of the reign of a usurper could be expected to be dangerous, with 
dissident Yorkists still to be subdued, the magnates of the realm to be wooed and won, 
and subjects to be simultaneously awed and tapped for funds. That Henry, a Welsh poor 
relation of the house of Lancaster, managed not only to survive as monarch, but go on 
to reign for twenty-four years in relative peace and successfully establish his dynasty, 
is astonishing, yet how he managed to establish and maintain power in the early years 
has merited little analysis from historians.114 Though it has been observed that by this 
point London was no longer able to act in a ‘king-making’ capacity, as arguably it had 
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in 1461 and 1471, this has never properly been examined in terms of how the news of 
Bosworth was received by the Londoners and the way they regarded the new king.115 
 
One of the few historians to address this issue directly is DeLloyd Guth, whose article 
about Richard III, Henry VII and the City relates in detail the circumstances 
surrounding both usurpations and theorises that by the time of the battle of Bosworth 
the City had only just ‘cautiously adjusted to Richard III’s two-year usurpation in time 
to face the prospect of another’s usurpation’.116 The suspicions harboured by the 
Londoners against the northerners in Richard’s regime and rumours surrounding the 
fate of the sons of Edward IV resulted in uneasy acceptance of his rule. By contrast, 
upon Henry’s triumphant entry into London ‘the city could now begin to relax for the 
first time since Edward IV’s death’, proved by the fact that by September 1485 the 
Common Council had turned its attention to the normal business of the City and 
‘normalcy was about to return’.117 There are problems with this view: quite why 
London felt any more able to relax with the virtual foreigner, weak blood claimant and 
untried stranger, Henry, on the throne where it could not with the tried, tested and 
undeniably royal Duke of Gloucester, Guth fails to explain. Moreover the City’s desire 
to resume normal business was not indicative of a level of comfort with this situation; 
normal business never stopped, as is evident in the Common Council meetings held 
during the turbulent months of June-August 1483.118 As Keith Dockray has argued at 
this point: ‘The new king’s position was, in fact, notably weak even after Bosworth 
was won, perhaps even weaker that Richard III’s had been in the summer of 1483, since 
Henry lacked the kind of solid and seasoned body of supporters that Richard had had 
in the north’.119  
 
Sean Cunningham, in his recent biography of Henry VII, saw the Londoners’ eagerness 
to greet the new king fresh from his victory at Bosworth as a demonstration of how the 
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institutional power of the Crown had, by this time, developed to overcome personality 
politics, ‘The Crown warranted obedience, regardless of who wielded its authority’. 
The Londoners were realistic enough to know that a ‘usurping king backed by a 
victorious army had to be welcomed appropriately… to ensure that the power of the 
new Tudor monarch looked favourably upon London’s liberties’.120 Cunningham saw 
the Crown-City relationship as far from relaxed, and emphasised the strains that 
initially affected the relationship in 1485, as the largely mercenary army that 
accompanied the new king to the City brought with it the sweating sickness which 
carried off two mayors, a number of aldermen and a fair proportion of the City’s 
inhabitants.121 It might well have been felt that God did not smile on the new regime, 
and the epidemic ‘was an inauspicious start … and brought misery and suspicion to his 
early relationship with the capital’.122  
 
Stanley Chrimes, in what is still the most comprehensive biography of the king, did not 
dwell on the City’s reception of the new king, stating only that the ‘City fathers set 
about receiving the victor with proper ceremony’.123 The inference is that the citizens 
of the City endured the minor inconvenience of the watch but otherwise life continued 
as normal, the advent of a new king impacting little upon their lives. To an extent this 
picture would not have been incorrect, disregarding the fact that the consequent 
coronation, parliament and pageantry would have been no small interruption of City 
life.124  
 
It is often supposed that not much may have been expected of Henry’s invasion, but 
London took the threat very seriously. Though Henry did not land in Wales until 7 
August, the Common Council of the City took measures to muster a large watch within 
the City on 28 July, consisting of 3,178 citizens from seventy-three companies.125 
Common Council meetings took place on 19, 24 and 31 August, to discuss the situation 
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and all were well attended.126 On 22 August, the day of the battle of Bosworth which 
saw the death of one king and reputed battlefield crowning of another, citizens were 
ordered that every householder and shop owner ‘shall go dayly in his harnes [i.e. 
armed]’, ready to do battle in the streets, ‘if any besynes of Frays happen to be’.127 
These extensive provisions were meticulously planned, with the organisation of the 
watch covered in great detail in the Journals of Common Council, but without reference 
to the wider political situation that merited such action. 
 
The City’s passive acceptance of Henry Tudor as the new king after his victory at 
Bosworth was born of political reality; it was the only course of action open to it. Henry 
had beaten his foe in battle and, in the absence of any living legitimate heirs of the 
vanquished king’s body, was the only candidate presenting himself as rightful king of 
England, ensuring his position as de facto ruler. That London, and indeed the rest of 
the country, accepted him as such demonstrated that the sons of Edward IV were 
believed to be either dead or irrelevant. The change of monarch was heralded with 
much military preparation in the City, but little fanfare, at least at this stage. On 24 
August, at a Common Council meeting attended by a great multitude of commons, 
eight individuals were selected to ride to greet the ‘highest lord, King Henry VII’ on 
his way back from the battlefield.128 For many of those present at the meeting this 
would have been the first they had heard that they were subject to a new monarch. At 
the same meeting a night watch of 196 men around the Guildhall was arranged.129  
 
The choice of individuals who were to ride to the king was significant. The deputation 
was to be headed by Richard Gardyner, alderman and a former mayor, and the 
Recorder, Thomas Fitzwilliam. Two other aldermen were also in attendance: William 
Stokker and John Ward. Four commoners, from different trades, made up the rest of 
the group: Thomas Burgoyn, Mercer, John Fenkill, Draper, Hugh Pemberton, Tailor 
and John Stork, Grocer.130 Quite why these men were chosen is unclear. It is possible 
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that some had connections to the likely servants of the new king. Gardyner, as a former 
mayor and long-serving alderman, might have added gravitas to the deputation. The 
Recorder, as the official mouthpiece of the City, would have been expected to be part 
of a welcome party, despite the Ricardian connections of the individual. No information 
about the selection process is given, though it was unlikely to have been random, as 
these men would have been responsible for the king’s first impression of his capital 
and its citizens. Pemberton and Fenkill were later aldermen and prominent in their 
crafts, therefore men of means and influence and could well have been a natural choice 
for such a deputation.131 Thomas Burgoyn was a mercer and would become one of the 
wardens of that craft, and therefore can also be presumed to be in possession of wealth 
and influence.132  
 
The Common Council met again on 31 August, firstly to ensure that the watches were 
maintained in maximum numbers, as the new king would naturally be accompanied by 
soldiers and camp-followers, and secondly to make arrangements for an appropriate 
welcome for the king when he entered his capital. Four hundred and thirty-five men 
from sixty-five companies were to be present to greet the king.133 The largest 
companies, the Grocers, Mercers, Drapers, Fishmongers, and Tailors were to provide 
thirty men each. The Goldsmiths were to send twenty-four men, and the Skinners and 
Haberdashers twenty each. All were to be dressed in murray gowns, with the mayor 
and aldermen in scarlet gowns and their attendants in tawny gowns.134 Almost as a 
footnote to the proceedings of the meeting it is mentioned that the council agreed a gift 
to the king of 1,000 marks, to be raised through the imposition of a fifteenth tax upon 
the London citizens.135 A further gift of 1,000 marks was agreed at the Common 
Council meeting of 19 October on the occasion of the coronation, according to 
tradition, again funded by a tax of a fifteenth.136 
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Seven citizens were selected in the Common Council meeting of 17 October to attend 
the chief butler of England, together with the mayor and aldermen, on the day of the 
coronation to serve the lords and magnates of the realm both in the hall and the chamber 
according to ancient liberties. Thomas Burgoyn, Mercer, was the only one of the 
deputation who had ridden to the king at Kenilworth to attend upon the chief butler. 
Henry Cote, Goldsmith, and William Spark, Draper, also amongst the seven, had 
performed the same duty at the coronation of Richard III.137 Whilst attending the king 
at the coronation banquet at Westminster Hall the mayor, if usual precedents were 
followed, would have offered the king wine in a gold cup with a gold ewer of water 
with which to dilute the wine, receiving the cup as a gift for his troubles.138 
 
That is as much as is said about the accession of Henry VII in the civic records. Normal 
City business then dominates the official records until the sweating sickness carried 
away two mayors and four aldermen.139 Literary sources fill in the gaps, with the Great 
Chronicle describing how the new king, once welcomed into the City, rode to St. Paul’s 
cathedral where he offered up his standards.140 From there Henry was conveyed to the 
Bishop’s palace, where he stayed. Prior to his entry into the City it is probable that 
Henry would have been schooled about his capital by the likes of bishop Morton, who 
had worked closely with the mercantile community of London in the reign of Edward 
IV, and Bray, with his merchant contacts, about the personnel and mechanisms of 
London. Though his entrance into London would have been a new experience for him 
it is unlikely to have held many surprises. 
 
One of Henry’s first acts as king was to call a parliament, with the purpose of 
legitimising and establishing the grounds for his rule and passing bills of attainder and 
an act of resumption. In total, in the last six months of 1485, the Common Council met 
sixteen times, more than the average annual figure of twelve meetings, a consequence 
not only the fear of unrest caused by the change of regime and the necessary aldermanic 
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elections as discussed above, but also to make preparations for the parliament called 
for 7 November.141  
 
Henry’s position in late summer 1485, after his victory at Bosworth, was still 
precarious. A usurper with a tenuous claim to the throne through his mother’s Beaufort 
blood, without first-hand experience of the English polity, fresh from having faced a 
number of magnates across a battlefield, Henry cannot have appeared to the Londoners 
as the man to end the recent dynastic feuds that had divided the country for much of 
the century. It cannot have seemed unlikely to them that a dissident Yorkist or rival 
with a superior blood claim might usurp the usurper, and indeed in the early years of 
the reign Henry did face such challenges. That Henry survived the first two years of 
his reign where his predecessor, a man of proven ability with a firm power base, failed, 
can be attributed in part to his political acumen. Henry’s demand that his reign be dated 
from the day before the Bosworth battle allowed him to employ a policy of ‘calculated 
clemency’, enabling him to demonstrate mercy by offering amnesty to those who 
fought against him, with named exceptions, with the result that the majority of the 
nobility of England, on the whole, capitulated quickly.142 
 
Henry’s ready welcome and acceptance by the Londoners is not indicative of their 
approval of the replacement of Richard III by Henry Tudor, but of the continued, and 
unaffected, institutional power and authority of the Crown. By the end of the fifteenth 
century, with remembrance of the lessons of the latter part of the previous century still 
in the collective consciousness, the City accepted the reality of the balance of power in 
its relationship with the Crown. The City needed the friendship of the Crown to 
continue to rule itself effectively with the authority vested in it by the Crown. In that 
respect, the wearer of the crown was irrelevant. At no juncture did London demonstrate 
any desire to play a larger role in events of high politics. If the Londoners no longer 
enjoyed their king-making role of the past, then there is an argument to be made that 
this was a role they relinquished through choice, that by maintaining a passive role in 
matters of high politics they could serve as a friend to all and be held accountable by 
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none. Sponsorship and approval of Henry’s accession, if there was any, would have 
occurred at a personal level.  
 
2.3. The Merchant Adventurers and the king 
One of the most pressing concerns of the mercantile community must have been the 
likely foreign policy of the new king. The Low Countries were the source of much of 
the mercantile wealth within the City, particularly as cloth export took precedence over 
wool export in the second half of the fifteenth century, leading to a corresponding 
increase in the wealth of the fellowship of the Merchant Adventurers over that of the 
Staplers of Calais.143 The Merchant Adventurers operated as a co-operative 
organisation comprising merchants from various guilds of the City, and other parts of 
the country, who traded in cloth and goods other than wool. This entity co-ordinated 
the charter of ships to the four great Antwerp markets, marshalled resistance to trade-
threatening circumstances, such as the imposition of royal subsidies, and developed 
common trade polices.144  
 
Mercer domination of the Merchant Adventurers generated resentment amongst the 
other mercantile guilds of the City, who objected to being subject to Mercer 
governorship and administration, for, according to the author of the Great Chronicle, 
‘by that Reson It was thowgth unto alle the othir adventurers that the mersers hadd 
much more ffavour many & sundry wayes than othyr marchauntys of othyr mysteryes 
hadd’.145 The clerks employed and the hall used by the Adventurers were those of the 
Mercers’ Company. On a practical level this meant that the Mercer wardens frequently 
sent out summons to meetings of the Merchant Adventurers in the Mercers’ hall to the 
wardens of other participating companies, thereby giving the appearance that the 
Mercers held a position of precedence over other members of the fellowship. 
Hypothetically, the Mercers also had the capacity to control trade and circumvent City 
law through their hold over an organisation which, because of its lack of formal identity 
within the City and the fact that it operated largely under the jurisdiction of foreign 
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princes, was not subject to regulation by the civic authorities and therefore could be a 
law unto itself.146 As Mercers were prominent within the ranks of the aldermen this 
tended not to happen, but the fact that it could added to the resentment of other 
participating companies.147 Consequently, a formalisation of the Merchant Adventurers 
was initiated in 1486, with ordinances approved and enrolled, and thus the organisation 
was brought within the jurisdiction of the mayor.148 To appease the non-Mercer 
members of the Adventurers the next two governors, based overseas in Flanders, were 
not Mercers, but a civil lawyer and then a Draper, though neither occupied the position 
for long and they were succeeded by John Pickering, a Mercer, who remained in the 
post for the next ten years.149 
 
1486 was not a comfortable year for the Merchant Adventurers. The timing of Henry’s 
accession could not have been worse, for the rolling trade intercourse between England 
and the Low Countries, last renewed on 12 July 1478, was due to expire on 2 January 
1486.150 Henry VII, motivated in part by his distrust of the pro-Yorkist Low Countries 
and probably also deterred by the civil wars that periodically flared in the area, only 
renewed the treaty for a year. Thus he kept his options open and the Adventurers 
insecure. A diet with Maximilian, king of the Romans and ruler of the Low Countries, 
was planned for the latter part of 1486, and the king requested that the mayor select 
two Mercers and one from certain other fellowships to meet with his council to discuss 
the matter.151 Doubt over whether the diet would actually take place prompted the 
Adventurers to plan the safekeeping of their goods and debts overseas; in November 
1486 the governor of the Adventurers wrote to his treasurers that they should seek to 
‘sett all your charges of goodes and dettes in suretie’ until the situation between the 
two countries was more certain, and to ensure that they ‘kepe all thing secrete and close 
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to yourself for the trusce expireth the secunde daye of January next.’152 Hence mutual 
distrust already tainted the relationship between Henry and some of the London 
merchants, particularly those engaged in overseas trading activities. The merchants did 
not trust the king to safeguard their interests and Henry, aware that Margaret of York’s 
Burgundian court had become a refuge for Yorkist dissidents after Bosworth, viewed 
the merchants with frequent contact with that area with suspicion.  
 
At the beginning of 1487 the treaty was renewed for another year, but, after the full 
extent of Margaret of York’s complicity in the Lambert Simnel conspiracy was known, 
Henry cancelled the agreement and reduced the renewal period to six months, until 24 
June 1487, and diplomatic relations with Maximilian ceased until early 1488.153 
Meanwhile, the governor of the Adventurers, John Pickering, in a bid to safeguard the 
interests of his merchants, had taken the audacious measure of seeking and obtaining a 
safe-conduct from Maximilian for a year, which, inclusive of the usual attached four 
month ‘settling’ period, carried the expiry date of 15 November 1487.154 This initiation 
of diplomatic and trade relations without the consent and against the demonstrated 
wishes of the monarch understandably incurred Henry’s displeasure. The Adventurers 
would have been naïve not to expect this, for not only had Henry already demonstrated 
a reluctance to engage in trade or diplomatic relations with the Low Countries, but the 
mayor, Henry Colet, ‘remembering that there is no amytie between the king and the 
king of the Romans’ had that summer warned the wardens of the livery companies who 
had members within the Adventurers that they should ‘spare’ shipping to the lands of 
the king of the Romans for fear of incurring the king’s wrath.155 The instrument of the 
king’s wrath was to be Chancellor Morton, who, after learning about the safe conduct, 
summoned the wardens of the fellowships of the Merchant Adventurers, and berated 
them for how they dared to trade with the Low Countries without the king’s licence 
and against his expressed wishes.156 He also accused the Adventurers of employing 
rebels in their service, complaining that both their former governor, John Wendy, and 
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their clerk overseas, John Colet, had assisted the Simnel conspiracy.157 This was not 
the first encounter between Morton and the Adventurers, for it was Morton who had 
been set the task of investigating customs fraud committed by the Adventurers in 1479-
1480.158 
 
As Morton had declared that no future trade should take place with the Low Countries 
without royal licence, the Adventurers immediately sent a deputation of men, headed 
by Thomas Frowyk, the Common Serjeant and son and grandson of Mercers, to the 
king at Warwick to request the necessary licences. Unlike the chastisement by 
Chancellor Morton, this deputation was well attended, with wardens from eight London 
companies in attendance able to witness first-hand the king’s displeasure with their 
actions.159 As the deputation reported back to the council on 26 September, the king, 
after haranguing the merchants, conceded to pardon them and allow them to purchase 
licences to trade, provided that all business was to be concluded and they were home 
before the expiration of the safe conduct on 15 November. 
 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the Merchant Adventurers were guiltier of 
underestimating the new king or of overestimating their own importance. To act 
without the king’s knowledge or blessing can be perceived as a demonstration of 
naivety or stupidity, for no monarch could allow such an affront to his authority to go 
unpunished, and the mayor’s warning of the king’s likely displeasure illustrated that 
this was not a difficult conclusion to draw. Alternatively, the merchants’ actions might 
be interpreted as a consequence of the cynicism that accompanied witnessing the 
tumultuous political events of the past few years. The new king, the fourth in the past 
three years, may not have been expected to maintain his position long. He lacked 
family, save his uncle, to bolster his position; was unmarried so it would be some time 
until he had sons to support him and ensure the succession, and he had only limited 
magnate support.160 A twenty-four year reign may have seemed unlikely at this 
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juncture, and the merchants may have gambled on Henry being a temporary incumbent 
of the throne, or at least in such a weak position as to put him in need of their financial 
aid and requisite goodwill.  
 
As the Adventurers had only recently become subject to the authority of the mayor, an 
authority delegated by the Crown, it is probable that the fellowship had not yet 
implemented a subsequent change either in working practice or attitude. This 
adjustment not having been made, coupled with a lack of faith in the new English king, 
it may have been natural for the Adventurers to prioritise their relationship with the 
cities and princes of the Low Countries, where they did business and where their 
governor was based. Such negotiations would have been quite usual for the merchants, 
for they were, of necessity, diplomats used to negotiating with foreign powers about 
their commercial concerns. What they underestimated was Henry’s overwhelming (and 
not unjustified) sense of insecurity; it was to become a constant theme of the reign that 
threats to the king’s security were deemed to merit harsh action domestically and 
provided the impetus to his foreign policy. 
 
Anne Sutton, in her book on the Mercers’ Company, hypothesised that Henry became 
determined to harass the London companies because of early demonstrations by the 
merchants of London, particularly those of the Merchant Adventurers fellowship, of 
their willingness to put trade considerations before the king’s political needs and 
safety.161 This theory can be substantiated and developed, for it is apparent that the 
actions of the Mercer-dominated Merchant Adventurers in the first eighteen months of 
the reign threatened to destabilise Henry’s fledging government and undermined his 
diplomatic standing and regard of his fellow European country heads. The 
Adventurers’ demonstration of diplomatic ability marked them as a body to be 
neutralised, and, as Henry’s distrust of the mercantile companies became apparent as 
the reign progressed, he awaited the opportunity to deal with the threat he perceived 
they posed. For the duration of the reign members of the Mercers’ Company failed to 
enjoy direct access to the king to sell their wares as selected Goldsmiths, Tailors and 
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foreign merchants did, and indeed as they had done in the days of the Yorkist kings.162 
Hence Henry’s enmity did not fall equally on all the companies, as shown by the favour 
he demonstrated to members of the Goldsmiths’ Company, whom he welcomed at his 
court, and the Merchant Tailors, on whose behalf he was later to interfere in civic 
politics.163 
 
2.4. Rebellion and Challenge 
Given Henry’s lack of initial magnate support, his tenuous blood-claim to the throne 
and the circumstances of his usurpation, it is perhaps less surprising that Henry faced 
opposition to his fledgling regime than that he was not subjected to more of it. The first 
six months after his victory at Bosworth, though peppered with rumour of sedition and 
rebellion, were quiet enough that he was able to remain in the vicinity of the capital, 
consolidate his position and establish his government. No viable alternative put himself 
forward as a candidate for the throne, and when the first serious rebellion of the reign 
did eventually merit the attention of the king, it lacked a visible figurehead for the 
opposition to champion.  
 
At Easter 1486 news reached Henry that Viscount Lovell and Sir Humphrey Stafford 
had escaped from sanctuary. Within weeks co-ordinated uprisings in Yorkshire and the 
west Midlands appeared.164 Several rebels, according to their indictments at King’s 
Bench, proclaimed ‘A Warwyke, A Warwyke!’, even though the young earl was at that 
time safely in the king’s custody in the Tower of London.165 C.H. Williams, in his 1928 
essay, states an uprising against the king’s liegemen took place in London at the 
beginning of May, with the rebels brandishing standards of the ragged staff and red 
rose. From this Williams concluded that the focal point of their rebellion was also the 
earl of Warwick, thereby allowing the obvious connection to be made between this 
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uprising and those instigated by Lovell and Stafford.166 What Williams fails to mention 
is that this ‘uprising’ consisted of only twenty-four men, making it a rather insubstantial 
rebellion, if indeed in can be called that, with the perpetrators wielding ‘ploughs, 
rokkes, clowtes, shoes and wolsakkes’ as well as the alleged standards of a red rose and 
a ragged staff.167 The addition of the standards of the rose and ragged staff are 
somewhat surprising, as the other items they were brandishing were items associated 
with cloth finishing, making it likely that this ‘riot’ was not politically, but 
economically motivated. Soon after this event a number of bonds were taken before the 
Chamberlain of the City for good behaviour from members of the Shearmen’s and 
Fullers’ companies. It is therefore likely that this was one of a series of disturbances 
caused by members of these companies and not, as Michael Bennett has claimed, part 
of a nationwide co-ordinated initiative.168 Moreover, this was the second small-scale 
riot experienced in the City that spring. The first had been equally small in scale, 
confined to a few minor livery companies, particularly the Shearmen and Fullers, and 
focused upon retrieving a man from jail on the night of 18 April.169 This riot had been 
quickly contained by the civic authorities and the arrangement of a ‘secret watch’ 
perhaps suggests that further unrest was expected.170 It is likely that these events 
represented the latest in a series of demonstrations by men involved in the cloth-
finishing industry against the export of unfinished cloth.171 Motivation for these 
uprisings was therefore economic, rather than political. 
 
The Crown’s response to the minor unrest in the City was, in light of the above, 
possibly an over-reaction. Nicholas Connell, a weaver from Bristol, and John Huet, 
Shearman of London, were accused of rebellion and insurrection against the king. In 
both cases the accused were not found culpable but for ‘divers considerations’ the king 
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ordered that both remain in custody at the Marshalsea at his pleasure.172 Were they 
perhaps detained to make an example of them, to discourage further unrest in the City? 
Or had the government become oversensitive to perceived action against it in light of 
the recent Stafford rebellion? London was one of several areas to which commissions 
of investigators into treasons and conspiracies were sent that summer, but whereas 
those to Hereford, Warwick and Worcester, areas that constituted the heart of the 
rebellion, were dated days after the demise of the rebellion at the beginning of May, 
that for London was dated somewhat later, 5 July.173 The commission failed to find 
anything truly noteworthy, but its existence suggests that London was an entity that 
Henry did not entirely trust. 
 
Far more serious than the Stafford uprising was the one centred upon Lambert Simnel, 
the pretender who purported to be Edward, earl of Warwick. News of the pretender was 
already spreading around London as early as November 1486.174 Though most of the 
events were played out some distance from the City and no mention of Simnel’s 
existence is made in the civic records, the City fathers were accorded a minor role in 
the drama. In February 1487 the priest who had groomed Lambert Simnel for his part 
in the conspiracy was brought before convocation at St. Paul’s Cathedral.175 In the 
presence of the prelates, clergy and before the aldermen and sheriffs of the City the 
priest, an Oxford man named William Symonds, confessed to abducting the son of an 
organmaker (Simnel) and taking him to Ireland for the purpose of presenting him as 
the heir to the throne. After his confession the mayor and sheriffs were requested by 
John Morton, the archbishop of Canterbury, to take the prisoner to the Tower.176 A 
couple of days later the earl of Warwick was presented to convocation and ‘certain 
lords of the king’s council…[and] the mayor, aldermen and sheriffs of London… so 
that he might be seen by everybody.’177 In this context the City Fathers were 
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representative of the king’s subjects, acting as witness to both the confession of the 
false priest and the presentation of the true earl of Warwick, thereby receiving 
confirmation that he was safely in royal hands. If the king had hoped that they would 
then disseminate this information then there is little evidence that they did this 
effectively. There is no mention at all of convocation, let alone the presence of the 
mayor and aldermen, in the civic records and the only oblique reference to this course 
of events is in a royal proclamation, carefully recorded in the Journal on 24 April 1487, 
condemning the spreading of ‘false tidings’.178 The chronicles also entirely overlook 
this event. Even Vergil, who at least relates the priest’s role in the affair, erroneously 
states that the priest was arrested after the failure of the rebellion.179 It is possible that 
there was thought to be little point in publishing the display of the earl: he was a twelve-
year-old boy who had been in close confinement for four years and few would have 
known what he looked like and almost certainly those that did would not have been 
amongst the lords, prelates and Londoners in attendance.180 The role of the Londoners 
as witnesses, therefore, was merely symbolic. 
 
Henry’s victory at Stoke was a pivotal point in his relationship with his subjects. The 
battle fought on 16 June 1487 demonstrated that Henry had the support of the most 
prominent members of the nobility: Bedford, Oxford, Derby and the young earls of 
Shrewsbury, Devon and Wiltshire brought their retinues, as did the Lords Lisle, Scales, 
Strange, Hastings and Grey of Powis.181 That is not to say that the rebels were without 
supporters of standing, for Edward IV’s widow, Elizabeth Woodville, her son, the 
marquess of Dorset, and Robert, bishop of Bath and Wells, were arrested in connection 
with this sequence of events.182 Any lingering threats to the new government were 
swiftly neutralised, at least for the next couple of years. No longer a fledgling king, a 
lucky usurper and isolated victor of Bosworth, Henry was now undisputed ruler of his 
realm, head of an effective government and force to be reckoned with. 
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That the battle of Stoke, which saw the defeat and death of John de la Pole, earl of 
Lincoln and the most senior living Yorkist after the imprisoned earl of Warwick, the 
exile and disappearance of Lovell, and the capture of Simnel, was considered critical 
by the Londoners is demonstrated by their actions. According to the Great Chronicle, 
the mayor, the Mercer Henry Colet, upon hearing of the king’s victory ordered ‘Te 
deum’ to be sung in the City churches.183 At a meeting of the Common Council, 28 
June, twelve days after the battle had been fought, a deputation of seven influential 
members of that body were selected to ride to the king at Kenilworth, bearing news 
that a gift of £1,000 had been granted to their sovereign by the council.184 The gift is 
significant. It was customary to give the monarch a large financial gift (usually 1,000 
marks) upon his coronation, and a smaller one at the coronation of his queen.185 To 
award the king after the defeat of his foes in battle was without precedent, especially a 
gift larger than the one awarded at his coronation. Richard III did not receive a 
monetary gift upon his entry into the City after he had dealt with the rebellion of the 
duke of Buckingham, though his ceremonial re-entry into the City afterwards had been 
comparable.186 Henry, re-entering the City in November 1487, was greeted at Hornsey 
Park by the mayor and aldermen, clothed in scarlet, their servants and 433 liverymen 
dressed in violet.187 Here the king knighted the mayor William Horn, the Recorder, 
Thomas Fitzwilliam and John Percyvale, a tailor and alderman. Quite why Percyvale 
was knighted is a mystery. Stow states that he and Horn were ‘knighted in the field’, 
but this seems unlikely, as both were listed as having been present at a meeting of the 
Common Council on 28 June and Percyvale was present at a meeting of the court of 
aldermen 11 June.188 Whilst Stoke was not so far away that they could not have been 
present at the battle, it would have been very strange had such prominent merchants 
decided to fight. 
 
The Londoners demonstrated a further desire to ingratiate themselves with the king 
when, on 11 July, the Common Council granted the king a further £2,000 loan, bringing 
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the total of loans accorded to Henry so far to £4,000.189 Not all of this amount was 
outstanding; Henry was careful to build up his credit rating, to use modern parlance, 
and repaid loans swiftly, often just before taking out another.190 
 
The City had therefore decided that the king was a permanent fixture in so far as such 
things could be guaranteed. Whereas his position had appeared unsure at the outset of 
his reign, and certainly his position in the autumn of 1485 had appeared to be far more 
fragile than that of Richard III in his first autumn, it now had an air of permanence 
about it that had previously been lacking. Henry now had a wife, having married 
Elizabeth of York the previous year, a son, Arthur, born autumn 1486, and no living 
rivals save the imprisoned earl of Warwick and the de la Poles, whose leader had just 
perished at the battle of Stoke.191 This was not simply a case of the City Fathers once 
more identifying the winner and choosing to provide him with the resources he needed 
to establish his regime, as there was no power struggle to back Henry against, but an 
acceptance of reality and response to the need to foster close relations with the reigning 
monarch. It might also, in part, have been seen as an opportunity to compensate for the 
misbehaviour of Merchant Adventurers, particularly as renewal of the trade intercourse 
with the Low Countries was still outstanding. It may have been hoped that with Simnel 
in the king’s custody the way might be seen to be open to resume diplomatic relations 
with Maximilian.  
 
2.5. Conclusion  
The coronation of Elizabeth of York in November 1487 was a cause for celebration on 
many levels. The houses of Lancaster and York were at last united through the bonds 
of marriage and in the blood of a new prince, born in the previous September. Henry 
had dispensed with all overt threats to his authority. Blood rivals in the form of the 
remaining de la Poles still remained, but for now they appeared to be a docile entity. 
What is surprising is not, perhaps, that he had faced challenges on such a large scale, 
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including a pitched battle larger than that in which he won his throne, but that he had 
not faced more challenges. 
 
It is interesting to compare London’s reaction to the accession of Henry Tudor to that 
of York, a city that had strong links with Richard III. York had sent eighty men to fight 
for Richard as soon as word reached them that Richmond had landed in England and 
the sentiment of regret at the passing of the last Plantagenet king recorded in their civic 
records is well known and often quoted.192 This did not mean that York was not capable 
of accepting the realities of the situation once Richard lost, and the magnificent 
reception that York gave when Henry visited the city in April 1486 is evidence of a 
desire to cultivate the good-will of the monarch, even if he was not the king they would 
have chosen.193  
 
London’s acceptance of the new king was passive, as had been its acceptance of the 
accession of Richard III. Neither king faced rebellion or uprising from the inhabitants 
of the City. No Londoner was attained after Bosworth. If we accept the likelihood of 
some support within London’s political society for Henry in 1484-5, then it is 
reasonable to re-assess the reception of news about the new king from one of a resigned, 
passive acceptance born of political reality to something slightly more positive. The 
advent of another usurpation would not have been welcomed by all, but it is possible 
that it was by a section of London’s mercantile community, some of whom may have 
played a minor role in its achievement.  
 
Though it is true to say that the City depended upon the support and goodwill of the 
Crown and was realistic enough to befriend whoever was incumbent in that position, it 
would be a mistake to think that the citizens cared not on whose head it might reside. 
Impartiality was a luxury that particularly the wealthy merchants could not afford, for 
their economic prosperity depended upon the foreign policies favoured and adopted by 
the new ruler. A division, therefore, frequently existed between the official response of 
the City, carefully orchestrated by the City fathers, and the response of individuals who 
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might act covertly upon their political affiliations. That the men involved in civic 
government were frequently the same men who acted covertly to their own political 
ends reflected the reality that members of the municipal administration appreciated the 
need to present a unified front. To demonstrate divisions between members of the civic 
government was to invite royal interference and, ultimately, control. 
 
The first years of the reign had proved to be a testing ground for the Crown-City 
relationship. The actions of the Adventurers had demonstrated that the mercantile 
community were willing to put their own priorities of commercial continuance and 
expansion above those of the king and his realm. In so doing, the Adventurers adopted 
the behaviour of an over-mighty subject in acting above the authority of the king and 
seeking to pursue their own independent diplomatic relations. Consequently the 
government of London, with whom the Mercers and Merchant Adventurers were so 
closely linked, was identified as a collective subject to be mastered, rather than a 
community to be worked with. An awareness of this may have prevented the civic 
government from seeking confirmation of its charter, as was usual upon the accession 
of a new king. A new charter was not granted until 1505, and when it was its terms 
were not satisfactory to the City, as will be seen. 
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Chapter 3: The Financial Relationship between the City 
and the Crown 
 
As soon as he became king, Henry had a pressing need to raise money. He had left 
hostages in Paris as pledges for money borrowed and a debt of 10,000 crowns to the 
Duke of Brittany remained outstanding.1 Servants had to be rewarded, followers 
needed confiscated lands restored and his royal household needed to be outfitted in a 
style fitting to a monarch. In theory, the timing of the battle of Bosworth meant that 
Henry would have benefitted from the payment of the Michaelmas land rents due on 
Crown lands not long into his reign. In practice, though, this income was over-
committed, with £4,700 of cash receipts from land revenues paid into the Exchequer 
for Michaelmas 1485 and Easter 1486 terms, and over £7,000 of assignments made on 
land revenues in the same time period.2 Henry’s urgent need for financial aid from his 
capital might have been expected to give the City leverage in negotiations to enhance 
their trading privileges or charter liberties, yet there is no evidence to suggest that 
Londoners sought to push their supposed advantage other than to request the traditional 
payment holiday of customs payments until they were formally granted to the king by 
parliament.3  
 
The City’s ability to provide financial aid to the government had been key to the 
interdependent relationship of the Crown and the City in the fifteenth century and 
earlier, and therefore it is logical that if and when the king no longer needed such 
finance, the relationship dynamic must have altered. Did the City’s ability to provide 
finance give it leverage in seeking privilege or redress of grievance? If so, was the City 
disadvantaged once the Crown became solvent and no longer had a need of its financial 
aid? What motivation, if any, did the City, and individuals within it, have to lend to the 
Crown?  
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This chapter will discuss the financial relationship Henry VII had with the capital and 
examine how much, financially, the City was worth to the Crown in the course of the 
reign. After a brief examination of the secondary literature on this topic and the 
definition of ordinary and extraordinary income the subjects of customs revenue, taxes, 
gifts and loans from the City and its contribution to the 1491 benevolence will be 
explored. 
 
3.1. Historiography and Sources 
Caroline Barron perceived the City-Crown relationship as one underpinned by matters 
of finance, with the king’s need for money versus the City’s desire for self-
government.4 ‘These were not the only matters of debate and contention’ between the 
City and the Crown, Barron writes, ‘but they underlay many of the overt struggles and 
complex negotiations’.5 The nature and extent of the Crown’s need for finance waxed 
and waned, and the relationship adjusted accordingly.6 Henry, as a new monarch, may 
have been expected to require the City’s financial assistance immediately and the City 
demonstrated its willingness to support him in their initial presentation of a gift of 
£1,000 after Henry’s victory at Bosworth. 
 
The full extent of Henry’s need, though, has not been quantified and no full coherent 
analysis of the financial aid Henry received from the City in the first decade of his reign 
has been undertaken by historians. Reginald Sharpe, writing in 1894, wrote about the 
loans made by the City to Henry VII, but his account did not cross-reference the City 
sources with those of the Crown and therefore his account is incomplete.7 The brief 
sentence summarising the loans made by the City to Henry in Frederick Dietz’s book, 
English Government Finance, written in 1920, has been heavily relied upon by 
historians since its publication.8 His assertion that the City lent a total, corporately, of 
£15,000 in six tranches between August 1485 and 1490 is based upon his examination 
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of the Exchequer Receipt Rolls and a number of London chronicles.9 Unfortunately, 
Dietz’s summary is neither entirely comprehensive nor accurate, and his more general 
misinterpretation of financial evidence has been highlighted by both Bertram Wolffe 
and W.C. Richardson.10  
 
It is almost impossible to calculate Henry’s income accurately for almost any point in 
his reign.11 Wolffe estimated that Henry’s land revenues in the last decade of his reign 
may have averaged as much as £42,000.12 Assessing the king’s income from customs 
has proved equally difficult. At the latter end of the nineteenth century, Georg Schanz 
attempted to quantify the total revenue to the Crown from customs, broken down by 
port.13 Dietz, utilising Schanz’s figures, asserted that customs revenues in the first 
decade of the reign averaged £32,951 per year, increasing to £40,132 p.a. for the rest 
of the reign.14 Though the accuracy of Schanz’s data has been called into question by 
Chrimes and Wolffe, no attempt has been made to correct his figures and therefore in 
the absence of more accurate data Schanz’s figures, via Dietz’s interpretation, continue 
to be employed by historians.15 A more accurate reconstruction of customs revenue 
from the port of London will be provided later in the chapter. 
 
The evidence for governmental fiscal management during the reign is problematic, 
even though the survival of the relevant documentation is reasonably good. A selection 
of Exchequer and City sources has survived, enough to give a reasonably full picture 
of the financial relationship between the two entities, but not enough to provide a 
complete one. One problem is that this period saw the emergence of the Chamber as 
the preferred fiscal instrument of the king as he attempted to circumvent the 
cumbersome apparatus of the Exchequer. The Chamber account books do not survive 
for the entire reign: the extant payment books are clustered into the last few years and 
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only three slim volumes of the receipt books survive.16 As the Exchequer did not handle 
all financial transactions during the reign and the Chamber books only survive for a 
few years of it, the existence of a substantial lacuna in the extant evidence may be 
perceived. 
 
There are other problems with the Exchequer records. No Issue Rolls survive for the 
reign, though the survival of a substantial number of Warrants for Payment helps to 
compensate for this lack, as does the survival of a near full set of Tellers’ rolls.17 The 
Tellers’ rolls are not without their problems; each Tellers’ roll records separately the 
issues and receipts recorded by each one of the four individual tellers of the Exchequer 
for the two terms into which the Exchequer year is divided: Michaelmas term, running 
from Michaelmas day until Easter, and Easter terms from Easter until Michaelmas.18 
As all payments are divided into the two terms it is difficult to gauge when, within a 
six month period, a financial transaction might have actually taken place. Moreover, 
not all the records of the individual tellers have survived and so we do not have a full 
record of all financial transactions undertaken through the Exchequer. The Receipt 
Rolls of the Exchequer, as the title suggests, record all receipts into the Exchequer (in 
triplicate) with a new series of rolls commencing at the start of each Exchequer term.19 
Though incomplete, the advantage of this series is that the dates of individual receipts 
are included and often more detail is given about the receipts than is apparent in the 
Tellers’ rolls.20 Therefore, an analysis of both the extant Exchequer records and 
Chamber books for the reign still falls short of providing a full picture of all Crown 
revenue and expenditure. It is outside of the remit of this thesis to attempt a full 
reconstruction of Henry’s finances, but the problems inherent in that Herculean task 
are also to be found, albeit on a smaller scale, in attempting to understand the full 
financial value of the City to the Crown. 
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The City’s Journals of Common Council recorded decisions made in that forum to grant 
financial gifts to the king and to acquiesce (or not) to the king’s request for loans. Not 
every loan is recorded, for reasons outlined below, but they provide a cross-reference 
point with the Exchequer documents. Occasionally, an individual livery company’s 
contribution to corporate loans may be included in their account books, though not 
always as often these amounts were collected directly from members without ever 
touching the finances of the company itself. 
 
3.2. Ordinary and Extraordinary Income 
It was an ideal generally accepted that a medieval king should ‘live of his own’, in that 
monarchs were expected to be able to meet their regular expenditure from the ordinary 
revenue they received.21 Edward IV echoed his predecessors, Henry IV and Henry V 
at the outset of their reigns, when he famously announced to the Commons of the 1467 
parliament that he would henceforth ‘live of his own’ and not charge his subjects ‘but 
in grete and urgent causes’.22 Yet achievement of this ideal largely eluded medieval 
monarchs, with Edward IV becoming the first monarch to be financially independent 
of parliament in over a century.23 Henry VII became solvent in the mid-1490s and went 
on to become wealthy, capable of paying amounts in excess of £100,000 out of his 
chamber to the archduke Maximilian without needing to raise additional finance.24 
 
Stanley Chrimes questioned the validity of the use of the terms ‘ordinary’ and 
‘extraordinary’ when applied to royal revenues, as such a distinction was not drawn by 
fifteenth-century commentators, but by historians. Fortescue, he argued, used this 
distinction only with regard to expenses, not income.25 While Chrimes instead 
preferred to use the terms ‘certain and casual’ to describe income, this thesis will utilise 
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the more descriptive and commonly used terms, ‘ordinary’ and ‘extraordinary’.26 
Ordinary income, in this context, refers to the regular income of the Crown. Most of 
this was derived from the Crown lands after the estates of the duchy of Lancaster were 
subsumed into the Crown demesne in 1399.27 In addition, customs dues payable on 
imported wine (tonnage) and other imports and exports (poundage and petty customs) 
were, by the second half of the fourteenth century, a regular part of the Crown’s income 
and contributed around £30,000 per annum to the Crown’s revenues.28 Henry’s first 
parliament granted him for life both the subsidy on wool and the revenues of tonnage 
and poundage for life. Only Richard III before him had successfully had these granted 
to him for life in his first parliament; Henry V had acquired them in 1415, Henry VI in 
1454 and Edward IV in 1465.29 Also to be classified as ‘ordinary revenue’ might be the 
fee farms paid by urban centres to the Crown, which in the case of the capital amounted 
to a mere £300 per year.30 Extraordinary income refers, in this instance, to all income 
that cannot be said to be regular or expected, often derived from taxation, loans, 
benevolences and gifts. 
 
Ordinary income was intended to meet the Crown’s regular expenditure. Regular 
expenditure was described by Fortescue as being the running costs involved in the 
monarch’s household and wardrobe, the wages of his servants and council, rewards for 
those who had done him good service and the maintenance of the security of his borders 
and the town of Calais.31 Extraordinary income was intended to meet extraordinary 
expenses. The considerable expenses incurred through war and the need to defend the 
realm from invasion and protect England’s borders necessitated the raising of 
additional revenue. Taxation was the most common form of raising extraordinary 
revenue. This had to be granted by the Commons in parliament, a process which in 
itself could take several months. Benevolences, or enforced gifts, which did not require 
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the authorisation of parliament, were a more unpopular way of raising funds and 
consequently were levied less frequently. The problems with traditional forms of 
ordinary and extraordinary income were two-fold: firstly, they took time to yield a 
return and secondly, they frequently were inadequate to meet the king’s expenses. The 
ability of the City of London to raise large amounts of capital swiftly was therefore 
invaluable to the king.  
 
Financially speaking, Henry VII enjoyed a number of advantages over his 
predecessors. Henry was a beneficiary of the Yorkist policy of conscious expansion of 
the royal demesne.32 The combination of the Crown’s traditional lands, including the 
Duchy of Lancaster, with Edward IV’s own Yorkist family estates and the estates he 
acquired through purchase and confiscation created the largest royal demesne ever held 
by a medieval king. This was added to by Richard III, who received an annual income 
of approximately £22,000-£25,000 per annum in land revenue.33 Henry VII was 
eventually to increase this to an average of around £42,000 p.a. in the second decade 
of his reign.34 Henry, upon his accession, had to restore estates confiscated by Richard 
III to their rightful owners who had supported him in exile, like the earl of Oxford, and 
create estates for those he rewarded, such as his uncle, Jasper, duke of Bedford. It was 
not until the subsequent resumption acts of 1487 and 1495 that Henry was able to 
greatly augment the landed wealth of the Crown.35  
 
Other revenue streams were added to Henry’s ordinary income as his reign progressed. 
In November 1492, after Henry’s short-lived campaign in France, peace was made with 
Charles VIII without military engagement having taken place. Henry benefitted 
handsomely, and received a pay-off worth 745,000 gold crowns and an annual pension 
of 52,000 crowns.36 Given the heavy financial contribution of his subjects, some 
resentment may have been directed towards the king, who profited from this venture, 
as it was when his father-in-law had profited after the treaty of Picquigny in 1475.37 
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Henry’s income from feudal dues, forfeit bonds and trading activities is even harder to 
quantify than his other income streams. Suffice to say, it is probable that they added to 
an income already adequate to discharge his expenses. This source of extraordinary 
funds, though they added to his coffers, arguably cost him in terms of both 
contemporary goodwill and historical reputation.  
  
3.3. Customs 
Between 1503 and 1509 well over half of England’s overseas trade of most 
commodities went through the port of London, including seventy-one per cent of the 
value of goods subject to the petty custom and fifty-one per cent of those subject to 
poundage.38 Therefore the customs paid in London were a rich source of revenue to the 
Crown. It is also apparent that much of the trade out of Southampton was undertaken 
by London merchants, and so any assessment of customs revenue in London cannot be 
a complete picture of the contribution of the London mercantile community to this 
Crown revenue stream.39  
 
Since the mid-fourteenth century three different customs duties were levied in the port 
of London: the customs and subsidies on wool, woolfells and hides (wool customs 
hereafter); the new, or petty, custom; and tonnage and poundage.40 The wool custom 
yielded the highest amount of customs revenue to the Crown. An agreement between 
the merchants of the Calais Staple and the Crown in 1466 saw the collection of the bulk 
of this custom in Calais, with the treasurer of Calais responsible for rendering his 
account of the collection at the Exchequer.41 Two collectors for the custom did remain 
in London, presumably to deal with wool that did not pass through Calais, but the 
accounts they rendered to the Exchequer were usually for sums not more than £10. 
 
                                                 
38 Peter Ramsey, ‘Overseas Trade in the Reign of Henry VII: the Evidence of Customs Accounts’, 
Economic History Review, vi (1953-4), 179. 
39 A.A. Ruddock, ‘London Capitalists and the Decline of Southampton in the Early Tudor Period’, 
Economic History Review, ii (1949), 137-51. 
40 Cobb, ‘Introduction’, Overseas Trade. 
41 See section 3.3.1. 
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The petty custom was a composite custom, comprising an ad valorem duty of three 
pence in the pound on all goods imported by alien merchants, with specific duties on 
wool, hides and wax imported or exported by aliens, and an additional cloth export 
custom on both denizen and alien merchants.42 Tonnage and poundage was granted for 
life to Richard III and Henry VII in the first parliament of their reigns, and continued 
to be so granted to monarchs thereafter. Tonnage was a duty imposed on all wine 
imports and poundage was an ad valorem tax on all goods imported or exported by all 
merchants.43 The Hanse were exempt from all of these duties, except the petty custom, 
as a consequence of the treaty of Utrecht negotiated by Edward IV in 1473-4 which 
gave the Hanse generous trading terms in part recompense for their aid during his bid 
to reclaim the throne.44 
 
Each custom (wool, petty and tonnage and poundage) had two collectors and a 
controller at the port of London who submitted complementary accounts to the 
Exchequer. Of the collectors those of tonnage and poundage handled the largest 
customs receipts. Unfortunately there is not a single year, from 1461-1509, for which 
all three accounts survive, and there are a few years for which accounts of some duties 
are entirely missing.45  
 
The table below contains the figures of the receipts from the Petty customs and tonnage 
and poundage as recorded in the Enrolled Customs Accounts for the reign. Accounts 
are usually recorded per Exchequer year, running from Michaelmas (29 September) to 
Michaelmas. Occasionally accounts do not adhere to the Exchequer year (owing to the 
death of a collector or other occurrence) and in these cases entries for the relevant year 
have been amalgamated and, where necessary, averaged. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Cobb, ‘Introduction’, Overseas Trade. 
43 Cobb, ‘Introduction’, Overseas Trade. 
44 Ross, Edward IV, 368, 385. 
45 Cobb, ‘Introduction’, Overseas Trade. 
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Year 
(Michaelmas to 
Michaelmas) 
Petty Customs Tonnage and 
Poundage 
 £ s d £ s d 
1485/6 2781 7 1 ¼ *   # 
1486/7 2781 7 1 ¼ *   # 
1487/8 2781 7 1 ¼ * 2807 19 9 ½ 
1488/9 3251 1 2 ½ 4796 2 2 ½ 
1489/90 3769 6 10 ¼ 5035 15 7 
1490/1 3604 15 3 ½ 4905 17 5 
1491/2 4037 4 7 ¼ 4950 7 5 
1492/3 3122 17 8 ½ 4694 3 5 
1493/4 2914 3 8 ¾ 3621 2 0 ½ 
1494/5 1357 16 1 ¾ * 5030 9 5 * 
1495/6 1357 16 1 ¾ * 4189 13 11 
1496/7 1357 16 1 ¾ * 5050 4 9 
1497/8 3923 13 2 ¾ 5316 3 9 
1498/9 3105 0 0 ¼ 4250 11 9 
1499/1500 4463 16 3 ¾ 5612 19 3 ¼ 
1500/1 5162 8 3 ¾ 6563 15 3 
1501/2 4282 15  10 ½ 6903 14 0 ½ 
1502/3 4461 18 9 6012 6 7 
1503/4 4424 19 4 ¾ 5708 17 9 
1504/5 4625 16 9 ¼ 5750 16 7 
1505/6 5474 5 0 ¼ 5848 12 0 
1506/7 5190 11 6 ¼ 7210 0 6 
1507/8 4864 0 11 ¼ 7739 5 4 
1508/9   # 6959 0 10 * 
 
Table 3.1 – London customs revenue throughout the reign of Henry VII.  
Source: Enrolled Customs Accounts, TNA, E356/23 & 24. 
* Adjusted to an average where the entries do not align with the Exchequer year. 
# Lost. 
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Much of the increase in customs paid was a consequence of an increase in imports, and 
though it is possible that this may reflect a successful reduction in the instances of 
fraud, it cannot be wholly attributed to any policy of government. The amount paid, 
nationwide, in petty custom dues rose by 68 per cent in the reign whilst that of 
poundage rose by 80 per cent.46 
 
It is apparent, from the above figures, that petty custom revenue, into which the cloth 
custom fell, was much reduced during the trade embargoes imposed upon trade with 
the Netherlands between summer 1493 and July 1497.47 The economic impact of royal 
foreign policy upon the mercantile community would have been correspondingly high. 
These embargoes were only a temporary disruption of trade and cloth exports continued 
to grow, from an annual average of 50,878 cloths in the first six years of the reign to 
81,835 in the last six, an increase of 61 per cent.48  
 
3.3.1. The Calais Staple 
The merchants comprising the fellowship of the Staple at Calais were important to the 
Crown not only as generators and collectors of the wool subsidy paid on all wool that 
passed through the Staple, but as a source of funds and administration for the financing 
of the garrison of the Staple. The Act of Retainer ratified in parliament in 1473 was the 
epitome of a working partnership between the Staplers and the king. By this act the 
Crown retained the services of the merchants of the Staple in funding the defence of 
the Pale of Calais. This agreement, negotiated and implemented in 1466, was not 
formally enshrined in statute until 1504.49 The terms of this agreement dictated that the 
Staplers were to collect the wool customs and subsidy paid on all wool exported from 
England that passed through the Staple and the ‘ordinary’ revenues arising out of 
Calais. From these revenues the Company of the Staple would make an annual payment 
                                                 
46 Ramsey, ‘Overseas Trade’, 179. 
47 R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy, 1485-1588 (London, 
1966), 67-8; E.M. Carus-Wilson and Olive Coleman, England’s Export Trade, 1275-1547 (Oxford, 
1963), 194-9. See the latter also for cloth import volumes during the reign, 68-113. 
48 Ramsey, ‘Overseas Trade’, 178. 
49 19 Hen.VII c.22; David Grummitt, The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436-
1558 (Woodbridge, 2008), 150. 
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of £10,022 4s 8d for the wages of the Calais garrison and further annual payments of 
£100 for the wages of the customers of the port of London and 1,000 marks for the 
wages of the royal judges.50 Additionally, the merchants of the Staple were also 
committed to providing adequate funds for the safe conduct of the wool-fleet between 
England and Calais. A further £3,000 p.a. would be retained by the Staplers from the 
customs to pay off the debt of £32,861 that the Crown owed to the Staplers.51 Surpluses 
remaining after all of the Staplers’ financial obligations had been met were paid to the 
Exchequer. Between 1467 and 1483 the Exchequer received an average annual surplus 
of £705 from the Staplers after the reckoning of their accounts.52 
 
In 1487 the Act of Retainer was renewed for sixteen years, but as it was noted that the 
Crown’s debt had long been paid off, the merchants of the Staple would no longer be 
allowed to retain any of the customs and tax revenue paid on wool in Calais left after 
the financial obligations of the merchants outlined in the agreement had been met.53 
Two years later it was decided that the accounts for the Staple would no longer be 
declared to the Exchequer, but instead would be presented to the king’s treasurer of his 
Chamber, where any surplus would be paid.54  
 
In the early years of the reign the members of the Fellowship of the Calais Staple, in 
common with other London merchants, were important lenders to the Crown. Stapler 
loans were generally repaid by assignment upon the surplus of the customs to be paid 
to the Crown under the Act of Retainer.55 As loans from the Staplers were, in effect, 
advances upon the surplus due to the Crown, they did not necessarily impact greatly on 
the merchants’ ability to provide loans either individually or through the corporation 
of London.  
                                                 
50 Susan Rose, Calais: An English Town in France, 1347-1558 (Woodbridge, 2008), 86; Grummitt, 
Calais Garrison, 148. 
51 Rose, Calais, 87. 
52 Grummitt, Calais Garrison, 149. 
53 Rose, Calais, 115. 
54 Rose, Calais, 115. Until this point the Calais accounts had been presented at the Upper chamber of the 
Exchequer for audit and enrolled within the Foreign Accounts rolls (TNA, E364 & E358.) 
55 Descriptions of this arrangement can be seen in various warrants for payment: TNA, E404/79 dated 
30 Jan 1486; TNA, E404/79, 4 Feb 1486; TNA, E404/79, 12 Feb 1487. 
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The Act of Retainer represented a partnership between the government of Edward IV 
and the merchants of the Staple of Calais. In return for adopting, where possible, a 
foreign policy favourable to the merchants, the Staplers took on the heavy 
responsibility of financing the Calais garrison and various Crown officials as well as 
responsibility for the financial administration of the Staple of Calais, including 
monitoring and facilitating the repayment of the king’s debt to them. Once the debts of 
Edward IV had been paid off, the Crown benefitted handsomely from this source and 
the lack of complaint from both the mercantile community and the garrison suggests 
that they considered the settlement fair and this arrangement survived until the 1520s.  
 
3.3.2. 1507 Book of Rates 
In July 1507 a book of rates, giving standard valuations for a wide range of 
commodities, was devised in what may be seen as an attempt by the government to 
impose order and uniformity in the collection of ad valorem customs duties and to 
check fraud and collusion between customs officials and merchants.56 Henry’s VII’s 
government had attempted to regulate and formalise the payment of customs in the port 
of London before the creation of the book of rates, for in October 1506 the governor of 
the Merchant Adventurers, John Sheldon, together with the Mercers William Buttry 
and William Southwod, were deputed to devise a ‘supplycacion’ or petition to the king 
regarding the ‘discharging of wares after a form’, suggesting that a move away from 
the declaration of wares by oath alone had been made.57 Sheldon and his associates 
were also to approach Edmund Dudley, ‘desyryng him to be a good Maister in the 
mater’.58 The result of the petition is not known, as the relevant part of the Mercers’ 
records has not survived, but discontent with the government’s continued attempts to 
reform the customs continued. A ‘Nwe Clamyd’ addition to the rate of poundage was 
the subject of complaint in June 1506 and the aldermen Thomas Bradbury and William 
Fitzwilliam were sent with two Common Councilmen to the king ‘to sue for a 
                                                 
56 Henry Cobb, ‘”Books of Rates” and the London Customs, 1507-1558’, The Guildhall Miscellany, iv 
(1971), 5; N.S.B. Gras, The Early English Customs System (London, 1918), 121, 694-696. 
57 Acts, 273-4. 
58 Acts, 273-4. 
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reformacion therof’.59 In the following January four aldermen were sent to the king ‘to 
be assistants to the Merchants Adventurers in Sute to be made to the Kyngs g[ra]ce for 
the Rates of Custmnes’.60 Quite possibly the solution employed was the creation of the 
Book of Rates which came into being in July the following year. This book had been 
created by the king’s council with the advice of the surveyors, controllers and 
customers of the port of London together with that of ‘the marchants adventerers of the 
same’.61 
 
Assumptions have been made that this book was created for the sole purpose of 
increasing Crown revenue, yet this cannot be sustained when the valuations contained 
therein are compared to those found in the London Petty Customs Accounts of 1502-3 
and 1506.62 It is therefore apparent that the book was largely based upon prices current 
in the port of London at the time. It is likely that this was an attempt to regulate the 
process of declaring customs and thus check fraud in the port.63 These rates were to 
remain largely unchanged until the reign of Mary in the mid-sixteenth century.64  
 
Yet despite the involvement of the Adventurers in its creation, the corporation of the 
City still found cause for complaint. In December 1508, nearly eighteen months after 
the implementation of the rates book, four aldermen from different companies along 
with eight commoners were appointed by the Court of Aldermen to consult with legal 
advisers over the best course of action or suit to be ‘made for the New Custmne’.65 
                                                 
59 Rep.2, f.10. 
60 Rep.2, f.21v. 
61 The Book of Rates has been reproduced by Gras, English Customs, Appendix C and amended by 
Cobb, ‘London Customs’, 13. 
62 Cobb, ‘London Customs’, 5-6; Elton, England Under the Tudors, 49; J.R. Lander, Conflict and 
Stability in Fifteenth-Century England (London, 1969), 104. The valuations are also comparable to a list 
of goods in the port of London listed in Arnold’s Chronicle, created not later than 1502/3. (The Customs 
of London Otherwise Called Arnold’s Chronicle (London, 1811), 234-237). 
63 Cobb, ‘London Customs’, 6. 
64 Cobb, ‘London Customs’, 8-12; Gras, English Customs, 123-4. 
65 Rep.2, f.56. Of the 12 men, two were Mercers, two Drapers, two Merchant Taylors and two 
Fishmongers, with the remaining four being a Grocer, a Goldsmith, a Skinner and a Haberdasher. One 
might have expected more Mercers given their domination of the Merchant Adventurers, and it may 
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Given the timing and the lack of alternatives, it seems likely that this New Custom was 
that embodied in the book of rates. Around the same time Edmund Dudley pressed the 
Mercers’ Company into accepting the new rates, demanding that two representatives 
of the company appear before him and give an answer as to what they and ‘other whiche 
he had desired to drawe them together for the Custume wolde say’.66 The 
representatives answered that they were not qualified to make such an answer and 
perhaps such a matter should be decided by a ‘generall assemble’. Dudley was not 
pleased by this, and replied that if they would refuse to give an answer then ‘he knewe 
well that the Kyng wold stop the clothes at the next shipping,’ not to resume until their 
agreement was secured.67 
 
In January 1508 the Court of Aldermen appointed eight men, comprising the Recorder, 
three aldermen and four common councilmen, to go to the king ‘for the reformacion of 
the subside newe claymed’.68 How this deputation was received is not recorded, but the 
City was not discouraged from pressing its point, for nine days later on 25 January 1508 
yet another deputation was appointed to ‘sue w[ith] the counncell of this citie to the 
kyngs g[ra]ce for the mater of subsidy’.69 Finally, on 16 February, no less than twenty-
three men, including the Recorder and twelve aldermen, were appointed to sue to the 
king for the reform of the book of rates.70 Once again, the result of this action is not 
recorded, and perhaps the City was prevented from pursuing the case further by the 
death of Henry VII in April 1509. 
 
That the City was overwhelmingly negative about the implementation of the Book of 
Rates is evident, but quite why is more difficult to determine. The delay between the 
book’s creation in July 1507 (and one assumes that its implementation was not long 
after this date) and the first action taken by the City fathers against it suggests that 
perhaps the book had proved to be an administrative burden on the merchants subject 
                                                 
have been because of the Adventurers involvement in the creation of the rates book that they were not 
given their usual majority representation in this forum. 
66 Acts, 319. 
67 Acts, 319-320. 
68 Rep.2, f.56v. 
69 Rep.2, f.58. 
70 Rep.2, f.61. 
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to it. It may also, in practice, have resulted in the payment of more customs. There is 
no mention at all of the Book of Rates in the chronicles, nor does it appear to have been 
discussed in Common Council, suggesting that perhaps this was not as big an issue as 
the effort the Aldermen put into fighting it might suggest. Given that at the time the 
Court of Aldermen were being extra careful about what was recorded in their 
corporation records and concerned that secrets discussed within the Court of Aldermen 
were not discussed elsewhere, it might have been the case that discussion about rates 
was a relatively safe topic to record.71 Therefore, the recorded instances of discussions 
focused upon the matter of the Book of Rates may not reflect the amount of Aldermanic 
time devoted to it in relation to other issues. 
 
Reform of the customs system was badly needed. In the late 1470s, Edward IV had 
complained that fraud was rife amongst the Mercers, and Henry VII had made similar 
complaints in the 1490s. Declaration of customs due by oath was an invitation to play 
bluff, and a lack of administrative control allowed corruption and smuggling to 
proliferate. The introduction of a formal book of rates altered the emphasis from fraud 
detection by the paid bureaucratic staff of the port of London to a means of formally 
assessing stock shipped through the port. It is an example of the increasing 
formalisation of the functions of Crown officers, a process that was to accelerate under 
Cardinal Wolsey in the next reign.  
 
3.4. Taxes 
In the fifteenth century the predominant form of lay subsidy, granted by parliament, 
was the ‘fifteenth and tenth’, a fractional tax levied on the movable goods of the king’s 
lay subjects.72 A fifteenth was levied in the countryside and a tenth in the boroughs and 
ancient demesne lands of the Crown. The tax was levied at a rate fixed from 1334 
onwards, with each vill or borough assigned an overall quota, collected by the 
authorities within those entities, and therefore all taxes of this kind uniformly yielded 
about £37,000 for the entire realm.73 Changes in inflation and geography eroded both 
the real and actual yield of the tax over the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
                                                 
71 Rep.2, ff.57, 57v. 
72 Jurkowski, ‘Taxation’, 271-290. 
73 Jurkowski, ‘Taxation’, 272; Dietz, English Finance, 13-14. 
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centuries, and in 1449 a rebate of £6,000 was introduced to make allowance for these 
changes, rendering the total yield to between £32,000 and £33,000.74 The Crown’s 
method of overcoming these problems was to request multiple grants of fifteenths and 
tenths. This model of taxation was rarely deviated from in the fifteenth century, partly 
as to do so was to invite administrative chaos and cost, and partly because any change 
in the system was resisted by the Commons.75  
 
London’s contribution to the normal yield of a fifteenth and tenth was £618 3s 5d, 
nearly two per cent of the whole.76 Though this amount was over three times as much 
as that paid by the next biggest urban centre, Bristol, it was still considerably less than 
might be expected, given London’s assessed wealth was over seventeen times that of 
Bristol’s in the 1520s.77 This discrepancy was to be addressed with the introduction of 
the Tudor subsidy in 1510 and developed throughout the sixteenth century, so that 
London’s contribution to the Elizabethan subsidies was between ten and twelve per 
cent of the total amount raised.78 London, in common with the urban centres of Bath, 
Canterbury, Coventry, Gloucester, Leicester, Norwich, Oxford, Southampton, York 
and Bristol, was considered a borough, as opposed to part of a county.79 Yet London 
was not taxed at the rate of a tenth, unlike the other borough towns and cities, but at a 
fifteenth. The reason for this was the traditional exclusion of the capital from payments 
of tallage, a predecessor of parliamentary taxation, an arbitrary royal tax levied on the 
royal boroughs. In place of tallage, the City was obliged to provide aid such as was 
asked from the king’s tenants-in-chief.80 Despite this, London had been frequently 
unsuccessful in avoiding the payment of tallage, but the right to pay the lower rate of 
tax stuck, and hence London remained under-taxed in relation to its wealth.81 Bristol 
paid the next highest amount, at £185 8s 1½d, and York £160 10s.82  
                                                 
74 Dietz, English Finance, 14. 
75 Jurkowski, ‘Taxation’, 272. 
76 Roger Schofield, Taxation Under the Early Tudors, 1485-1558 (Oxford, 2004), 56. 
77 Barron, London, 45. 
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79 Schofield, Taxation, 55-6. 
80 Baron, London, 11-12. 
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Jo.10, f.99. Barron, London, 11-12. 
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In common with every vill and borough, London had allotted quotas to be raised for 
each fifteenth to each of its wards. 
 
Ward Contribution 
Aldersgate £7 
Aldgate £6 
Bassishaw £7 
Billingsgate £32 
Bishopsgate £13 
Bread Street £37 
Bridge £32 
Broad Street £27 
Candlewick Street £16 
Castle Baynard £12 
Cheap £52 16s 
Coleman Street £15 16s 9d 
Cordwainer Street £52 16s 
Cornhill £16 
Cripplegate £40 
Dowgate £36 
Farringdon Within £50 
Farringdon Without £35 
Langbourn £21 
Lime Street £1 19s 11d 
Portsoken £6 
Queenhithe £20 
Tower £26 
Vintry £16 13s 4d 
Walbrook £33 6s 8d 
 
Table 3.2. Distribution of tax among the wards. Source: The Great Chronicle of London, 265-6. 
 
Two taxes in the reign of Henry VII differed from the normal fifteenth and tenth model. 
The 1489 tax was directly modelled on that of 1472, with the overall sum to be raised 
capped at £100,000, including £25,000 to be levied upon the clergy.83 Just over a 
quarter of the anticipated amount was raised, with the Great Chronicler blaming the 
                                                 
83 Cavill, ‘Henry VII and Parliament’, 147; Schofield, Taxation, ch.4. 
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inefficiency of the commissioners and the costs involved in levying the tax.84 The 
subsidy was such a disaster that once the failure of the subsidy was acknowledged in 
parliament the king pardoned the outstanding amount, receiving in exchange a grant of 
a fifteenth and tenth.85 In 1497, with war against Scotland pending, the Crown’s need 
for funds was met by a loan of £120,000 sanctioned by the Great Council in lieu of a 
parliamentary grant of two fifteenths and tenths.86 The taxation granted by this 
parliament was collected by specially appointed commissioners who assessed 
individual contributions, though unlike the tax of 1489 it had a fixed county quota.87 In 
London, the Court of Aldermen appointed four of their number to assist the justices of 
the peace in the City in this assessment.88 The aldermen were then responsible for the 
collection of the tax within their own wards.89 The cancellation of the war with Scotland 
led to the cancellation of the second of the two grants made by parliament on this 
occasion.90 
 
In 1504 Henry VII sought from parliament a grant of two feudal aids, for the knighting 
of Prince Arthur and the marriage of his daughter, Margaret, to James IV of Scotland. 
Arthur had been knighted in 1489 and in 1504 he had been dead for nearly two years, 
whilst Margaret’s marriage had taken place the year before. The motives of the king, 
therefore, were rather questionable, probably stemming from both a desire to establish 
and reinforce the boundaries of the royal prerogative and the financial windfall this 
might represent. Parliament did not dispute Henry’s right to the aids, but it was apparent 
in the vigorous debates provoked by the request that the Commons feared that the 
consequent investigation into feudal tenures ‘shuld be to theym doutefull, uncerteyn 
and gret inquietnes’.91 The aversion of the Commons to such investigations was not a 
new phenomenon: in 1472 Edward IV was granted an unusual subsidy to raise 13,000 
archers, to be levied in the form of a tax of a tenth of all income derived from lands, 
                                                 
84 GC, 243. 
85 Cavill, ‘Henry VII and Parliament’, 148. 
86 Chrimes, Henry VII, 199; Cavill, ‘Henry VII and Parliament’, 186. 
87 Chrimes, Henry VII, 200; Cavill, ‘Henry VII and Parliament’, 186. 
88 Rep.1, f.13v. 
89 Jo.10, f.99; Rep.1, f.14v. 
90 Jo.10, f.112. 
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tenements, rents, fees, annuities, offices, corrodies and pensions of all temporal 
possessions.92 The Commons ensured that records of individuals’ income were not ever 
submitted to the Exchequer nor kept for future use.93 Stanley Chrimes hypothesized 
that Henry’s motive for requesting these aids was to initiate a far-reaching inquiry into 
tenure holdings and feudal rights as part of his wider policy of extending the royal 
prerogative.94 To avoid such an inquiry the Commons offered a subsidy of £40,000, 
justifying it not only on the grounds of the feudal aids due, but also as necessary for the 
defence of the realm.95 The king accepted the offer, and remitted £10,000 as a goodwill 
gesture. Thus he received approximately the equivalent amount of a fifteenth and tenth.  
 
3.4.1. Civic Taxation 
In addition to the taxation imposed upon the City by parliament and the customs 
charges made upon the merchants, Londoners were occasionally subject to civic 
taxation. Civic taxation was not generally imposed for the usual expenses of the City, 
for these were normally met by the revenues of the City chamber and the Bridge derived 
from property, City tolls, apprenticeships and freedom fees.96 Large expenditure on 
civic projects, however, occasionally necessitated taxation to raise the necessary funds. 
In 1493 civic taxation of a fifteenth was levied to fund the repair of the aqueduct on 
Gracechurch Street after a two year investigation into its condition had been 
undertaken.97 The 5,000 marks payable to the king for the renewal of the City’s charter 
in 1504 was also raised by a fifteenth. This was to be raised in five tranches, each of 
1,000 marks or £666, and thus five fifteenths were necessary to raise the full amount.98 
 
Civic taxation was commonly employed to raise money for costly pageantry for the 
celebration of royal occasions. It was decided in Common Council as early as May 
1500 that a fifteenth and a half would be levied upon the inhabitants of the City to pay 
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for the celebrations expected upon the arrival of Kathryn of Aragon in London prior to 
her wedding to Prince Arthur.99 In July 1501, four months before Kathryn’s arrival, the 
money was still being collected and auditors were assigned to deal with the expenses 
incurred by the pageant.100 Similarly a levy of a civic tax of one and a half fifteenths 
was agreed by the Common Council to fund the City’s contribution to the celebrations 
surrounding the coronation of Henry VIII.101 In addition to having to contribute 
towards a civic tax to pay for such events, citizens might also have to pay small amounts 
towards their own livery company’s role in royal occasions. The accounts of the 
Drapers, Ironmongers and Leathersellers, for example, reflect the costs incurred for 
hiring and decorating a barge to greet the king in 1485.102 The Drapers’ Company was 
later to spend a total of 5s 11d on barge hire and decoration on the occasion of the 
Queen’s coronation.103 The costs of the demands for pageantry and celebration 
represented yet another royal drain on the wealth of the citizens. 
 
3.5. Gifts and Loans  
The decision of London’s Common Council to send representatives of the City to 
Henry VII after his victory at Bosworth set the initial tone for the relationship between 
the City and the monarch. In a display of deference, loyalty and fealty, not to mention 
self-preservation and pragmatism, the capital sent leading citizens in a deputation to 
the king to assure him of the support and good faith of the City. Just as importantly, a 
gift of 1,000 marks was given to the king in tacit acknowledgement that the City would 
provide practical support in future by providing the ready cash that a new monarch 
would undoubtedly need.104 This was a spontaneous gift given in addition to the usual 
1,000 marks given by the City towards the coronation expenses of a new monarch. 
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Though Henry was to use the financial services offered by the City, he did not take 
advantage of them as much as did his predecessors. Between 1448 and1460 the ailing 
government of Henry VI received fourteen loans or gifts from the corporation of 
London.105 Edward IV, in the nine months between July 1460 and April 1461, received 
a total of £11,000 in corporate loans and gifts from the capital.106 This amount was 
unprecedented and perhaps reflected the desperation of the Londoners to ensure that 
once they had committed themselves to support Edward’s bid for the throne their 
candidate succeeded and thus save them from the vengeful wrath of the Lancastrians.107 
Henry VII received the same amount in loans over the first four years of his reign, not 
including the three 1,000 mark gifts he received on the occasions of his accession and 
his and his queen’s (separate) coronations.108  
 
Loans from Londoners to the king came in three forms: corporate loans from the 
inhabitants of the City of London, loans from the fellowship of the Staple of Calais, or 
directly from individuals. As the merchants involved in these loans were frequently the 
same, a large loan from one of these sources might impinge on the ability of the others 
to offer finance. Rarely were loans made directly by the livery companies, though this 
had happened in 1460-1 when the Drapers and the Grocers lent £200 each to the future 
Edward IV and the Fishmongers a further £133 6s 8d.109 The Mercers objected when 
Henry VII sent letters to the Livery Companies directly to request loans in January 
1486/7, resolving to request the Common Serjeant to suggest to the Lord Treasurer that 
the king redirect his request to the ‘hole Citie’ via the mayor.110 They were forced to 
capitulate when, at a meeting of the fellowships at which the Treasurer was present, the 
Goldsmiths stated that they would be prepared to acquiesce to the king’s request, an 
                                                 
105 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 93. Not all the amounts of the fourteen awards are known as only 
£2,000 in loan and £1,000 in gifts can be definitely identified. 
106 Though it is to be noted that Edward only formally ascended the throne in March 1461. Barron, 
‘London and the Crown’, 102-4. 
107 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 97. 
108 Jo.9, ff.84, 91, 161. See table 3.3 below. 
109 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 107, n.66. 
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act attributed in the Mercers’ records to the desire of the Goldsmiths to ‘have sureties 
certen lordes and bisshoppes to them bounden’.111 
 
Frederick Dietz, after an extensive search of the receipt rolls of the Exchequer for the 
first year of Henry’s reign, concluded that a total of £10,121 17s 4d had been received 
in loans during this time from a combination of individuals (including prelates, 
magnates, and various foreign and indigenous merchants) and the City of London.112 
All of these loans were paid off within the year. The Londoners provided a large 
proportion of this amount, including at least one corporate loan of £2,000, just over 
£1,000 from the Staplers of Calais and at least £1,000 from individual members of the 
London mercantile community.113 Therefore, over two thirds of the amount calculated 
by Dietz was gathered from the capital, unsurprising given the ability of the City to 
raise ready finance. Given the faults with Dietz’s methodology highlighted by Wolffe 
and Richardson, this figure can be used for indicative purposes only as the minimum 
amount that the Crown received in loans in his first year, as allowances must be made 
for loans paid directly into the king’s Chamber, for which we do not have records 
during this vital time. 
 
3.5.1 Corporate loans 
Ordinarily, a corporate loan from the City would be requested by the king in a letter 
explaining his need for financial aid.114 On rare occasions, when the king’s need was 
particularly pressing, this request would be presented to the mayor and aldermen by 
senior members of the king’s council or administration. Early in 1486 the Lord 
Treasurer, John, lord Dinham, Reynold Bray, and ‘othyr honourable personagis’ went 
to the mayor to ask for a loan of 6,000 marks. The mayor then assembled the aldermen 
                                                 
111 Acts, 297. 
112 Dietz, English Finance, 1485-1558, 51-52. 
113 TNA, E405/75 & E401/957. It is probable that more than the above figure was received in loan from 
individuals within London, for many loans are recorded as being from Bray as per letters (possibly loans 
requested by signet letters and collected by Bray) or loans to be repaid into the hands of Bray, which he 
would then pass on to the lender. It is highly unlikely that all the loans recorded as being from Bray (or 
Dinham and Cornborough) were from him but rather were procured by him from contacts within the 
City. 
114 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 91. 
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and Common Council to discuss the request.115 Similarly, in November 1496, Bray and 
other members of the king’s council approached the mayor and ‘his brethir’ to deliver 
the king’s request for a loan for £10,000 to defend the realm against the Scots.116 The 
mayor, again, assembled the Common Council at which Bray made a personal appeal 
on the king’s behalf and the commons agreed to lend £4,000, which ‘was well and 
thankfully takyn’ by the king.117 As the 1486 loan was the first requested by the king 
of the City and the 1496 one was an unusually large amount it can be concluded that 
requests delivered by high-ranking personnel were reserved for when the stakes were 
higher than usual. That the exact approach taken by the king in his request of other 
loans during the reign is not recorded, either in the chronicles or in the Journal of the 
Common Council, suggests that the usual form of a letter was used. Once a request for 
a loan had been received, the mayor would then assemble the Common Council to 
approve and agree the size of the loan.118 The method for collecting the loan would 
then be decided and individuals appointed to collect the funds.119  
 
In addition to the large corporate loans it is apparent that the king also used the civic 
administration’s ability to provide ready finance for short-term loans. These were 
usually small in amount, limited to a couple of months in duration and not ordinarily 
recorded in the civic records. The reasons for this can be guessed at: it is possible that 
because of their small size they could be raised through a few select members of the 
Court of Aldermen or other members of the civic administration. Occasionally they 
were raised on a relatively informal basis through the companies. The minutes of the 
court of the Mercers’ Company records how in March 1489 the king requested from 
the corporation of London a loan of £1,400 for the term of two months to fund the 
provision of 1,000 men of war to Calais.120 The mayor’s request of the Mercers’ 
Company’s assistance in raising this amount was not met with enthusiasm, for after 
                                                 
115 GC, 240. 
116 GC, 274-5. 
117 GC, 275; Vit. XVI, 212. The civic journal records only the Common Council’s approval of the loan. 
Jo.10, f.80v. 
118 Jo.9, ff.114, 151, 191v, 232, 251v, 273v, 274; Jo.10, f.80v. 
119 Jo.9, f.224v. 
120 Acts, 189. No corresponding entry appears in the Journal of Common Council, and therefore it is 
likely that Common Council approval was not needed in this instance. 
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‘remembering’ that they had only recently given to the collectors their contribution of 
£760 towards a corporate loan of £4,000, the Mercers agreed to the new loan only after 
the seven aldermen of their company agreed to contribute £70 towards their company’s 
allotted contribution of £170 so that no other individual within the fellowship would 
have to contribute more than 40s.121 In compliance with the established norms of 
financial negotiation with the City the king did not receive the full amount that he had 
requested, receiving on this occasion only half.122 The loan was duly repaid after two 
months and no record of it was made in the Journals of the Common Council.123 A 
similar small loan was made in August 1489 of £1,000 and levied upon the livery 
companies.124 That the civic administration had co-ordinated this loan is confirmed by 
an entry in the Goldsmiths’ Minute Book, which states that the company was to deliver 
£70, its contribution to a loan of £1,000 to the king, by 6 July that year.125  
 
An entry in the Journals of Common Council records the appointment of six men in 
July 1486 to collect various unspecified sums of money granted to the king.126 This 
does not appear to relate to the only corporate loan then outstanding, delivered to the 
Exchequer in February of that year, nor to the gifts of money made on the accession 
and coronation of the king, as claimed by Guth, as the City was too efficient too wait 
almost a year to arrange the collection of such amounts.127 It is suggestive, therefore, 
of one or more of the many smaller loans made by the City and received directly into 
the king’s Chamber.  
 
Unlike his father-in-law, Henry was careful to repay loans promptly, usually a year 
after they were given, thus maintaining, to use modern parlance, a good credit rating.128 
Edward IV, by contrast, only absolved himself of the £11,000 debt incurred at the 
beginning of his reign in 1478, when he sold certain City monopolies and lands for the 
                                                 
121 Acts, 189. 
122 The loan was only £700 in total, TNA, E401/964. 
123 TNA, E405/75, m.51d. 
124 TNA, E401/966; Goldsmiths’ Company, Minute Book A, f.303. 
125 Goldsmiths’ Company, Minute Book A, f.303. 
126 Jo.9, f.114 
127 Guth, ‘Dun Cowe’, 204 n.90. 
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sum of his indebtedness.129 Henry’s loan repayments were made in cash rather than by 
assignment and were repaid to representatives of the City selected by the Common 
Council, and the amount was then given to the City Chamberlain who would oversee 
its distribution to the contributing parties.130 Repayments were sometimes made in 
instalments: a payment made out of the Exchequer in 1490 of £2,009 was the final 
instalment of repayment of a £4,000 loan made by the City in February 1489.131  
 
There is no evidence that interest was paid on any of the loans made by the City to the 
king. The amount approved in the Common Council meetings is always the same as 
that received into the Exchequer, thus McFarlane’s supposition, that the Exchequer 
received an amount lower than the loan amount agreed to take account of interest due 
on the sum, is not applicable to corporate loans made by London to the Crown during 
Henry’s reign.132 Nor was interest attached to the loan upon repayment. The question 
of why corporations and individuals were willing to lend for no financial gain has been 
ably answered by Gerald Harriss who argues that loans were an expression of the 
subject’s obligation to provide aid to the Crown in times of necessity and therefore by 
their very nature they were interest-free.133 The subject was expected to help the king 
in his plight, not profit by it.  
 
Though Henry was to receive a total of £19,000 in loans approved by the Common 
Council during his reign, not including small, short-dated loans, only one corporate 
loan from the City of London was made prior to the battle of Stoke in June 1487, for 
the sum of £2,000.134 Even considering the two gifts of 1,000 marks each made at 
                                                 
129 See chapter 2, section 2.1.2. 
130 E.g., Jo.9, f.224v; TNA, E405/75, m.4. 
131 TNA, E405/78, m.5d. The payment appears under the heading of Michaelmas term, 1489, but it could 
refer to a payment made by the Exchequer anytime up until the end of February 1490. Given that £4,000 
was lent to the king in February 1489 (Jo.9, 191b; TNA, E401/964) it makes it likely that payment was 
a year later. 
132 K.B. McFarlane, ‘Loans to the Lancastrian Kings: the Problem of Inducement’, in his England in the 
Fifteenth Century, 63-65. 
133 G.L. Harriss, ‘Aids, Loans and Benevolences’, Historical Journal, vi (1963), 17-18. 
134 GC, 240; TNA, E405/75, E401/957. Some companies had already received payment of their share of 
the loan from the first instalment; the Mercers received £730 in December 1489. (Acts, 198) The Mercers 
and the other mercantile companies were probably prioritised; the Carpenters had to wait until later in 
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Henry’s accession and coronation by the City, the king’s need for financial help after 
the battle of Bosworth renders this surprising. The willingness of the City to provide 
financial help after the battle and possible reasons for this have already been discussed, 
but the lack of help before Stoke is marked if compared to that given to Edward IV or 
even Richard III in the first eighteen months of their reigns.135 Two possible arguments 
can be made for the lack of loans taken from the City prior to the battle of Stoke. It is 
conceivable that Henry was reluctant to indebt himself to one corporate body, 
particularly one with political influence in its own right, until he felt he had firmly 
established his own authority. He may also have been reluctant to ask the mercantile 
community for funding when he was determined to impose his will upon them in 
diplomatic matters.136 Alternatively, the City of London may have considered the king 
a bad investment, and demanded collateral or terms for loans (unrecorded) that the king 
found unacceptable, terms that were removed after the battle of Stoke when Henry 
appeared to be more secure in his position. After Stoke, the stream of finance from the 
City to the Crown became more regular. A £4,000 loan was approved in December of 
1488, £2,000 was lent in 1489 and the same amount the year after. £3,000 was lent in 
1491 and a final corporate loan of £4,000 was given in 1496.137  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1490 to receive the £8 they contributed to the ‘Grette loan’: Records of the Carpenters’ Company, ed. 
Bower Marsh (Oxford, 1914),ii, 83. 
135 Jo.9, ff.56, 78v, 81, 85. 
136 See Chapter 2, section 2.3. 
137 See Table 3.3. 
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Year Date Amount Source 
1486 Jan/Feb £2,000 GC, 240 
TNA E401/957 
1487 Jul/Aug £2,000 Jo.9, f. 151 
TNA E101/413/2/1 f.4v 
1488/9 Dec/Jan £4,000 Jo.9, f. 191v 
TNA, E401/964 
1489 Jun/Jul £2,000 Jo.9, f. 232. Agreed to lend until 30 Dec. 
TNA E36/124, f.19 
1490 June £2,000 Jo. 9, f. 251v 
TNA, E405/78, m.17 
1491 June £3,000 Jo. 9, ff.273v, 274 
1496 Nov £4,000 Jo. 10, f. 80v 
TNA E36/14, f.339 
 
Table 3.3. Loans extended to the Crown by the City.  
Note: This table does not include small, short-dated loans not approved by the Common Council. 
 
There is no record in the civic records of the first loan on this table. This loan was 
received into the Exchequer 23 February 1486 and, as discussed, the king’s request for 
the loan had been conveyed to the Guildhall by Bray and Dinham personally.138 As it 
was the first loan to be raised by allocation to the Livery Companies rather than the 
wards ‘ffor the more ease of the pore people’ it is possible that it was decided that 
approval was required only by the wardens of the companies, rather than the Common 
Council.139 The only reference to this loan extant in the City records is in the approval 
of a loan in July 1487 which, it was stated, was to be levied in the same way.140  
 
All of the loans made 1486 and 1490 were levied upon the companies, whereas those 
of 1491 and 1496 were levied on the wards.141 Raising funds by company was probably 
preferred as the companies were organised administrative units capable of collecting 
money from their members quickly, but using them omitted many elements of society, 
                                                 
138 TNA, E401/957; GC, 240. 
139 GC, 240. On 24 Jan 1486 a meeting in the Guildhall took place with the mayor and aldermen and the 
masters and wardens of the companies and their assistants in attendance. Though no details of the 
meeting were recorded it is likely that this assembly approved the loan request. Jo.9, f.95. 
140 Jo.9, f.151. 
141 Jo.9, ff.151, 191v, 232, 251v, 273v-4; Jo.10, f.80v. 
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not just the poor, as the Great Chronicle claimed, but also aliens, employees of the royal 
household or other noble households, women, servants and members of the gentry. 
Administratively raising funds though the livery companies might have been easier, as 
money raised by the wards was done so with the imposition of a tax of a fifteenth, or 
however many fifteenths were required to make up the requested sum. As each fifteenth 
in the City raised just over £630, raising a few thousand pounds was not an exact 
science. The 1491 loan, approved by Common Council in June for £2,000, highlights 
this problem.142 Negotiation must have taken place between the City and the Crown 
administration as soon as Common Council approval was given, as three days later 
another meeting was called to approve raising the amount of the loan to £3,000.143 It 
appears likely that the collection of funds had already commenced in the City, and that 
raising the extra £1,000 presented some logistical problems, for the Exchequer received 
only £2,802 8s 7d.144 To account for the discrepancy between the amount expected into 
the Exchequer and the amount received, a crossed out payment of £197 11s 4d, noted 
as part of a £3,000 loan from the City, appears in the Tellers’ rolls with the marginal 
note that not all of the expected £3,000 had been received.145 Further evidence of 
difficulty raising the sum is to be found in a receipt in which the mayor, Hugh Clopton, 
acknowledged a contribution towards the loan by the Abbot of St. Augustine of 
Canterbury of £186 13s.146 It is doubtful, given the financial resources of the City, that 
this type of arrangement was a frequent occurrence and how it came about is a matter 
of conjecture; possibly it was brokered through the contacts of one of the aldermen. 
 
The reason for switching to levying the loans by ward rather than company is perhaps 
that by 1491, and certainly 1496, when the last two loans were made, heavy financial 
demands had already been made upon the citizens. These demands did not just take the 
form of loans on both the City and individuals but also in the form of taxation, 
benevolences and sums involved in the provision of pageantry for royal occasions. 
                                                 
142 Jo.9, f.273v. 
143 Jo.9, f.274. 
144 TNA, E405/78, m.29. 
145 TNA, E405/78, m.34d. The record of the repayment of this loan also makes reference to this 
discrepancy; TNA, E405/78, m.41. The error in calculation was the tellers’ own. 
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Opting to raise money through the wards would have increased the number of taxpayers 
and so reduced the burden on those who had already contributed large amounts. 
 
Henry VII was never refused a loan, unlike Henry VI, who on seven occasions between 
1448 and 1460 was met with excuses of diplomatic poverty by the City.147 That does 
not mean that the City always gave financial aid willingly to Henry VII. After it was 
decided that the £4,000 loan of 1496 was to be levied upon the wards, assessors were 
appointed for each ward, and they and their assistants had to swear to assess the citizens 
in their jurisdiction ‘sparyng no man for favour nor grevyng no p[er]sone for hate’.148 
That the loan was not popular is suggested by the apparent reluctance of some aldermen 
to pay their share. On 10 January 1497 aldermen were reminded that their contribution 
to the loan was due by the 25th of that month.149 Yet in March some of the sum was still 
outstanding and it was agreed in the Court of Aldermen that those who further defaulted 
would be committed to ward until the money was paid.150 Ominously it was added that 
this would apply to the Recorder as well as to the aldermen, suggesting that Robert 
Sheffield had also been reluctant to pay his share. The loan, because of its size and 
perhaps also because of the truculence of the citizens, was paid into the Exchequer in 
two tranches, of £1,600 and £2,400.151  
 
This loan was not a usual corporate loan, but rather was a part of the so-called ‘forced-
loan’ of 1496, authorised by the Great Council that met in October that year in 
Westminster. The council authorised a loan of £120,000, to be raised throughout the 
country on the security of a forthcoming grant of taxation by parliament, and was to be 
employed in the defence of the kingdom against the Scots.152 Individuals, not only in 
London but throughout the country, were approached for funds, though few London 
merchants contributed in addition to the corporate loan. John Shaa, the London 
                                                 
147 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 93. 
148 Jo.10, f.83; GC, 212. 
149 Rep.1, f.10v. 
150 Rep.1, f.13. 
151 TNA, E36/14, ff.226, 286, 339. 
152 Hannes Kleineke, ‘Morton’s Fork? – Henry VII’s ‘Forced Loan’ of 1496’, Tant D’Emprises – So 
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Goldsmith, contributed £333 6s 8d, the same amount the City of Norwich paid as a 
whole.153 The only individuals to contribute larger amounts were Reynold Bray, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury John Morton and John, Lord Dinham, at £666 13s 4d 
each.154 Like London, the civic leaders of other major towns and cities such as Bristol, 
Norwich, Southampton and Canterbury were approached personally by a royally 
appointed commissioner.155 Bristol corporately gave £638 6s 8d.156 In other cities such 
as Exeter, York and Lincoln commissioners negotiated with individual men for their 
personal contribution.157  
 
The application of the epithet ‘forced’ to this loan has been questioned by some 
scholars. K.B. McFarlane, Gerald Harriss, Stanley Chrimes and Hannes Kleineke all 
pointed out that this loan was not ‘forced’ in the modern sense of the word, but rather 
the pressure exerted on individuals and corporations to contribute was a moral one.158 
Chrimes makes the point that loans invited by Signet letters, as this one was, might be 
difficult to refuse, but none the less resulted in loans that were made by agreement 
rather than under duress.159 The sums requested were just that, they had to be asked for, 
usually with a justification outlining the need of the monarch. Amounts asked for were 
not assessed, were generally rather small, were requested from rich individuals and 
usually repaid. In this instance ‘bills of mutuum’ were promised as security for 
repayment.160 London’s mayor handed the City’s bill to the City’s Chamberlain for 
safekeeping, and the careful recording of this event suggests that it was exceptional to 
receive such a receipt, though one would expect that the City would have received some 
sort of formal memoranda from the Exchequer acknowledging the receipt of all loans 
from the City to the Crown.161 
 
                                                 
153 TNA, E36/14, ff.226, 286; TNA, E179/265/32, ff.14 & 60. 
154 TNA, E36/14, f.226; TNA, E179/265/32, ff.60 & 61. 
155 Kleineke, ‘Morton’s Fork?’, 320. 
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159 Chrimes, Henry VII, 202-3. 
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3.5.2. Individual loans   
The complaint recorded in the Acts of Court of the Mercers’ Company that the king 
had requested loans directly from various members of their company has already been 
mentioned. The exact content of that complaint is worth relating. In January 1486 the 
Mercers complained that: 
  
the kyng hath sende his letters myssyves unto dyuers parsons of oure felyshipp of the 
mercery and also unto certen parsons of dyuers & many other felyshippes to have 
certen mony by mean of prest [loan or advance], that is to witt of sum parsone xl li. & 
sum xx li.162 
 
No precedent existed for such a demand, continued the complaint. This is incorrect, as 
the practice of requesting loans from individuals through the medium of letters from 
the king under the seal of the signet was well established and had recently been 
employed by Richard III.163 It is possible that the amounts requested were 
unprecedented or that the scale was unprecedented, or perhaps the letters were not 
couched in usual terms. It was eventually agreed that each company would be set an 
amount to lend, and it is probable that in this manner the loan of £2,000 given to the 
Crown in 1486 was agreed and raised, and this may account for its absence in the civic 
records.164 
 
The king was not deterred from approaching individuals for loans, and was to do so 
successfully later that same year. Over 100 individual Londoners lent sums ranging 
from sixty shillings to the £33 6s 8d given by each alderman.165 Just over £1,000 was 
received by the Exchequer in total from this source between December 1486 and March 
1487.166 The loans were of short duration, with most repaid during the following terms, 
with the exception of twenty-two of the aldermen, who received half the repayment in 
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163 Hannes Kleineke, ‘The Commission De Mutuo Faciendo in the Reign of Henry VI’, EHR, cxvi 
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the Easter term of that year and the other half during the Michaelmas term.167 The 
amounts given in loan by individuals at this time may serve as an indication of their 
wealth relative to each other. Londoners were not the only ones to be approached in 
this way; over a dozen Bristol merchants also gave loans ranging between £3 and £20, 
though they had to wait two years for repayment.168 The prioritisation of the repayment 
of City debts over others may be indicative of Crown policy to maintain an exemplary 
financial relationship with the capital and its citizens.  
 
Why Henry chose to raise money in this way rather than request a loan from the 
Corporation of London is unclear. Requesting, gathering, recording and repaying loans 
from individuals involved a heavy administrative burden. One corporate loan of £2,000 
was outstanding at the end of 1486, when the first of the individual loans was received 
by the Exchequer, but given that this sum was repayable in February 1487, and the total 
due from the individual loans was not realised until March 1487, it begs the question 
why another corporate loan was not requested. It is conceivable that smaller loans were 
given by the City on a short-dated basis, but there is no evidence for this in the 
Exchequer records, which, whilst not entirely intact for this period, have no major gaps. 
Was the fact that Henry took only one loan from the corporation of London before 1487 
indicative of his reluctance to be indebted to the City, or symptomatic of the City’s 
wariness of the new king? Is it possible that the king felt he could not berate the 
merchants for pursuing their own diplomatic relations with the Low Countries whilst 
in debt to them financially? Either way, whatever reason prevented the king from 
acquiring finance in this way before June 1487, it no longer existed after the battle of 
Stoke.  
 
A few individuals consistently lent money to the Crown, though lost relevant Chamber 
and Exchequer records makes construction of a complete picture of individual lending 
impossible. Despite this, regular lenders can be identified. The three biggest lenders in 
the first year of the reign by a large margin were Thomas Wyndowte, Edmund Shaa 
and his nephew John Shaa. Thomas Wyndowte, a Mercer, lent over £1100 in total 
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during Michaelmas term 1485, of which at least £760 was repaid the following term.169 
He went on to lend £400 at least in Easter term 1489 and over £300 in 1493.170 Why 
he might have been willing to lend such amounts remains a mystery; he was not 
knighted nor received any obvious rewards for his provision of financial services. He 
was possibly closely associated with Reynold Bray, who he named an executor of his 
will, and was prevailed upon by Bray to lend.171 He was perhaps offered benefits in 
kind, such as the opportunity to become a large supplier of goods for royal occasions, 
as he was to receive payments totalling at least £650 for goods supplied for the Queen’s 
coronation.172  
 
Sir Edmund Shaa lent at least £833 to the king in the first year of his reign.173 This is 
considerably more than we know he lent to Richard III over the same space of time, 
yet he is considered to be one of the most generous lenders to the Crown during that 
short reign.174 Edmund is also known to have lent Edward IV £635 at least, again less 
than the amount lent to Henry VII in 1485/6.175 John Shaa lent around £100 that can be 
traced in the records in the first year of the reign.176 In 1489 he lent at least £866, 
followed by a minimum of £300 the following year, £350 in 1491 and £300 in 1493.177 
In all likelihood John Shaa lent a lot more but deposited his loans into the Chamber, as 
his position in the port of London as Searcher would have enabled him to acquire 
repayment quickly and easily, and many repayments for him are noted as being 
assigned on money collected by him at the port of London.178 Other lenders gave 
smaller amounts: Sir Henry Colet lent around £132 in 1485 and £333 6s 8d in 1489.179 
Thomas Riche and Thomas Fuller both lent over £100 in the first year of the reign.180  
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This is by no means a long list of individual lenders to the Crown and if one supposed 
that the extant Exchequer records contained the sum of all individual loans to the 
Crown then the unlikely conclusion could be drawn that Henry VII lacked influential 
and wealthy supporters within the City. An alternative reading could be that it is another 
indication of Henry’s reluctance to be indebted to one individual or body, and perhaps 
he chose to spread his debt further than a handful of rich, powerful members of the 
London mercantile community. One of the extant Chamber receipt books covers the 
period July 1486 to September 1487, and again few loans from members of the 
mercantile community are to be found therein.181 It is possible that additional loans 
were received into the king’s chamber outside of this period, but we can only speculate 
what logic dictated which loans were to be received where. It is perhaps the case that 
receipts were shared between the two entities on a need basis. The plethora of small 
loans given by individuals in 1486 would have been too administratively onerous to be 
paid into the Chamber and therefore were received into the Exchequer.  
 
It is likely not only that many loans from individuals were received into the Chamber, 
but also that many trusted individuals within the Crown administration received money 
on behalf of the king. In the first decade of the reign there are many loans recorded in 
the Exchequer records from Reynold Bray and the Treasurer, John, Lord Dinham and 
his under-treasurer, Robert Lytton. These are often rather large and possibly represent 
not direct loans from these individuals but a consolidation of loans from their various 
contacts.182 Supporting this theory is the number of wealthy individuals that do not 
appear to have lent money to Henry VII yet are likely, given their connections to the 
court, to have been approached for funds. Hugh Brice, who lent over £3,800 to Edward 
IV by himself and just under £1,000 in syndicated loans, appears in the Exchequer 
records to have only lent money to Henry VII at the same time as many other high-
worth individuals in 1486.183 Given his obvious wealth, his previous generosity to the 
Crown and that he had been knighted by Henry in October 1485 one would have 
expected him to have been a contributor to the king’s coffers. Also nearly entirely 
                                                 
181 TNA, E101/413/2/1. 
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absent, except for their contribution to the individual loans of 1486, are the merchants 
William Capell, John Broun, John Fenkill and Robert Billesdon who were to be 
knighted by Henry in January 1486.184 
 
It is not recorded whether any security was provided for loans by individuals. No 
evidence survives to suggest that it was, yet both Edward IV and Richard III frequently 
gave high value jewels or plate to individuals as collateral. Exceptions to this were 
loans given by merchants who held positions within the port of London, presumably as 
they could hold customs or money acquired through their role as security for their loans 
or secure payment by assignment against customs income. The Queen, on the other 
hand, did give jewels as security for loans, as evidenced by Henry’s redemption of her 
loans outstanding after her death.185  
 
One last source of loans from the mercantile community of the City came from the 
fellowship of the Staple of Calais. These worked slightly differently to the above 
described loans, in that a system of repayment from the taxes and customs the 
merchants paid on wool exported through the Staple had already been devised in the 
reign of Edward IV, as described above. 
 
3.6. The Benevolence of 1491  
The term ‘benevolence’ is derived from a ‘benevolent loan’, given as a token of the 
subject’s goodwill.186 In effect, the king, when requesting a benevolence, was offering 
to accept out of his good will a monetary contribution towards the costs of defending 
the realm in lieu of military service.187 In real terms the difference between a 
benevolence and a loan was that a benevolence was not expected to be repaid. In effect 
it was a subsidy, but not granted by the authority of parliament. The resentment caused 
by the 1473 and 1481 benevolences levied by Edward IV to fund his expeditions to 
                                                 
184 See Chapter 2, section 2.1.4. 
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France and Scotland prompted Richard III to outlaw the practice in the parliament of 
1484.188 
 
The benevolence of 1491, like that of 1473, was justified by the king’s intention to 
invade France and secure the borders of the realm. The benevolence was presented to 
the realm as a necessity for the security of the realm and imposed a moral obligation 
upon the subjects. The Great Chronicle describes how the London mayor, John 
Mathew, responded to this appeal in a time of need when he was summoned ‘afftyr he 
[the king] had ffelt the good wylls of his noblys’. Henry, apparently, ‘soo handelid hym 
by his grete policy, that he caused hym to graunte toward his good spede, If his grace 
yood in propyr persoon CCli.’189 This was certainly a more positive response than the 
one Edward IV received in 1473 from the then mayor, Robert Drope, who offered only 
£30. Mathew’s apparent willingness to contribute to the cause, with the caveat that he 
offered the money if the king would lead an army into France as he claimed he would 
do, indicates that this was not a ‘forced’ contribution, but one given in recognition of a 
good cause. Consequently all the other aldermen felt obliged to follow suit, though not 
all of them shared Mathew’s enthusiasm, for ‘Sundry of theym w’held the payment, 
term of theyr lyvys and then paid by theyr executours.’190 Sir William Horne was one 
such alderman who paid posthumously: his executor, John Stork, Grocer, settled the 
debt in March 1497.191  
 
Reluctance to pay may have been a consequence of the heavy financial burden imposed 
upon the City in that year, for as well as the benevolence the City also made a corporate 
loan of £3,000 to the king, as authorised by Common Council in June 1491.192 Whilst 
some of the elite of the capital, or indeed the realm, may have objected to the 
benevolence, such disapproval was not universal. No personal objections or refusals to 
pay the benevolence are recorded in the civic records, unlike in 1496.193 The Great 
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Chronicler pointed out that by visiting neighbouring counties and requesting money in 
person, Henry VII, like Edward IV before him, was able to raise greater sums, perhaps 
as much as he could have raised through the levying of four fifteenths but ‘wyth lesse 
grudge of hys commons, ffor this charge payd noon but men of good substaunce.’194  
 
Once the aldermen had made their contributions then the crafts and livery companies 
of the City were divided amongst various of Henry’s ministers (or commissioners) who 
then extracted benevolences from them, supposedly after assessing their ability to 
contribute.195 No consistent modus operandi was employed by the commissioners, and 
thus the unlucky members of the Drapers’ Company, who came under the auspices of 
Dr. John Morton, archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor, paid between £10 
and £40 each whereas the Mercers, who fell into the bishop of Winchester’s remit, had 
to pay only 40 marks each at the most.196 The Exchequer records confirm that the 
financial burden did not fall upon the companies according to their ability to pay; the 
Tailors paid a total of £334 whereas the richer company of the Mercers paid £160.197 
Hence Fabyan, the author of the Great Chronicle and himself a Draper, was to complain 
of the ‘hard dealyng of the lord Chaunceler’ and so the benevolence was nicknamed 
the ‘malyvolence’.198  
 
Morton appears to have played a prominent role in the benevolences of both 1473 and 
1491. In 1473 the Great Chronicle states that the equivalent of two fifteenths was raised 
by the king’s own labour and that of ministers he assigned in his stead, the only one 
named being ‘Bysshopp of Ely then doctor Morton’.199 The infamous ‘Morton’s Fork’, 
which asserted that those who spent little must have saved and therefore could make a 
considerable contribution to the king’s cause, and likewise those who displayed their 
wealth had money to spare, may or may not have been an invention by John Morton 
but his ‘hard dealing’ suggests it would not have been out of character. 
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Few individuals appear to have been approached for contributions over and above those 
that may have contributed via their companies. John Shaa, listed in the Exchequer 
notebook for the benevolence amongst the knights and personnel of the royal household 
rather than with those of the City, gave £100. Henry Colet doubled the £200 he was 
obliged to give as an alderman, the only alderman to contribute further funds to the 
king.200 John Wyngar and Laurence Aylmer, both later to serve as aldermen and 
mayors, gave £40 and £20 respectively.201 In total the City was to contribute £9,682 to 
the 1491 benevolence, nearly a fifth of the total amount raised of over £48,000. 202 
Retrospective authorisation by parliament for the collection of the benevolence was 
provided in 1495, when an act was passed to allow for the legal enforcement of the 
collection of arrears, both from individuals and collectors of the benevolence.203 
 
3.6.1. Redemption of Richard III’s pledges 
In a rather weak mitigation of the Benevolence of 1491, the Great Chronicler noted that 
Henry strove to repay some of the loans made to Richard III and thereby reclaimed 
items of jewels and plate that had been given as collateral. This particularly impressed 
Fabyan as ‘by hys [Henry’s] Royall power he mygth have cawsid to have been Restorid 
unto hys Tresory wythowth payment for theym.’204 Henry was also fair in his dealings 
with the creditors, ‘he of his goodnesse allowid unto alle such as hadd any of the sayd 
pledgys all such Summys as they hadd layd ffor theym.’205  
 
Whilst the claims made in the chronicle can be substantiated, it would appear that 
Henry had striven to repay Richard’s debts earlier in the reign rather than in a bid to 
distract from the unfairness of his benevolence. Richard Gardiner, alderman, had 
received 100 marks from the earl of Oxford sometime before mid December 1485 
which Gardiner had lent to Richard upon the security of a gold salt.206 At the same time 
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Gardiner received £100 as his share of the £2,400 lent to Richard III.207 Quite how 
Gardiner was able to secure repayment at this time is not clear. It may be that he had 
established a connection with the earl of Oxford, perhaps based upon lands Gardiner 
held in or near his home town of Exning in Suffolk.208 Evidence is lacking for the 
details of repayment of other amounts lent to Richard, but it is probable that Reynold 
Bray repaid at least some of the loans with money paid to him by the Exchequer in 
1485/6 for that purpose.209 
  
3.7. Financial pressure and the crisis of 1497 
Though effective financially, politically Henry’s taxation of his realm was problematic, 
resulting in two armed rebellions in 1489 and 1497.210 Not since Richard II’s reign had 
a monarch’s fiscal policy been met with violent resistance. Complaints about heavy 
taxation were by no means unusual: the rebel manifesto of 1469 listed the burden of 
taxation among its grievances, but two tax rebellions within the same reign was 
unprecedented.211 
 
The 1489 rebellion, provoked by the grant of taxation by the parliament of that year, 
had been preceded by intensive lobbying for local exemptions from payment of the 
second part of the 1487 taxation due and contributed to the death of the earl of 
Northumberland.212 Difficulties in collecting taxes persisted throughout the reign, 
particularly in the north, where payments were repeatedly late and incomplete.213 Sixty-
two per cent of actions prosecuted in the Exchequer by tax collectors against non-
payers during the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII were brought during the 1490s.214 
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This is not to say that objection to taxation was universal, for Schofield concluded that 
the greater part of tax revenue due in the early Tudor period was collected and paid into 
the Exchequer promptly.215 
 
There is no evidence of any serious objection to taxation in London during the reign, 
though protest about the heavy financial burdens placed upon the realm in 1496-7 was 
played out upon the doorstep of the capital. In May 1497 the actions of a tax collector 
in the west of Cornwall provoked a protest which quickly manifested itself as a 
widespread rebellion encompassing much of the south-west.216 In June at Blackheath, 
almost ten years to the day since the battle of Stoke, the king once more faced down 
rebels in battle. The Londoners fought with the king, though their most recent battle 
experience was confined to fighting off the forces of the bastard of Fauconberg in 
1471.217 
 
This was primarily a practical response on the part of the inhabitants of London rather 
than a demonstration of political affiliation. Rebels on the outskirts of the City 
presented a very real threat to the homes, businesses and lives of the Londoners, and 
therefore necessitated the organisation of a military response by the City. By 7 June the 
mayor and aldermen, with the Common Council and the wardens of the fellowships, 
met at Guildhall to discuss the threat, agreeing that every able-bodied man was to be 
prepared to defend the City at a moment’s notice.218 By 10 June the Common Council 
was informed that the rebels from Cornwall were currently at Guildford, making 
safeguarding the City a necessity.219 Orders were sent out to the wardens of the 
fellowships that read: 
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Purwith of yor fealiship as many p[er]sones as ye may make defensibly harneised and 
arrayed … for defence of this Citie and the worship of yor said fealiship to wayte uppon 
us at Ledenhall uppon Tuesday next comyng at ix of the clocke afore none not failing 
hereof in any wise.220 
 
Men were thus told that they must act for the defence of the City and the worship of 
their company, with no mention made of the king and the need to defeat those who 
rebelled against the Crown. The priority of the civic fathers was thus apparent: the City 
must be defended by force of arms. That the civic fathers and inhabitants of the City 
were motivated by self-preservation mattered little to the king, who after the battle 
knighted the mayor, John Tate, and his sheriffs, Richard Haddon and John Shaa, as 
well as the Recorder, Robert Sheffield, for their part in the fray.221 
 
Ian Arthurson has questioned whether this was purely a protest against the taxation 
policy of the government, stating that political motives underpinned the actions of the 
rebels. The scale of the repercussions of the rebellion, coupled with the fact that 
Cornishmen did not feature heavily amongst the individuals singled out for 
punishment, is suggestive of government belief that the root cause of the rebellion was 
a desire to dethrone Henry rather than merely an expression of dissatisfaction with 
taxation policy.222 This premise is contested by Paul Cavill, who is inclined to take the 
accounts of contemporary commentators at face value when they claimed that the 
rebels’ intention had been to punish those of the king’s advisers who had persuaded 
him to seek taxes.223 That Londoners were disinclined to participate in the unrest on 
the side of the rebels might be explained partly by the City’s natural reluctance to 
involve itself in national politics and so risk negative royal attention, and by its ability 
to pay the taxes demanded of it. No organised protest against government taxation took 
place in the capital and the only sign that the inhabitants may have considered the 
Crown’s demands to be high is the reluctance of some individuals to contribute to the 
agreed corporate loans. 
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If one accepts Cavill’s argument, then it is possible that the Londoners did not have 
much sympathy for the 1497 rebels. The burden of taxation did not hit the capital hard, 
contributing a total of just under £4,330 as its share of the seven grants of fifteenths 
and tenths collected between 1487 and 1497. As a proportion of the total yield of 
taxation in this time (£217,000 gross, £203,000 net) London’s contribution represents 
barely two per cent, which is utterly disproportionate to its size and wealth.224 That is 
not to say that the Londoners were happy with their financial lot, for some of the 
aldermen had contributed to the 1496 corporate loan of £4,000 only reluctantly, 
indicating that perhaps some of the elite of the City at least were not far from the end 
of their financial tethers.225 However, given the Crown’s propensity for repaying 
promptly they are likely to have been in the minority.226 Arguably, until this point in 
time, the City had only been subjected to what might be termed ‘financial extortion’ 
once, and that was when a total of £9,682 17s 4d was raised from the City for the 1491 
benevolence.227 Given that the total yield of the benevolence was around £48,000, 
London’s portion of the total sum extracted from the realm was more in keeping with 
its wealth.228 Compared to the rest of the realm London had financially not fared badly 
in the first seventeen years of the reign. 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
Henry is reputed to have left full coffers for his son, Henry VIII, to squander. Few 
historians, even in the absence of firm evidence, have questioned this and Henry’s 
solvency after the first decade of his reign is taken as fact, evidenced, amongst other 
things, by his extravagant expenditure upon jewels, plate and huge amounts of money 
paid out of his Chamber to the Netherlands.229 Henry’s ‘rapacity’ is the subject of 
another chapter, but there can be little doubt that he reformed the finances of the Crown 
and much of his solvency was a consequence not of his supposed avaricious nature but 
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simply of more efficient and effective financial machinery operated by administratively 
talented personnel. 
 
It is perhaps indicative of Henry’s personality that he had taken little advantage of the 
finance London could offer in the first two years of his reign. His receipt of only one 
corporate loan of £2,000 between the battles of Bosworth and Stoke raises some 
interesting questions. Was the City perhaps reluctant to offer Henry finance as little 
was known about him, his support network or likelihood to remain upon the throne? 
This is surely unlikely, for the City, once it had decided to lend its support to a candidate 
for the throne, ordinarily did all it could to ensure that candidate remained on the throne. 
London had already demonstrated its support for the new king at Kenilworth in August 
1485, and though relations between the mercantile elite of the City and the king had 
been upset by the determination of the merchants to continue trade with the Low 
Countries in contravention of royal wishes, at no point does it appear that support for 
the rebels gained traction within London.  
 
As no record exists of the king having requested a loan in this time it is more likely that 
Henry did not wish to take on debts that he could not service. Smaller loans from 
individuals were requested instead which were more easily paid back as and when the 
Exchequer was able. The vast majority of the loans that Henry had in the course of his 
reign, not just those from the City, were repaid within a year, demonstrating not only 
Henry’s determination not to be indebted, financially or morally, to any corporate body, 
but also that the engine of the Exchequer was at last working effectively. 
 
This desire to not be indebted to anyone may have come from the king’s wish to be his 
own man, able to make decisions independently from any obligations or responsibilities 
to lenders. No entity or individual was to gain a financial hold over him in the same 
way that the City of London gained financial leverage over the Yorkist kings. No loans 
of any description were taken out in the king’s name after the Great Loan of 1496.  
 
Though the rest of the country was to feel the strain of the heavy financial burdens 
placed upon them in the first decade of the reign there is no evidence to suggest that 
the Londoners felt similarly burdened. Protest against heavy financial demands took 
the form of foot-dragging by the elite, not popular unrest by the masses. This benign 
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response was a consequence of the ability of the City to absorb royal financial demands 
with relative ease. 
 
With the ending of the Crown’s need for the financial help from the City, which most 
medieval kings had depended upon, it could perhaps be expected that the City might 
have lost some of its bargaining power. If one were to categorise the Crown-City 
relationship as a patronage arrangement then it is logical to assume that without the 
Crown’s need for money, London had lost its bargaining chip and therefore was subject 
to the whim of the monarch. To assume this, though, is to believe that the City was 
little more than a royal banking facility. As will been seen, this was far from being the 
case. 
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Chapter 4: The Livery Companies 
 
The livery companies were an essential part of the fabric of the life of the City, 
controlling access to the freedom of the City and the political, social and economic 
advantages that entailed. They were also crucial in the business life of the City, 
regulating the trades and crafts, and providing a mouthpiece for the economic needs of 
merchants and artisans. Livery companies regularly petitioned the Crown and 
parliament directly, creating a triangular aspect to the Crown-City relationship, and 
therefore their actions and pursuit of their ambitions effected the Crown-City relations. 
This chapter will seek to assess the impact that the relationship of the Crown and the 
companies had on the relationship of the City and the Crown.  The members of the 
Court of Aldermen came from these companies: did the composition of the aldermanic 
court affect its relations with both the Crown and the commonalty as a consequence? 
Can the Court of Aldermen be said to have been representative of the interests of the 
City as a whole? Were the companies capable of acting as political interest groups, and 
if so how were they perceived by the Crown?  
 
The triangular relationship between the livery companies, the City and the Crown has, 
unusually for this period, received a reasonable amount of scholarly attention as a 
consequence of the interest the livery companies still maintain in their histories. 
Research in this area is aided by the abundance of extant company records. This chapter 
will commence with a summary of the historiography of the subject followed by a brief 
explanation of the development of the companies. It will then explore the relationship 
the companies shared with the Crown, and will consider issues pertaining to parliament, 
the acquisition of royal charters and regulation. Finally, the chapter will discuss the 
controversy surrounding the grant of the Merchant Taylors’ charter in 1503 and will 
offer possible explanations for the actions and theories regarding the motivations of 
those involved. 
 
4.1. Historiography 
The continued relevance of the Livery Companies to life in the City of London has 
ensured that that they are one of the few areas of London history to have been 
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consistently researched over the last couple of hundred years. The companies 
themselves have, from an early period, commissioned histories of their crafts and 
corporations. Not all of these have been written by historians, but by company clerks, 
guild members or other interested parties and therefore they tend to vary in quality. 
George Unwin, in 1908, was the first to undertake a comprehensive comparative study 
and highlighted for the first time the link between crafts and their religious guilds.1 His 
work was relied upon heavily and developed by Sylvia Thrupp fifty years later in her 
ground-breaking work on the mercantile class of the City. Thrupp brought to light the 
abundance of extant documents for medieval London, particularly those generated by 
the guilds, and paved the way for others to explore this previously untapped wealth of 
information about the capital.2 Caroline Barron’s book on late medieval London 
successfully drew together more recent research undertaken upon individual companies 
to update the picture previously painted by Unwin and Thrupp.3 Both Barron and 
Thrupp stopped short of extending their surveys into the reign of the first Tudor king, 
a constant theme when one looks at the historiography of this period.  
 
Several individual company histories not only illuminate the development of their 
subject company but also serve to contribute to the overall picture of the interaction 
between the companies, City and Crown. Of particular note is Anne Sutton’s extensive 
study of the Mercers’ Company in London, which also yields an abundance of 
information about the Mercer-dominated fellowships of the Staple and the Merchant 
Adventurers, including their diplomatic activities.4 Pamela Nightingale’s account of 
the Grocers’ Company and Elspeth Veale’s of the Skinners and the Fur Trade both fix 
their chosen subjects firmly within the context of the prevailing economic and political 
circumstances of the time, with examinations of the full sphere of relations of these 
companies with the City and Crown, though Nightingale’s account ends in 1485 and 
Veale only skims the late fifteenth to early sixteenth century.5 Matthew Davies has 
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recently developed his work on the companies of the City from an examination of the 
Tailors’ Company to broader investigations into their political behaviour and the 
interactions between the companies, the City and the Crown.6 His argument, that by 
the fifteenth century the companies had become politically well informed and 
consequently developed sophisticated apparatus to facilitate lobbying activities, has 
been accepted and adopted here, and extended to examine the repercussions in detail 
upon the triangular relationship between the City, companies and the Crown.  
 
4.2. The Development of the Livery Companies 
There is evidence that craft guilds existed in the City in Saxon times, but they cannot 
be said to have become coherent social and economic units until the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries.7 Most originated as cooperative interest groups of men practising 
the same trade who would often live in the same neighbourhood and worship at the 
same parish church and hence they developed religious and social functions. In return 
for a fee, members could expect prayers and masses to be said for their souls, aid if 
they fell upon hard times and participation in the annual mass and feast held to honour 
the fraternity’s patron saint.8 These religious associations had a more practical purpose 
too, in that through them craft guilds were able to enforce trade regulations with oaths, 
thus allowing use of the ecclesiastical courts should they be broken.9  
 
By the fourteenth century membership of a craft or guild became the customary way to 
obtain entry into the freedom of the City and become a citizen after a period of 
apprenticeship.10 As the companies essentially controlled access to the freedom of the 
City, they were by now crucial to the regulation not only of the crafts but also of the 
citizenry.11 In legal documentation it became normal practice to define a person by both 
                                                 
6 Davies and Saunders, Merchant Taylors’ Company, Davies, ‘Crown, City and Guild’ and ‘Lobbying 
Parliament’. 
7 Barron, London, 199. 
8 C. Barron, ‘The Parish Fraternities of Medieval London’, in C. Barron and C. Harper-Bill ed., The 
Church in Pre-Reformation Society: Essays in Honour of F.R.H. Boulay (Woodbridge, 1985), 13-37. 
9 Veale, Fur Trade, 46. 
10 Thrupp, Merchant Class, 3. The other methods were by redemption or through patrimony, which were 
far less common in the fifteenth century. 
11 Davies, ‘Crown, City and Guild’, 243. 
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his place of denizen and his craft, a clear demonstration that membership of a craft was 
an essential aspect of a citizen’s identity.12 Though the crafts controlled the freedom to 
the City and therefore, indirectly, the electorate of the civic administration, London’s 
electoral unit was the ward. Between 1376 and 1384 a constitutional experiment was 
implemented whereby the Common Councillors were selected by the misteries, but this 
proved so problematic that the wards were reconstituted as the basic political unit of 
election.13 
 
The need to regulate the crafts on behalf of the City government necessitated the 
drafting of rules and regulations. Ordinances became a requirement of these institutions 
and, though they varied from craft to craft, normally made provision for the election of 
wardens, inspection of work produced by members, training of apprentices and for 
excluding non-members, particularly foreigners. In the fourteenth century at least 
thirty-seven crafts brought ordinances before the mayor and aldermen for ratification 
and enrolment into the City’s records.14 Barron notes that it was mostly the artisan 
crafts that submitted their ordinances for approval by the civic authorities in this way. 
The mercantile crafts of the Mercers, Grocers and Goldsmiths had ordinances, from 
1348, 1345-8 and 1364 respectively, but though these were copied into the Letter Book 
they did not feel the need to seek the formal approval of the mayor and aldermen. As 
most of the members of the Court of Aldermen were derived from the ranks of the 
mercantile companies it was perhaps felt to be a redundant formality to regulate 
themselves.15  
 
4.2.1. The Livery Companies in the Fifteenth Century 
The diversification in England’s export market throughout the course of the fifteenth 
century and success of the cloth trade led inevitably to an increase in the wealth 
generated by the London merchants and a corresponding increase in the differential in 
                                                 
12 Thrupp, Merchant Class, 4. 
13 For a full discussion of the political circumstances that led to this innovation see Nightingale, Grocers’ 
Company, 245-317. An abridged version of events can be found in Thrupp, Merchant Class, 60-80. 
14 Barron, London, 224. 
15 Barron, London, 224. 
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wealth between the mercantile elite of the City and the manufacturing majority.16 As 
the vast majority of the mercantile elite belonged to the mercantile companies, namely 
the Mercers, Grocers, Fishmongers, Goldsmiths and Drapers, and most craftsmen to 
the lesser companies, this differential was one between the mercantile and the artisan 
companies.17 Few changes took place to the hierarchy of the companies after the 
fourteenth century, with the exception of the political emergence and growth of the 
Tailors’ and Haberdashers’ companies. The order of precedence amongst the 108 
companies of the capital was not formalised until January 1515, and though it received 
adjustment in 1528 with the merger of the companies of the Fullers and Shearmen to 
form the company of Clothworkers, the order of the companies heading the list, known 
as the Great Twelve, has remained unchanged ever since.18  
 
By the end of the fifteenth century it had become increasingly rare for those from non-
mercantile companies, and even from the lesser companies of the Great Twelve, to 
become aldermen. Only one man from an artisan craft, Henry Pountfreyt, Saddler, 
served as an alderman in the fifteenth century, from 1403 to 1411.19 The ironmonger 
Thomas Bretton was the first of his trade to qualify financially as an alderman in twenty 
years when he was elected to the ward of Aldersgate in 1483; thereafter it took the 
Ironmongers another thirty years to see one of their own elected.20 Richard Chawry, 
Salter, was another exception who qualified for a seat in the aldermanic court.21 In 1503 
the Armourer, John Warner, was obliged to translate to the Grocers’ Company upon 
                                                 
16 Bolton, Medieval English Economy, 290-305. For a discussion about the expansion of the wealth of 
London merchants in the early sixteenth century see Oldland, ‘Merchant Capital’, 1058-1080. 
17 To this list can be added the Merchant Taylors and Haberdashers during the reign of Henry VII. 
18 The twelve companies, from 1528, were, in order of precedence, The Mercers, Grocers, Drapers, 
Fishmongers, Goldsmiths, Skinners, Merchant Taylors, Haberdashers, Salters, Ironmongers, Vintners 
and Clothworkers. The Tailors and the Skinners took turns to be sixth and seventh in the order after 
1484. 
19 Barron, London, 230. 
20 Beaven, ii, 17; Anne Sutton, ‘Agnes Don-Bretton, Merchant Stapler, Widow and Matriarch of 
Southampton and London’, The Ricardian, xxii (2012), 59-93. Though one of the ‘Great Twelve’, the 
Ironmongers was never a company of predominantly merchants in the same way that the Mercers, 
Drapers, Goldsmiths, Fishmongers and Grocers were. 
21 Beaven, ii, 16. 
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his election as alderman to the ward of Aldersgate.22 Over the course of the sixteenth 
century it became established that any person from a lesser company elected alderman 
had to be translated to one of the Great Twelve companies.23 The lesser companies, 
never politically prominent in the City, consequently lost all opportunity for 
representation at the highest municipal level in this narrowing of the ruling economic 
groups. 
 
The Mercers’ Company provided the most mayors during the fifteenth century by a 
large margin: twenty-five of the eighty-two (30 per cent) different men that served in 
that capacity whilst the Grocers and the Drapers had sixteen mayors (20 per cent) 
each.24 This pattern was to persist throughout the reign of Henry VII. The Mercers 
fielded nearly a quarter (23 per cent) of the aldermen that served during the reign of 
Henry VII, the Grocers 19 per cent, and the Drapers 16 per cent.25 For the mayoralty 
under Henry VII, the picture is slightly different. The Mercers still provided by far the 
most: nine out of the twenty-four different men who served in this reign, equating to 
38 per cent, but the Grocers only had one mayor elected during the reign, who served 
only a month, and the Drapers had three.26 The Goldsmiths had three mayors during 
Henry’s reign, all men who were familiar in court circles.27  
 
That a handful of companies dominated the Court of Aldermen is a reflection not upon 
the agency of the companies but simply that these institutions had as their members a 
comparatively large number of wealthy men. The non-mercantile companies may have 
had merchants among their ranks, but few of them were able to meet the £1,000 
qualification in movable goods required for election to the Court of Aldermen, as set 
                                                 
22 Beaven, ii, 20. 
23 Archer, Stability, 18-19. 
24 These figures are derived from Barron, London, 336-350. 
25 A total of 74 men served as aldermen during the reign of Henry VII, not counting the de jure alderman 
of the ward of Portsoken, the Prior of Christ Church. Data derived from Beaven, ii, 1-34, and an analysis 
of the Journals of Common Council. 
26 John Warde, Grocer, was elected in Sept. 1485 after the deaths of the two previous mayors (one of 
whom was a Draper) sweating sickness days before. 
27 Of the seven Goldsmiths who served as mayor in the fifteenth century all but one had significant 
connections with the royal court. Lutkin, ‘Goldsmiths’, 314-61; Reddaway and Walker, Goldsmiths’ 
Company, 275-316. 
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in 1469.28 The mercantile companies may have benefitted from their dominance of 
civic government but did not usually engineer it, though they did seek to preserve it as 
their opposition to the elevation of the Tailors to mercantile status demonstrated. 
 
In addition to the divide between the greater and lesser companies, internal divisions 
of hierarchy became commonplace within some of these institutions, firstly in the 
mercantile companies and gradually, by the mid fifteenth century, in the lesser 
companies, whereby ‘liveried’ members were elevated over their fellow members. 
Only the senior members, usually the economically dominant of the company, were 
admitted to the ‘livery’, embodied by the award of a livery, or clothing, in the company 
colours to wear upon formal occasions.29 Between 1394 and 1461 the Mercers’ 
Company admitted 1,047 men to its membership, of whom 456 (44 per cent) reached 
the livery.30 In 1501, the livery comprised only sixty-six men out of a membership of 
around 273.31 
 
The surviving evidence does not, unfortunately, lend itself to an assessment of the 
number of members each company had until well into the sixteenth century.32 A list of 
the number of liverymen for each company, complied in 1502, does survive, though, 
which assessed the liveried population of the City at 1,376.33 Thrupp infers that this 
figure represents the size of the mercantile class of the City, but this presumes not only 
that all liverymen from these companies were merchants but also that the sole 
qualification into the livery was a high degree of wealth, though the bar for entry 
probably varied from company to company.34 It would be surprising if this was the case 
in companies such as the Shearmen (fifty-one liveried members), Carpenters (thirty) 
                                                 
28 LBL, 85. 
29 Thrupp, Merchant Class, 12-13; E.M. Veale, ‘The “Great Twelve”: Mistery and Fraternity in 
Thirteenth-Century London’, Historical Research, lxiv (1991), 237-63. 
30 Barron, London, 215; Jean Imray, ‘“Les Bones Gentes de la Mercerye de Londres”: A Study of the 
Membership of the Mercers’ Company’, in A.E.J. Hollaender and William Kellaway ed. Studies in 
London History (London, 1969), 174. 
31 Thrupp, Merchant Class, 43; Oldland, ‘Merchant Capital’, 1058-1080. 
32 Thrupp attempted an exercise of this nature but had to conclude that the surviving evidence was 
insufficient for the task (Thrupp, Merchant Class, 41-47). 
33 Jo.10, f.373-373v. 
34 Thrupp, Merchant Class, 42-43. 
  141 
and Weavers (thirty).35 Seventy-five liveried Brewers constituted 35 per cent of the 
membership of the company; if all of them had been wealthy men it is probable that 
the standing of the company would have been much higher.36 Similarly, if the 
Carpenters’ thirty liverymen had all been wealthy it is probable that the company would 
have been able to contribute more to the £4,000 loan made to Henry VII than the £8 
they received as repayment in 1490.37 
 
The role of the liverymen in municipal politics increased in the course of the fifteenth 
century. In 1467 the wardens of all liveried companies, in addition to common 
councillors, were permitted to attend the elections of the mayor and sheriff in Common 
Hall.38 In 1475 wardens were further empowered to select additional ‘good men’ of the 
livery of their companies to participate in the same and it was declared that henceforth 
the two aldermen put forward as candidates for the mayoralty should not be from the 
same company, which limited the opportunity for one company to pack the election 
with supporters for its mayoral candidate.39 The fundamental composition of the 
electorate was not altered and remained the preserve of the more prosperous elite of the 
City. In fact these measures reinforced the exclusion of those lesser companies who 
lacked a liveried section, of which, in 1501-2, there were twenty-eight.40 The wealthy 
elite of the City, therefore, governed the artisans, creating a two-tier citizenry, and the 
mechanisms for their election awarded them effective control over the entry into the 
City’s government. 41  
 
It would be simplistic to claim that the division between the wealthy and the non-
wealthy citizenry was purely a product of a divide between the greater and lesser 
                                                 
35 Jo.10, f.373. 
36 The Brewers had 165 members and 75 liverymen in 1501 according to their own membership lists, 
but 65 according to the list in Journal 10. I accept Thrupp’s argument that the membership lists, where 
they exist, are more likely to be accurate than the list in the Journal. Thrupp, Merchant Class, 42- 46. 
37 Records of the Carpenters, ii, 70. The Mercers and Grocers contributed £1,615 between them (GC, 
242). 
38 LBL, 73. 
39 LBL, 83, 132. This practice was especially prevalent in the late fourteenth century. Thrupp, Merchant 
Class, 83. 
40 Jo.10, f.373v. 
41 Barron, London, 207. 
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companies. Companies such as the Tailors, Skinners and Haberdashers consisted of a 
relatively thin top layer of merchants who assumed the livery and governed the 
company, and a lower, far more numerous, tier of artisans.42 As the companies tended 
to be controlled by their most prosperous members, the wardens and the court of 
assistants of these institutions usually comprised merchants responsible for the 
regulation of craft activities in which they were frequently not involved nor 
commercially concerned. This disconnection between the livery and the yeomanry in 
such companies was to become a larger issue towards the end of the sixteenth century.43  
 
Susan Reynolds advises caution in labelling London’s government an oligarchy.44 If 
oligarchy is defined, she argues, as rule by the self-interested few then London does 
not fit the description, for the Londoners perceived themselves as governed by 
aristocracy (i.e. rule by a better sort). The language of the selection of men for councils, 
(Common Hall and Common Council) supports this, for the phrase ‘good men’ is often 
employed in the description of who should be selected to these bodies.45 The move to 
widen the City electorate (Common Hall) in 1475 to encompass men from lesser 
companies implies that the City fathers were not ignorant of or unsympathetic to the 
desire for political participation held by less prosperous members of the citizenry.46 
There are problems with this theory: whilst in principle rule by aristocratic means was 
accepted as desirable, the narrowing of the economic pool from which the Court of 
Aldermen was drawn inevitably led to a closer alignment of interests of the members 
of that body, to the exclusion of the concerns of the wider electorate. Consequently, by 
the end of the fifteenth century, a disjunction existed between the ideals promoted by 
the civic authorities and the realities of their composition. London was ruled by an 
oligarchy, whether it perceived itself to be so or not. 
 
                                                 
42 Veale, Fur Trade, 183-185. 
43 Archer, Stability, 100, 103. 
44 Susan Reynolds, ‘Medieval Urban History and the History of Political Thought’, Urban History 
Yearbook (1982), 14-23. 
45 LBL, 73, 82. 
46 LBL, 73. 
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Stephen Rigby concludes that an oligarchy was prevalent in fifteenth century London, 
but for quite different reasons.47 He argues that the existence of oligarchy in the City 
was, in large part, facilitated by the active support and interference of the Crown. His 
argument hinges on his belief that the provisions of the charters granted to the City 
reinforced the principles of oligarchy by empowering the City’s officials as Justices of 
the Peace.48 This extension of ‘their policing and economic powers’ was seen in 
London ‘as a means of undermining the customary good rule of the City to the 
detriment of its artisans’. This argument may be questioned. The policing of the City 
had always been within the remit of the mayor and aldermen and no material difference 
to this was made by empowering them as JPs except to give them formal recognition 
and allow for their participation in due judicial process. In policing the City the mayor 
and aldermen deputed all livery companies to conduct a watch of the capital, including 
the artisan crafts.49 The economic narrowing of the companies of origin of the aldermen 
was of far greater significance in the creation and endurance of a ruling oligarchy in 
London and hence the effect of Crown intervention upon the creation of an oligarchy 
in London was negligible. Whereas Henry VII was actively involved in the promotion 
of oligarchic governments in other urban centres of the realm, such as Exeter and 
Bristol, the ruling oligarchy of the City was already firmly established before his 
accession.50 In fact, Henry arguably tried to widen the oligarchic power-base of the 
City through his promotion of the Tailors and the Haberdashers to mercantile status, as 
will be seen. 
 
The practice of utilising the livery companies as peace-keeping units was well 
established by the fifteenth century. Arrangements for the watches called to enforce 
curfews, impose law-enforcement and ensure the peace were often carefully recorded 
in the Journals of the Common Council. Watches were called in times of unrest or when 
there was a perceived likelihood of riot within the City.51 This enlisting of the help of 
                                                 
47 Stephen Rigby, ‘Urban ‘Oligarchy’ in Late Medieval England’, in J.A.F. Thomson ed., Towns and 
Townspeople in the Fifteenth Century (Gloucester, 1988), 60-83. 
48 Rigby, ‘Urban Oligarchy’, 80. 
49 Jo.9, ff.81v, 84. 
50 James Lee, ‘Urban Policy and Urban Political Culture: Henry VII and his Towns’, Historical Research, 
lxxxii (2009), 499-501. 
51 Watches were called at both the accession and the death of Henry VII, (Jo.9, f.81v-84; Jo.11, f.66v). 
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the livery companies at times of social disorder helped restore discipline in three ways: 
firstly, and obviously, by policing the City. Secondly, members of the companies from 
the richest merchants to the poorest artisans were involved in keeping the peace and 
therefore had a vested interest in the maintenance of law and order. Hence the citizenry 
were subject not only to the imposition of order by the watch, but also by their company 
who, deputed by the mayor to police the City, would have been expected to address 
harshly any law-breaking by their members in addition to seeing them subject to the 
usual due process. Lastly, frequently the protagonists of disruptions within the City 
were young men, apprentices or journeymen, and therefore members of the companies 
involved in the watch were the masters and employers of these men.52 Both a practical 
and moral obligation would have been set upon the masters and employers to bring 
these young men into line.53  
 
This obligation of the companies to keep their members in order was sometimes used 
in an attempt to prevent unrest. In December 1491 the wardens of the companies were 
called to a meeting at Guildhall where they were commanded to ‘see that good Rule be 
kept amonge their fealiships and that the maisters and wardeyns shall calle their 
fealiships afore theym and to shewe theym the same comanndement … that they kepe 
due ordre for the[m] and their [servants].’54 It would seem that this command was 
successfully applied, for no record of riot exists for this time, nor indeed of the 
perceived threat of one.55 The rivalries of the livery companies had the potential to 
explode into violence, as will be seen in the next section, but, perhaps paradoxically, 
the companies were also a key component in the stability of the City.56 
 
                                                 
52 Archer, Stability, 1-9. 
53 It is possible that on occasion these young men were used by their masters to create social disruption 
to make a political point, See Bolton, ‘City and the Crown’, 11-24. 
54 Jo.9, f.282. 
55 It is possible that there was still the potential for brawling in the aftermath of the election of Hugh 
Clopton as mayor (GC, 246). 
56 This statement is also true a century later (Archer, Stability, 100-148). 
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4.2.2. Livery Company Rivalries 
The discrepancy in civic political and economic influence between the greater and the 
lesser crafts was a source of tension within the City. Long-standing rivalries also 
existed between companies that engaged in similar trades. The extent to which Henry 
and his council were aware of these long-standing rivalries and whether they, 
consciously or not, exacerbated them, has implications in the examination of the early 
Tudor government’s policy towards interest-groups and perceived power-bases. What 
impact did the rivalries and mergers of this period have upon the City and did the 
Crown exploit the economic and social situation underlying these issues for its own 
ends? 
 
Perhaps the longest-running and most consistent of rivalries was that between the 
Tailors’ and Drapers’ Companies, with episodes resulting in actual or near violence in 
1425, 1440, 1442, 1443, 1452 and 1491.57 The Drapers resented the growing political 
influence and economic status of the Tailors’ Company, which, for much of the 
fifteenth century, had been little more than an ambitious artisan company with few 
aldermen and no mayor among its ranks.58 The desire of the Tailors to break into the 
profitable cloth market and the claim of the Drapers to the right of search of all cloth 
sold in the City by Tailors were obvious causes of strife.59 The Drapers’ Company was 
a large, wealthy, mercantile guild with several aldermen amongst its numbers, but its 
members were frustrated in their attempts to bring the Tailors to heel by the number of 
friends amongst the aristocracy, possibly customers, the latter company enjoyed.60 A 
patent granted to the Tailors in 1439 gave them the right of search over the shops of 
members of the Drapers’ Company, which naturally led to lobbying by the Drapers’ 
for its repeal.61 The Tailors regularly enlisted the support of other small textile crafts 
such as the Shearmen and Fullers, thereby creating the potential for physical conflict, 
                                                 
57 LBK, ff.40v, 205v & 214; Thrupp, Merchant Class, 85. 
58 The Tailors had only 2 aldermen between 1350 and 1450 (Lutkin, ‘Goldsmiths’, 272). 
59 Barron, London, 210. 
60 See section 4.3.5. 
61 Matthew Davies, ‘The Tailors of London and their Guild, c.1300-1500’ (unpublished DPhil. thesis, 
Oxford, 1994), 122-124. The patent was, in 1442, declared contrary to the rights of the City and repealed. 
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which indeed did occur when a Draper, Robert Clopton, was elected mayor over the 
Tailor candidate, Ralph Holland.62 
 
Rivalry between the Tailors and the Drapers extended into the reign of Henry VII and 
beyond. The Great Chronicle of London described the second time the Tailors sought 
to have one of their own, Sir John Percyvale, elected as mayor in 1491. With the 
assistance of the Fullers, Shearmen and Dyers they conspired to have Percyvale run for 
election against Hugh Clopton, who, though a Mercer, was unlikely to be elected as he 
was new to the Aldermanic court. The Aldermen apparently thought that Percyvale was 
unsuited to the job, considering his ‘hote apetyte which he hadd yerely to that offiyce’, 
and therefore turned him down for the second time.63 The discontent of the Tailors 
manifested itself as 
  
many Rittous & heinous words by the ffelyshypp of the drapers, saying that for malice 
which they awght unto the Taylours They kept hym yerely ffrom that oofice, By mean 
of which wordys grete Rumour & noyse was that day In the halle, and afftyr the malice 
of Sundry & meane personys of those ij ffelyshyppys grewe.64 
 
Percyvale was the losing mayoral candidate a total of four times, and succeeded only 
on the fifth occasion after the king wrote to the Court of Aldermen requesting that he 
should be elected.65 He was the first member of the company to become mayor.  
 
Friction between the Tailors and Drapers did not make cooperation impossible upon 
matters of concern common to both companies. The companies presented a joint 
petition to the Common Council in September 1482 complaining about the poor quality 
of the work completed by the Shearmen and others involved in the finishing of woollen 
                                                 
62 C.M. Barron, ‘Ralph Holland and the London Radicals, 1438-1444’, in A.L. Rowse and C.M. Barron 
ed., A History of the North London Branch of the Historical Association, Together with Essays in 
Honour of the Golden Jubilee (1971), 60-80. 
63 GC, 245-6; Jo.9, f.280v. The first time had been in 1489, when he lost out to William White, a Draper 
(Jo.9, f.239). 
64 GC, 246. 
65 GC, 288; Jo.10, f.141v. Percyvale’s other attempts had been in 1496 and 1497, (Jo.10, ff.78v & 108v). 
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cloths.66 Their request for tighter controls and powers of search over such work was 
granted, an example of economic expediency prevailing over persistent rivalry. 
 
The Tailors’ Company appear to have been a particularly argumentative body, for they 
were also involved in a dispute with the Skinners’ Company in 1484 over which should 
take precedence in civic processions. The mayor, the Haberdasher, Robert Billesdon, 
was forced to arbitrate and resolved the issue by dictating that henceforth the Tailors 
and Skinners would annually alternate the positions of sixth and seventh in the 
processions common on City occasions, which they still do to this day.67 The Tailors’ 
ambitions and talent for making influential friends made the mercantile companies of 
the City especially wary, and perhaps accounts in part for the reaction of the City to the 
Tailors’ achievement of these ambitions in the early part of the sixteenth century, as 
will be expanded upon later.  
 
Resentment over the amount of control wielded by the mercantile companies over trade 
reached boiling point in 1484 when men from the Shearmen, Fullers, Tuckers, and 
Cappers crafts unloaded unfinished woollen cloths from ships bound for Calais.68 Crisis 
was averted when the mayor and aldermen, fearing a riot, ‘assembled in harness goyng 
toward the waterside, whiche so heryng, the forsaid Riottours with theire compeny 
departed & fledde’.69 The Shearmen succeeded in obtaining attention for their cause, 
for in December of that year a royal proclamation stated that export of unfinished cloth 
valued at over forty shillings was banned, and this was later confirmed by Act of 
Parliament.70 The discontent of the Shearmen was to continue through Henry VII’s 
reign. Two uprisings occurred in London, in April and May 1486, the first of which 
enjoyed the support of the Fullers and Tuckers who were similarly affected by this 
                                                 
66 LBL, 196-7. 
67 For information on the Billesdon award, as the Tailors-Skinners agreement was known, see Matthew 
Davies, ‘Governors and Governed: The Practice of Power in the Merchant Taylors’ Company in the 
Fifteenth Century’ in Guilds, Society and Economy in London 1450-1800, I.A. Gadd and P. Wallis ed. 
(London, 2002), 219. 
68 Acts, 159. 
69 Acts, 160. 
70 Sutton, Mercery,335. 
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issue.71 Though these demonstrations were small they were indicative of their 
discontent. In 1495 many Shearmen and Fullers were bound to keep the peace in bonds 
ranging from £5-£100 to the Chamberlain of the City, indicating that there had been, 
or was threat of, some disturbance from these men.72 
 
Most minor rivalries left little trace or impact upon the development of the companies. 
Conflict between the Leathersellers and the Glovers in the dying days of Edward IV’s 
reign, the Haberdashers and the Hurers in 1500 or the Dyers, Haberdashers and the 
Tailors at about the same time were resolved through the arbitration of the mayor and 
aldermen.73 Each company zealously guarded its position, liberties, rights and 
privileges, particularly against perceived encroachments from other companies. It was 
because of the vigour with which they did so, according to Thrupp, that though the 
companies were highly organised groups they did not, unlike their counterparts in some 
other European cities, become the primary unit of administration and representation 
within the capital.74  
 
4.3. Crown, City and Company 
A triangular relationship existed between the Crown, the Civic authorities and the 
companies: guilds in London had long enjoyed a direct relationship with the Crown 
and frequently sought its authority for the grant of desired rights and privileges, 
especially in the form of letters patent. The motivation of the Crown in encouraging 
such approaches is less transparent than that of the individual companies and differed 
according to the company involved, as will be demonstrated. The question to be 
addressed here is the extent to which Henry perceived that the London companies were 
not homogenous units but individual social, economic and political entities, each with 
its own set of priorities and differing agendas. This in turn raises further lines of 
enquiry, the most obvious being whether he regarded these companies as a threat in 
any way, and if so, which ones and why? How did the relationships between the 
individual companies and the Crown affect the Crown-City relationship?  
                                                 
71 See Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
72 Jo.10, ff.46-47v. 
73 LBL, 168; Rep.1, ff.77, 82v, 96, 110v. 
74 Thrupp, Merchant Class, 73. 
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4.3.1. The King, the Court and Individual Companies 
The Mercers, as already examined, were regarded with some suspicion by Henry VII 
on account of their close identification with the Merchant Adventurers and the latter’s 
establishment of independent diplomatic relations with the Low Countries in 1486-7. 
Even so, the Mercers had friends at court: Richard Fox, bishop of Exeter, Bath and 
Wells, Durham and Winchester successively during Henry’s reign as well as Keeper of 
the Privy Seal, and Giles, Lord Daubeney, together with Sir Richard Nanfan requested 
to join the fellowship in February 1490.75 Some Mercers were honoured with 
knighthood, though fewer, proportionally, than in Edward IV’s reign. Henry Colet, a 
known close friend of Reynold Bray, was knighted in 1486 with fellow Mercer John 
Broun.76 Richard Haddon and John Tate were the only other Mercers knighted during 
the reign, both for their roles in the 1497 uprising that culminated at the battle of 
Blackheath when they served as sheriff and mayor respectively.77 Henry knighted a 
total of fifteen aldermen during his reign, six of them during their terms as mayor. 
Given the numbers of Mercers who served at the highest levels of civic government, 
one might arguably have expected to have seen a higher proportion of them knighted.78 
This did not reflect well upon the esteem in which the mayor, aldermen and political 
community of the capital were held by the Crown, for as the Mercers dominated the 
Court of Aldermen throughout the reign, they became inextricably entwined, in the 
minds of Henry and his council, with the government of the capital.  
 
A combination of the unpopularity of the Mercers’ Company at court and the popularity 
of the Tailors was perhaps, at least in part, responsible for the replacement of Mercers 
and Drapers by Merchant Taylors as leading suppliers to the Great Wardrobe in the 
                                                 
75 Acts, 201. 
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course of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.79 Many of the items purchased 
by the Wardrobe would have been ordered by the King’s Tailor, who may have 
recommended to the Keeper of the Great Wardrobe suppliers of such goods; naturally 
he would have favoured fellow Tailors. Otherwise the mandate to supply the wardrobe 
was in the gift of the Keeper and unlikely to have led to contacts within the court or 
royal household. 80  
 
The position of King’s Tailor was one that required personal contact with the person 
of the king and others who were dressed with provisions by the Great Wardrobe.81 
Items would have been made at the workshop of the King’s Tailor with his oversight, 
and as Henry VIII’s personal warrants recorded an average of 277 items per year, a 
tally that cannot have been far off for his father, the position was thus lucrative and 
desirable.82 The King’s Tailor not only attended upon the king and his household but 
also held the formal position of Sergeant Tailor of the Great Wardrobe, a position that 
paid 12d per day with 100s allowance for the rent of a house within the City as well as 
a summer and winter livery.83 Only two men held this position in Henry VII’s reign: 
George Lovekyn, who had served in the same capacity for Edward IV and Richard III 
(the latter only briefly), and, after his death in 1504, his former apprentice, Stephen 
Jasper, who continued in this position until his death in 1511.84 These men, even though 
they were not Englishmen, were senior members of the Tailors’ Company; Lovekyn 
served a company warden in 1486-7.85 They may well have been able to assist the 
interests of their company, even if only by obtaining the good will of the great men 
they served, including the king.86 It is also possible that their connections to the king 
aided their ascent within the company. 
 
                                                 
79 Davies and Saunders, Merchant Taylors’ Company, 62, 64-6; Great Wardrobe, xxix. 
80 Great Wardrobe, xxx. 
81 Great Wardrobe, xxxiii. 
82 Great Wardrobe, xxxiii. 
83 Maria Hayward, Dress at the Court of King Henry VIII (Leeds, 2007), 320. 
84 Hayward, Dress, 320. 
85 See Anne Sutton, ‘George Lovekyn, Tailor to Three Kings, 1470-1504’, Costume, xv (1981), 1-12; 
Hayward, Dress, 320. 
86 The regard in which the king held Lovekyn is evidenced by the gift made by Henry upon Lovekyn’s 
second marriage of five yards of ‘good scarlet’ (Hayward, Dress, 320). 
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These were not the only Tailors familiar with the court, for Stephen Jennings, a 
prominent merchant of the Staple and senior member of the Tailors’ company, 
regularly appears in the Chamber book receiving payment for supply of goods and one 
entry for £100 for the ‘plegging of certain of the queen’s jewels’.87 That Jennings was 
personally known to the king is further evidenced by the king’s letter on his behalf 
requesting his election as mayor in 1508.88 It is probable that he was involved in at least 
some of the negotiations for the incorporation of the tailors as the Merchant Taylors in 
1502. 
 
Throughout the late medieval era few merchants were as numerous or influential at 
court as the Goldsmiths. Goldsmiths were exceptional, not only in that they were often 
to be found at court in comparison to other London merchants, but in that many of them 
became trusted royal servants. Two of the most prolific suppliers of goldsmiths’ work 
to Richard II’s court, Drew Barantyn and Nicholas Twyford, were charged with 
purveying essential items for military campaigns, whilst another, John Brydd, carried 
messages to the continent for both Richard II and Henry IV.89  
 
Three reasons can be given for the prominence of men of the Goldsmiths’ Company at 
court. Firstly, the nature of the goods they supplied required direct interaction between 
the vendor and the customer. High-value items of precious metals and jewels were 
subject to taste and so sight before purchase was desirable, and commissioned bespoke 
items required cooperation between the craftsman and the customer. It was not just 
luxury items that fell into the remit of the goldsmith, but also everyday items. Plate 
required frequent replacement and repair, as did more delicate items of jewellery worn 
as part of clothing.90 The sale and the creation of goldsmiths’ work required a level of 
expertise that excluded other merchants and tradesmen from engaging in it, and hence 
the goldsmiths maintained a monopoly in this area. Therefore, it was common for a 
large number of goldsmiths with a varying range of specialities to supply royal and 
aristocratic households. Secondly, by virtue of their expertise, Goldsmiths enjoyed a 
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virtual monopoly of control over the Mint and the king’s Exchange within the Tower 
of London.91 Finally, Goldsmiths tended to be rich men with large supplies of ready 
cash. Naturally they were not unique amongst the mercantile community of the City in 
this, but many of them assumed a quasi-banking role, providing loans of ready cash to 
men connected to the court.  
 
It is evident from the extant Chamber books of the reign that the above held true for 
the court of Henry VII. The Chamber books contain numerous payments to goldsmiths, 
but remarkably few to other merchants, with the exception of a handful of mainly 
Italian foreigners. Four Goldsmiths in particular stand out in the frequency and breadth 
of their relations with the Crown: Hugh Brice, Edmund Shaa, John Shaa and 
Bartholomew Rede. These men successfully amalgamated the roles of royal servant 
with that of City father, arguably to the benefit of both institutions, as will be seen. 
 
Though appearance in the Chamber book does not necessarily denote personal contact 
between the king and the vendor, it suggests that goldsmiths often received 
commissions directly from the royal household rather than via the Great Wardrobe. 
Payments for metal work supplied for the king’s clothes were generally made from the 
king’s Chamber and the goods were delivered directly to the officer of the Wardrobe 
of the Robes, who for most of the reign was John Fligh.92 Regular payments appear to 
Piers Danyell, described as a ‘Frenchman of Paris’ and a ‘jewler’ which would 
obviously have had to have been made via a go-between.93 Craftsmen, or at least the 
master of craftsmen, like John Arnold, described as ‘the King’s Goldsmith’ in the 
Chamber books in 1507, also possibly did not enjoy a personal relationship with the 
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monarch.94 Arnold’s work consisted mainly of items of craftwork and maintenance, 
such as mending the king’s dagger or embellishing harnesses, suggesting he maintained 
a close proximity to the royal household and a correspondingly close working 
relationship with its personnel. It is possible that he held a permanent position within 
the Great Wardrobe, though it is apparent the position of King’s Goldsmith was not 
typical of that of other royal artificers. The position was not confirmed by letter patent, 
and therefore lacked a formality that the King’s Tailor and Skinner, for example, 
enjoyed. The King’s Goldsmith did not work out of the premises of the Great Wardrobe 
as other royal artificers did. The position was also not exclusive as relationships with 
other goldsmith merchants were maintained and the volume of business transacted with 
them often exceeded that with the King’s Goldsmith. Royal artificers were ordinarily 
craftsmen, yet goldsmith merchants frequently were described as the ‘King’s 
Goldsmith’, as John Shaa was in 1492.95 It was therefore more of an honorific title and 
not a formal salaried position. Arnold did not keep his position for long as he only 
received payments between January and July 1507, receiving a total of £123 1s 2d in 
that time.96 It is unlikely, given the amount he was paid and his probable resultant 
wealth, that he was amongst the lower social echelons of his craft. The same was true 
for Robert Amadas, who served as King’s Goldsmith to Henry VIII but was a 
prominent merchant and active within the Goldsmiths’ Company.97  
 
It is likely that royal purchases of expensive jewels and New Years’ gifts, which were 
often bought in bulk from a single goldsmith, were done with the personal input, or at 
least supervision, of the king.98 Gold and jewels were of importance to Henry VII, 
contrary to his reputation as a miser, for between 1491 and 1509 it has been estimated 
that he spent at least £200,000 on jewels and plate, more, it is likely, than the luxury-
loving Edward IV.99  
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Contact with the king may have depended upon the status of the individual goldsmith. 
Rich merchants who dealt predominantly in high-value luxury items like Thomas 
Exmew, John Mondy, Nicholas Warley and Robert Amadas, who each provided Henry 
with goods totalling over £500 in value, were regular, preferred, suppliers and probably 
personally acquainted with the king for reasons outlined above. These men were also 
suppliers to other members of the royal family: John Mondy supplied Margaret 
Beaufort with items of his trade, firstly in tandem with Sir John Shaa and later, after 
Shaa’s death, on his own.100 The forenamed Goldsmiths were frequently named as 
sureties in bonds concerning individuals with whom they very likely did not have a 
personal connection, implying that they were men with ready cash willing to provide 
financial services.101  
 
Henry VII may have favoured individual Goldsmiths but that favour did not necessarily 
extend to the Goldsmiths’ Company, for they were treated no more favourably than 
other mercantile companies. Its acquisition, in 1505, of a letter patent that confirmed 
its powers of nationwide search, came after the deaths of John Shaa and Bartholomew 
Rede, who had enjoyed successful careers as royal servants as well as merchants, and 
therefore the influence of these powerful men was unnecessary in securing such a grant. 
The ability to pay for the honour was probably more influential, as the company paid a 
total of 300 marks for the charter.102 The Goldsmiths exercised their new rights through 
a series of summer tours of the provinces, demanding that goldsmiths resident in these 
areas swear an oath to observe the ordinances of the London Goldsmiths’ Company. A 
two-shilling fee was collected from those who took the oath, amounting to £51 8s in 
1507 alone.103 The company was also cautious about the possibility of incurring royal 
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displeasure, for it was felt prudent to purchase a pardon for the company in the same 
year.104 Reddaway dismisses this purchase as merely ‘one of the periodical royal 
pardons for trade offenses’, but the timing, coming soon after the company had lost 
Rede and Shaa, its two most influential members, the payment of 300 marks and 
naming of fifty-five individual Goldsmiths and six widows indicates that the company 
members were perhaps feeling vulnerable.105  
 
Various members of the royal administration had their own connections with individual 
Livery Companies. The Tailors admitted Reynold Bray and Robert Rede, the Sergeant-
at-Law (later Chief Justice of Common Pleas), as brothers of its fraternity in May 1490 
without charge.106 Help was sometimes solicited from influential members of the court 
by the companies for their aid in law suits, petitions or quarrels. James Hobart, the 
attorney general, was courted not only by the Drapers’ Company whilst they opposed 
the Merchant Taylors’ patent, but also by several smaller institutions, such as the 
Carpenters who paid £1 for his assistance in smoothing their bill through the 1497 
parliament.107 The Drapers sought the friendship of Edmund Dudley, paying him a gift 
of £10 in 1504 and admitting him and his servant, William Bukkyll, into the company 
the following year.108 Thomas Lovell was a patron and a brother of the Grocers’ 
Company and endowed it with properties worth £15 10s per annum. He also bought 
and rebuilt the Weighhouse in Cornhill for their use at a cost of £300.109 Lovell was 
closely connected with many senior members of the Grocers’ Company both during 
and after the reign of Henry VII: John Wyngar, mayor 1504-5, sent him gifts, as did 
John Ward, the alderman, who bequeathed to him a standing cup.110 Hugh Denys, 
Henry VII’s Groom of the Stool, benefitted from his association with the Grocers: in 
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July 1505 the Grocers, as was in their gift, recommended three men for the position of 
garbeller in the City, of which Denys was admitted into the role.111 This was one of the 
City offices that Henry VI had granted by royal patent to a royal servant as a reward in 
1442, leading to various attempts by the City to regain control of the office in 
perpetuity.112 It was not until 1478 that this was achieved, when Edward IV sold to the 
City the offices of cloth-packer, garbeller, gauger and wine-drawer for £7,000.113 It is 
intriguing, then, that the Grocers selected a royal servant for this position in 1504, and 
had obviously identified Denys, in his capacity as a senior member of Henry’s Privy 
Chamber staff, as a man of influence worth courting. The issue seems to be that the 
City sought to control its own sources of patronage, rather than to keep control of the 
office itself. 
 
4.3.2. The Companies and Parliament 
London’s proximity to Westminster gave its inhabitants and corporations a distinct 
advantage, both in terms of ease of travel and in the fluidity of information. It also gave 
the London companies the opportunity to lobby not only parliament, but also members 
of the governmental administration, and indeed several company accounts show 
expenses incurred by deputations to government officials.114 It was not rare for even 
the smallest of the livery companies to lobby the king and his council or parliament 
directly.115 Unfortunately, only the petitions that were enacted by parliament were 
recorded upon the parliament rolls and therefore it is near impossible to see the full 
extent of the lobbying activities by these institutions. The unenrolled petitions that have 
survived, as Matthew Davies has illustrated, serve to give a picture of politically aware 
and astute corporate bodies within the City who were not only conscious of political 
events but also of political process.116 Increased legal activity led to a requirement for 
the employment of appropriately knowledgeable personnel. Company clerks, key 
                                                 
111 Rep.1, f.172v. 
112 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 90-1, 99. 
113 Barron, ‘London and the Crown’, 99-100. 
114 Davies, ‘Lobbying Parliament’, 139. Barron, ‘London and Parliament in the Lancastrian Period’, 
Parliamentary History, IX (1990), 344-5. 
115 Davies, ‘Lobbying Parliament’, 137. 
116 Davies, ‘Lobbying Parliament’, 136-148. 
  157 
members of company bureaucracy, were increasingly men with legal knowledge and 
experience, a necessary development as their remit frequently included dealing with 
matters of litigation, drafting of bills, petitions, ordinances and property transactions 
and associated documentation 
 
Davies suggests that the London MPs may not have been of much help to lobbying 
companies.117 The belief that a single MP, acting in his company’s interest on his own, 
was unlikely to be able to make much of an impact may have deterred companies from 
seeking their intervention. Moreover, it was usually the landed knights and gentry who 
were accustomed to taking the lead in parliament rather than the burgesses.118 Naturally 
an MP might have done what he could to further the interests of his own company and 
here the mercantile companies were, once more, at a political advantage, for thirty-
seven of the fifty-three men returned as City MPs between 1422 and 1460 were from 
the companies of the Mercers, Grocers and Drapers. The remainder were drawn from 
the Fishmongers, Ironmongers and Salters, themselves among the ‘Great Twelve’.119  
 
Instead of seeking support from their local MPs, it appears that companies preferred to 
court the support of those who were lawyers or men of influence, often the Speaker or 
some other official. The Pewterers lobbied for a statute to be passed in the 1487 
parliament against itinerant craftsmen who made and sold inferior goods.120 Despite 
paying the clerk of the parliament house, Thomas Bayne, 6s 8d to speed the reading of 
their bills and providing the Speaker with a large, decorated, pewter vessel worth 27s 
4d, they were unsuccessful, and only obtained their desire in the last parliament of the 
reign.121 The Pewterers were forced to adjust their ambitions over the course of several 
redrafts before they finally obtained their act. An initial bill had requested the power of 
search over Pewterers in all parts of the kingdom, but its final form vested the authority 
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to organise such searches in local JPs and other borough officials.122 They also enlisted 
the Pewterers of York as co-petitioners and bought the aid of John Mordaunt, the king’s 
Serjeant ‘to stope heym that vose [sic] a genste vs’ for ten shillings.123 The two MPs 
from York, the clerk of the Commons, the clerk of the market and the warden of the 
Armourers’ Company were among those wined and dined by members of the 
Pewterers’ Company in the taverns of Westminster, and gifts of money and wine were 
given to Chancery clerks, the Speaker’s clerk and the Speaker (Edmund Dudley) 
himself to ease the passage of the bill through the commons.124 Members of the Lords 
were then lobbied, a submission was drawn up and delivered to Chancellor Warham, 
and Thomas Frowyk, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, was given a pike.125 The 
tenacity of the Pewterers in pursuit of their statute paid off, and this case illustrates that 
even the smaller companies of the City were capable of employing a sophisticated 
knowledge of parliamentary procedure and personnel to further their cause. 
 
The Carpenters, in 1497, similarly gained success in parliament in their quest for the 
repeal of a statute passed two years previously, which limited the wages and working 
hours of building craftsmen and other labourers.126 The Upholders, in 1495, 
complained to parliament about the use of false materials in the filling of cushions and 
featherbeds, but this petition failed.127 Both companies, like the Pewterers, invested 
money to employ personnel to research and draft the appropriate bills, requiring no 
small outlay of funds as well as a modicum of political acumen. The same could be 
said for the London Silkwomen, whose lobbying resulted in five statutes enacted by 
parliaments between 1455 and 1504 which restricted imports of silk wares.128 It is thus 
apparent that the size or status of the company did not necessarily influence the chance 
a petition had of success. 
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The large companies were no more successful than the small ones in acquiring acts 
passed in their favour. At the 1487 parliament a Common Council ordinance that 
prohibited the retail of goods at fairs outside London by Londoners was successfully 
opposed by other cities and towns of the realm.129 It is probable that the ordinance had 
already met opposition within the City, for it was suspended in March 1487, a month 
after it was first made, until the September of that year.130 The ordinance stated that the 
practice of freemen selling their wares across the realm was to the harm of all 
concerned: Londoners failed to get the best price for their goods and the merchants and 
artisans of other towns suffered as a consequence of increased competition.131  
 
The ordinance was probably the creation of the Mercers, who had persistently tried to 
prevent freemen of the City, particularly the Haberdashers, from selling items of 
mercery at provincial fairs.132 In 1484 they had petitioned the mayor, arguing that 
freemen of the City should ‘fordo goyng to fayres’, without success.133 The Drapers 
and the Tailors may have supported the Mercers in this endeavour as they desired all 
provincial clothiers to come to London and use Blackwell Hall, established in 1395 to 
control the sales of woollen cloth by non-citizens of the capital, for their retail needs. 
It is probable that the Goldsmiths also lent their support, as at assemblies in 1498 and 
1500 they were to prohibit their members from attending fairs.134 The seven-month 
delay in the implementation of the Common Council ordinance suggests that it 
encountered initial opposition from inside the City itself. Between them, the companies 
of the Mercers, Drapers, Tailors and Goldsmiths had thirteen aldermen in 1487 and the 
mayor, Henry Colet, was a Mercer, and so one might assume they held enough 
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influence between them to implement their collective will.135 Though these companies 
did eventually manage to enforce their ordinance, at least until it was overturned by 
parliament, the episode illustrates that the larger mercantile companies could not ride 
roughshod over the interests of the other companies and unpopular measures could not 
be forced through the Common Council. 
 
Parliament, in response to the Commons’ petition, overruled the authority of the mayor 
and aldermen and annulled the ordinance on the basis that it allowed Londoners to 
retain control over the distribution and pricing of goods.136 The Mercers, optimistically, 
tried to revive the ordinance by petitioning parliament in 1491, but as there is no record 
of it in the parliamentary rolls it may be safely assumed that it was one of many 
petitions not passed.137 
 
In both the City and other parts of the realm, parliament can be seen to have functioned 
effectively as a means for redress for constituents and cooperatives. Parliament may 
have been the avenue of choice for smaller companies who felt their needs were not 
perhaps given due consideration by the mercantile elite that ruled the City. Nor was the 
lobbying of parliament the preserve of the City companies: in 1504 the Shearmen of 
Norfolk submitted a bill requesting the repeal of a bill made in the 1495 parliament 
which had favoured shearers not of the craft company.138 Companies outside the capital 
may have lacked direct access to influential people but they were far from ignorant 
when it came to seeking redress for matters that concerned them, including, upon 
occasion, complaining about the Londoners themselves.  
 
4.3.3. Regulation 
It is apparent that the livery companies of the capital had come to be regarded with 
suspicion by men from other parts of the realm, particularly those visitors who were 
subjected to alleged high prices whilst attending parliament at Westminster. In the 1487 
parliament a complaint was lodged against the livery companies of the City: 
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…for selling of dere stuffe excedyng price reasonable, saying that by mean of 
ordenances whiche that everyche withyn them self by reason of theire corporacions do 
make ordenances & statutes in comen hurt of the Kynges liege people, with muche 
saying on the same more to grete rebuke of this Citie.139 
 
Complaint must have been made directly to the mayor and aldermen, though via what 
channel is unclear, for their response was decisive. A demand was issued, in December 
1487, by the Court of Aldermen that all company ordinances were to be submitted for 
their approval. Thereafter, all ordinances were to be recorded in the Letter Book, and 
those not so approved and recorded were to be cancelled.140  
 
The demand of the mayor and aldermen for the submission of ordinances was given 
whilst parliament was sitting, and therefore was presumably intended to give a visible 
appearance of taking the complaint seriously. This was no small inconvenience to the 
companies, the mayor and aldermen and the administrative staff of the Guildhall. The 
last comparable occasion was the guild inquiry demanded by the Crown in 1388.141 It 
was with some reluctance, it may be construed by the amount of time elapsed between 
the initial request and eventual compliance, that the Mercers’ Company submitted their 
ordinances to the mayor and aldermen for approval in October 1488, one of the last to 
do so.142 A possible reason for this is that in the past the large mercantile companies 
had not felt the same need as lesser companies to submit their ordinances for approval 
to the mayor and aldermen as the aldermen were largely derived from their number. To 
confirm their own ordinances may have been seen as an unnecessary formality. 
Alternatively, it may have been that they were only now willing to have their 
ordinances committed to scrutiny, as the newly elected mayor, Robert Tate, was a 
mercer.143 So eager, in fact, had the Mercers been to keep some of their ordinances 
covert that they created a ‘new’ book of ordinances to comply with this ruling, so 
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allowing them to omit possibly offensive ordinances from the old book.144 The 
ordinances were returned, fully approved, in mid-December.145 
 
Not all of the ordinances submitted as part of this exercise were approved.146 The 
Saddlers’ Company complained in 1490 that the cancellation of unauthorised 
ordinances had left them without ordinances with which to govern the craft.147 The 
Corsours similarly were left without ordinances, whilst those initially presented by the 
Waxchandlers and Pewterers were deemed inadequate.148 Yet at no point was the 
authority of the mayor and aldermen to approve and ratify such ordinances disputed, 
as it was seen as the natural route for all guilds wishing to adjust their current 
ordinances, make new ones or incorporate an extension to their powers of search into 
their crafts within the City. Through the approval of ordinances the mayor and 
aldermen delegated the business of the regulation of trade, quality of goods, and 
behaviour and employment of apprentices to the crafts and companies of the City. The 
very process of approving ordinances reinforced the authority of the mayor as the 
business head of the City. 
 
By the opening of Henry VII’s reign, therefore, and for most its duration, the authority 
of the mayor and aldermen to regulate the City companies and guilds was unquestioned, 
as it was in other cities, such as York and Norwich, with similar corporations. It was 
only after the City questioned the royal prerogative as a by-product of their fight to 
repress the ambitions of the Merchant Taylors that the authority of the mayor and 
aldermen over the companies was queried and confiscated as part of a wider policy to 
extend the royal prerogative right up to the boundaries of his rights.149 
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4.3.4. Royal Charters 
Royal approval of guild practices and privileges was regularly sought, particularly from 
the fourteenth century, and this approval manifested itself in the form of royal charters 
(or, strictly speaking, letters patent). The desire for and acquisition of such letters patent 
can be considered, as Matthew Davies states, as ‘a significant theme in the … histories 
of the London companies.’150 In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the crafts had 
sought the protection and security of a royal patent only infrequently, but this practice 
became far more common from the fourteenth century.151  
 
This was partly as a result of the Mortmain Act of 1391, which required all guilds 
acquiring lands, through the bequests of their members, to obtain a royal licence each 
time at considerable cost. To avoid this, the crafts obtained charters that allowed them 
to hold lands up to a certain yearly value in mortmain, and most of these enterprising 
institutions took the opportunity to gain various rights and privileges at the same time. 
Royal patents, from 1391, constituted statements of incorporation for they granted 
guilds the right to have a ‘perpetual commonalty’ and to plead and be impleaded in 
common.152 This meant that the patent provided a guild, or rather a company, with 
status, and conferred a legitimacy and security over and above that that could be 
obtained from the City authorities. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the 1390s saw a flurry of 
patents granted to guilds: the Skinners and Grocers obtained theirs in 1393, the 
Goldsmiths and Mercers in 1394 and the Saddlers in 1395.153  
 
The acquisition of letters patent was obviously seen to be advantageous, for they were 
regularly sought thereafter despite their cost.154 Thrupp suggested that the main reason 
for seeking a royal patent was to provide the company members with protection against 
the competition of country workers outside the mayor’s jurisdiction who sent their 
goods for sale in the capital, so frustrating the desire of the company to regulate produce 
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of their craft within the City.155 Whilst this may have been a consideration for many of 
the manufacturing companies it was not usually the prime motivation of most of the 
livery companies. Rather, these patents were used to secure rights that the companies 
held to be important: a common livery, power to hold assemblies and elect officers to 
rule the company according to their ordinances, and the right to hold land, albeit of a 
specified annual value, in perpetuity. Occasionally patents might be sought when the 
privileges desired were unlikely to be granted by the civic bureaucracy, such as 
extension of the rights of search, either geographically or over other guilds, or, as 
Thrupp pointed out, over workmen outside the City.156 Hence these patents highlighted 
the limitations of civic authority and, occasionally, undermined it, by granting 
companies the ability to establish regulations that may have contravened the authority 
of the mayor and aldermen in addition to circumventing civic regulation.157 To prevent 
this, a commons petition was presented to parliament and enacted in 1437 to ensure 
that all livery company ordinances, even those approved by letters patent, should be 
approved and enrolled by the relevant municipal authority before their implementation, 
thus ensuring that the regulation of City companies remained firmly in the jurisdiction 
of local government.158 Not all the guilds felt the need to seek legitimation via a letter 
patent in this way; for many approval of the mayor and aldermen and enrolment of their 
ordinances within the Letter Book was usually deemed to be sufficient.  
 
Royal letters patent were frequently sought and obtained by companies into Henry 
VII’s reign and beyond. The Bakers became one of the last of the crafts extant since 
the beginning of the century to become incorporated by letters patent in 1486. 159 It was 
unusual for such patents to contain anything controversial or against the perceived 
liberties and privileges of the City or authority of the mayor. In 1502 the Haberdashers, 
Cappers and Hatters sought and obtained a patent incorporating them as the Merchant 
Haberdashers. The mayor and aldermen were unhappy with the grant, elevating as it 
did the status of the Haberdashers’ company to a mercantile rather than an artisan 
institution, but formal complaint was not made and the new title was adopted with little 
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fuss.160 The Merchant Haberdashers’ enjoyment of their new status was temporary as 
under pressure from Guildhall they were forced to relinquish the merchant title in a 
new patent granted by Henry VIII in 1510, though the aldermen did pay forty marks 
for the Haberdashers’ administrative costs in effecting this change.161 No reason for 
this insistence was recorded in the City’s official records, but it can be construed that 
the dignity of the title was deemed unsuitable for the company and such delusions of 
grandeur were not to be tolerated. The Haberdashers, therefore, served as an exemplar 
to deter other companies from seeking such honours and potentially creating a 
headache for the City equal to that caused by the Merchant Taylor grant of 1503. 
 
4.3.5. The Merchant Taylors’ Company 
After a series of secret negotiations between prominent members of the Tailors’ 
company, its wardens and members of the king’s council, the Tailors and Linen 
Armourers of London were granted letters patent dated 6 January 1503. These not only 
incorporated them as ‘Merchant Taylors’, but also authorised the master and wardens 
of the company to increase their membership by admitting an unlimited number of 
Englishmen without regard to any other craft or guild in the City, and to ordain and 
execute ordinances without mayoral approval as long as these were not prejudicial to 
the laws of the realm or the mayor of London.162 This was considered by the Tailors to 
be recognition of their progression to a mercantile company, putting them on an equal 
footing with the weathier companies of the Mercers, Grocers and Drapers.163  
 
The Merchant Taylors’ company patent conferred by royal prerogative a status and 
privileges that the Tailors must have been aware would not have been approved by the 
mayor and aldermen. The secret nature of the negotiations suggest that the Crown was 
also not entirely ignorant of the City’s likely objections. To promote the Tailors’ guild 
from a company composed of mainly artisans that only had its first mayor in 1498 to 
one with mercantile status a mere four years later could be predicted to cause 
resentment. It was rare for the Crown to act in a manner prejudicial to the authority of 
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Guildhall and for it to do so provides reasonable grounds for speculation that the 
government may have had motives other than a mere fondness for the Tailors, or the 
£200 they paid for the patent.164  
 
The mayor and aldermen initially responded to the Merchant Taylors’ grant in 1503 by 
consulting learned counsel and sending a delegation of four aldermen and the Recorder 
of the City, Robert Sheffield, to the king to express their unhappiness with the patent 
and request its repeal.165 That they felt the need to take formal action against the grant, 
whereas they had reluctantly accepted a similar grant to the smaller Haberdashers’ 
Company a year earlier, is interesting. Their objection centred on the encroachment 
upon the jurisdiction of the mayor, thereby going against the ancient rights and 
privileges of the City. Possibly the combination of the new privileges granted to the 
Taylors and the aggressive ambition of the company made the other mercantile 
companies feel uncomfortable.  
 
The Crown’s response, in November 1503, was that the clause in the Merchant Taylors’ 
patent safeguarding the rights of the mayor applied only to the article which specified 
that the ordinances made by the new company should not be prejudicial to the rights of 
the mayor. Furthermore, the mayor and aldermen were commanded to appear before 
the king and council and show why the Merchant Taylors should not enjoy the effect 
of their grant and, more ominously, why the king should not, by his prerogative, make 
such a grant.166 The royal council demonstrated at this meeting that they were aware 
how unpopular the patent was with the citizens of the capital, for it warned the mayor 
and aldermen that they would be held responsible for any disturbances in the City under 
the pretext of the patent granted to the Merchant Taylors.167 
 
At this juncture it is worth noting the significance of the mayoral election on 13 October 
that year, when the Draper, William Capell, was elected. As usual the Common Hall 
of London had presented two candidates to the serving mayor and aldermen to choose 
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from, and despite having rejected him the previous four years, the Court of Aldermen 
selected Capell over the Haberdasher, William Welbeck.168 It is likely that on this 
occasion Capell’s agenda - to see the Tailors relegated to their rightful, more humble 
place - was aligned with that of the rest of the civic government, whereas a 
Haberdasher, in light of the recent patent awarded to that company, may have been 
considered to lack the vigour the City sought in the repeal of the Tailors’ patent. 
 
Even before Capell’s tenure as mayor, the Drapers had thrown much of their resources 
and influence into securing support to lobby for a repeal of the patent. Officials within 
both the bureaucracy of London and at court were retained by the Drapers, at great 
expense. Robert Sheffield, the City Recorder, was paid a total of £5 6s 8d for his 
support against the Tailors; James Hobart, the king’s attorney, and John Hale, clerk of 
the mayor’s court, found themselves in the Drapers’ pay at various times fighting for 
their cause.169 Three yards of black velvet were given to a master Mattock ‘to solyst 
M[aster John] Shaa ayenst the Tailo[r]s’.170 As Shaa, the Goldsmith and alderman, was 
known to stand in high favour with the king his support was worth having.171  
 
The City pursued the matter long after common sense dictated that discretion might be 
the better part of valour. In December 1503, it was decided by the mayor, William 
Capell, and the Court of Aldermen to try and persuade the king to repeal the patent by 
offering 2,500 marks to annul the Merchant Taylors’ charter and a further 5,000 marks, 
payable over five years, for the confirmation of the City charter.172 John Shaa was 
selected in his absence to take this offer to the king, along with the Recorder.173 
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Unfortunately, Shaa was absent because he was on his deathbed. As it was his lack of 
intervention was probably irrelevant, as it became apparent when parliament opened in 
the New Year that the king and council had decided to put an end to the argument by 
removing municipal oversight of company ordinances.  
 
The significance of this episode is manifold. It is a rare example of the Court of 
Aldermen failing to present a unified front in its dealings with the Crown. The unity of 
purpose of the aldermen had been, was usually and would be again, remarkable when 
the differing interests of the individuals concerned are considered.174 Livery company 
rivalries and differing economic interests which may have tainted the personal 
relationships between individual aldermen were exposed, and one can imagine that the 
agents of the Crown took note. 
 
4.3.6. The Livery Companies and the Statute of 1504 
Early in the 1504 parliament an act was passed which bit into the jurisdiction of all 
municipal authorities, not just that of the capital. The bill presented to the Lords in the 
form of a commons petition, though it was undoubtedly government-sponsored, 
explained that many civic ordinances had been made which were contrary to the king’s 
prerogative, to his laws, and to the commonweal.175 In the rehearsal for the bill it was 
explained that the 1437 act which had allowed corporate bodies to have their ordinances 
approved by the relevant municipal authorities or justices of the peace, had expired. 
Hence, in future, no ordinances were to be made, executed or enrolled without the 
approval of the Chancellor, Treasurer and two chief justices, or any three of them, or 
alternatively by the judges of assize on their circuit, on pain of a £40 fine for every 
infringement.176 Francis Bacon was later to refer to this law as one necessary to ‘restrain 
the by-laws or ordinances of corporations, which many times were against the 
prerogative of the king, the common law of the realm, and the liberty of the subject, 
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being fraternities in evil’.177 This act, theoretically at least, undermined the authority of 
the mayor and aldermen, depriving them of the ability to regulate the corporate bodies 
within their cities by effectively removing these institutions from municipal 
jurisdiction. Thus the mayor and aldermen were effectively demoted to mere foremen 
with responsibility over the companies only for the day to day business of quality and 
behavioural monitoring. For the second time in the reign the livery companies were 
ordered to submit their ordinances for approval, this time to the authorities named in 
the statute, an immediate sign their subjugation to royal control was not intended to 
exist on paper only. 
 
In questioning the royal prerogative, particularly at a time when a policy of consciously 
extending the royal prerogative was being pursued, the City fathers had virtually 
invited, if not pushed, the king and his council to clarify the situation, which, 
characteristically, they took the opportunity to do in their favour. To suppose that the 
patent was the sole cause of this attack upon municipal authority by the Crown would 
be to take too London-centric a view of the situation, though London’s challenge to 
royal authority may have acted as the catalyst.178 Given the king’s previous disputes 
with the Mercer-dominated Merchant Adventurers, he may well have seen it desirable 
to bring such bodies under his direct oversight. The imposition of such a heavy 
administrative burden upon key personnel within the government combined with the 
inevitable unpopularity of such a measure throughout the realm suggests that this was 
not undertaken as a knee-jerk reaction to London’s challenge to the royal prerogative 
but rather the expression of a broader agenda.  
 
Rappaport offers a different argument for the imposition of the 1504 act. He claims that 
the act ‘served to enhance, not dilute, the powers of the livery companies in the early 
modern period’, by providing the companies with the sanction of not only the municipal 
authorities but also of the central government.179 This argument fails not only to 
consider that many companies already enjoyed the official sanction of the Crown, 
conferred in the form of letters patent, but also does not take account of the context in 
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which the statute was created or the wider policies of the early Tudor administration. 
Had the companies felt that this act enhanced the reciprocal relationship Rappaport 
claims they shared with the Crown then it is unlikely that they would have petitioned 
for its repeal in 1509 and 1512.180 The encroachment upon the City’s prized self-
government may have been considered too high a price to pay by the companies for the 
re-enforcement of their direct connection with the Crown, particularly as, in practical 
terms, they had little to gain by it. 
 
The final episode in the Merchant Taylors’ grant was the agreement made at a Common 
Council meeting on 22 May 1504 to offer the king £5,000 for the confirmation of the 
City’s charters and repeal of the patent, with the sum to be renegotiated if the patent 
was not repealed.181 The king, unsurprisingly, refused, and the City, the following 
March, agreed to pay 5,000 marks, in five yearly instalments, for the confirmation of 
the City’s charter only.182 Two points, though seemingly obvious, deserve emphasis: 
firstly, that the City could reduce the amount payable so drastically, once it became 
clear that the patent would not be repealed, demonstrates that it maintained some 
bargaining ability. Secondly, Henry turned down a large sum of money, proving that 
his primary motivation was not financial, but principle was more important.  
 
Henry’s motivation in supporting the Merchant Taylors against vehement City 
opposition may have been two-fold. Firstly, as previously discussed, the Mercers and 
other mercantile companies that comprised the membership of the Merchant 
Adventurers had been identified as dangerous power-bases early in the reign and had 
proved themselves willing and able to prioritise their own economic profit above 
Henry’s political safety. This impression would not have been enhanced by the plethora 
of merchants caught flouting the trade restrictions imposed upon trade between 
England and the Low Countries in the 1490s.183 The mercantile elite who controlled 
the civic government of the capital were politically and economically capable of 
providing practical support to would-be pretenders and therefore could have been 
perceived to constitute an over-mighty elite. Such a threat was in need of neutralising, 
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or at least diluting, when the opportunity presented itself. The Tailors’ ambitions 
presented just such an opportunity, allowing Henry to employ a ‘divide and rule’ tactic 
by promoting the Tailors to a position where they might obtain equal standing with the 
mercantile companies of the Mercers, Grocers, Drapers and Fishmongers, thus diluting 
the power and influence of these companies and winning for the Crown support 
amongst the mercantile elite. Arguably, dilution of the mercantile pool within the 
capital may also have been Henry’s aim with his earlier grant to the Haberdashers. That 
Henry had proved happy to promote companies with only a handful of merchants in 
their ranks to mercantile status may have provided an impetus to the City’s objections 
to the Merchant Taylors’ grant; one elevation to such a status might be grumbled about 
but generally overlooked by the City, a second demanded action lest a precedent be set. 
Secondly, once the City challenged the royal prerogative the Crown was obliged to 
defend it, and it was naïve of the City to believe otherwise.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
The Livery Companies were not perceived by Henry and his government as a 
homogenous group but rather as individual entities with their own political and 
economic interests. Some of these interests were perceived to be contrary to those of 
the king and his council, whereas others could be manipulated to aid in the achievement 
of long-standing goals. Consequently, though a consistent policy had to be followed in 
the regulation of such entities, the treatment and favour shown to them was not uniform. 
Royal sponsorship of the Merchant Taylors was possibly not originally intended by the 
king and his council to become so overt, but was perhaps intended, like the grant made 
a year earlier to the Haberdashers, to dilute the oligarchic control the great mercantile 
companies had over the civic administration. The elevation of companies friendly to 
the king and their active promotion within the municipal bureaucracy also ensured that 
if the king did not have spies within the Court of Aldermen, he at least had well-
disposed allies therein. What Henry and his council cannot have anticipated was the 
reaction of the City, but even that was manipulated by the king and his council into an 
opportunity to extend the royal control. 
 
If Henry’s original aim in supporting the elevation of the Tailors’ Company to full 
mercantile status had been to dilute the influence of the other mercantile companies, 
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particularly the Mercers, upon the City’s politics and economics and assert the royal 
prerogative in areas traditionally within municipal jurisdiction, neither strategy enjoyed 
long-term success. The Mercers remained the pre-eminent power in the City for the 
duration of the sixteenth century and maintained their influence over the Merchant 
Adventurers. The London authorities probably sought repeal of the 1504 act in the first 
parliament of Henry VIII’s reign, but even if so this and other subsequent attempts 
failed.184 In 1512 the Merchant Taylors’ Company refused to support the companies of 
the Mercers, Grocers, Drapers, Fishmongers, Goldsmiths and others in the presentation 
of a petition to parliament requesting a repeal of the 1504 act.185 Henry VII’s 
intervention on their behalf had therefore earned a loyalty that outlived him. As it 
transpired this was to become largely irrelevant, for by the 1520s the act was largely 
ignored by the companies which reverted, without fanfare, to submitting their 
ordinances to the mayor and aldermen for approval and enrolment. That they did so 
without challenge from the government is possibly a reflection both on the 
administrative burden it had placed upon already busy personnel, and the fact that the 
act only theoretically, and not in practice, extended the prerogative of the Crown.  
 
The only reference to a violation by the companies of the 1504 act was made in the 
preamble of an Act of 1531 that dictated that the maximum a company could charge an 
apprentice for his entry into the freedom would be 2s 6d.186 No mention was made in 
relation to the apathetic attitude adopted by the companies towards obtaining the 
appropriate approvals for their ordinances, only that they had enacted ordinances that 
allowed the inflation of freedom fees ‘in disheritaunce or diminucon of the 
p[re]rogatyffe of the king, nor of other, nor ageynste the comen p[ro]fite of the 
people’.187  
 
The reign of Henry VII saw the erosion of municipal power in the regulation of Livery 
Companies, but the companies themselves emerged relatively unscathed. They 
remained essential to the fabric of the capital, socially, economically and politically, 
and the reign witnessed their continued evolution but no great alteration of their 
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circumstance, with the exception of the Merchant Taylors. The companies emerged 
from the reign of Henry VII with their individual rights, privileges and regulations 
intact; the demotion of the civic authorities had little effect upon them, and that it did 
have was temporary in nature. Mergers, rivalries, disparity between the merchants and 
the artisans, charitable functions of associated fraternities all carried on as before and 
would long after. Little changed until the Reformation dispensed with the doctrine of 
Purgatory and rendered many functions of the religious fraternities associated with the 
guilds redundant as it removed the impetus of charitable action as a remedy to the soul 
for earthly sins.188 Yet what Henry VII’s actions did achieve was the destabilisation of 
the City’s expectations of the Crown, born of the security Londoners had enjoyed under 
the Yorkist monarchs, that the king would protect the liberties and privileges it held 
dear. Any progress towards independence and autonomy the City had been making 
during the fifteenth century was arrested and the citizens were sharply reminded that 
everything they held they did so at the king’s pleasure.  
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Chapter 5: Communication and Interaction 
 
This chapter explores the nature and use of channels of communication by the Crown 
and the City in the reign of Henry VII. Written, verbal and visual communication will 
be examined, with a particular focus on political communication, which in this instance 
is defined as communication that took place between the politically active agents and 
individuals within the City and the Crown for a range of purposes connected with 
governance, trade and other matters.  
 
This chapter will first consider the role of ‘non-political’ communication in the City-
Crown relationship. This is followed by an exploration of the chief means by which the 
Crown communicated with the capital and vice versa. The chapter will then assess how 
effective and important pageantry and ceremonial was as a method of communication 
to a mass audience in an age where much communication was visual and ritualised. 
Parliament’s role as a conduit for communication between the capital and the king will 
be considered next. Lastly, it will be asked what role individuals, within both the Crown 
and City administrations, played in the facilitation of communication and whether the 
character or tone of communication changed as a consequence of the personalities 
involved. 
 
5.1. Non-Political Communication 
Communication between the City and the Crown took place on a multitude of levels 
and for a variety of reasons. While the communication necessary to facilitate the 
provision of goods and services to allow the royal household and its personnel to subsist 
is not the primary focus of this thesis, the capital’s role as supplier and the royal 
household’s as consumer was an essential element in the Crown-City relationship.1  
 
Though the royal household department of the Great Wardrobe, for example, 
epitomised the interdependent relationship of the City and the Crown, its role in the 
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relationship by this point was strictly economic rather than political. Similarly the 
Royal Mint functioned as an autonomous part of the royal administration. By the late 
fifteenth century the Great Wardrobe and the Mint had only limited political 
significance, though the Mint brought individual goldsmiths into close contact with 
certain courtiers and the king. The Mint was headed by a court official, who usually 
held the position of Master-Worker with a member of the Goldsmiths’ Company either 
holding the position jointly with him or working directly under him.2 From the start of 
Henry VII’s reign this post was held by Giles, Lord Daubeney, with the Goldsmith 
Bartholomew Rede. From 1492-3 Rede held the position jointly with fellow Goldsmith, 
John Shaa, an indication, perhaps, of how highly the king regarded Shaa. Thereafter 
Rede held the position on his own until his death in 1504.3 The lesser offices of the 
Mint – the clerkship of the Mint, the exchange, the keeper, the assayer, the engraver 
and the controller - all fell to goldsmiths.4  
 
The Mint implemented any change in coinage and therefore recoinage brought the 
goldsmiths working there into close contact with the king and his council. Giles 
Daubeney and Bartholomew Rede headed the commission charged with making the 
new sovereign coin in 1489.5 On at least two occasions John Shaa and Bartholomew 
Rede attended upon the king’s council, presumably to give their advice about the 
forthcoming recoinage.6 Once Rede was put in sole charge of the Mint he had more 
regular contact with the king: a receipt for 2 January 1506 states that Rede paid £20 of 
the profits from the Mint into the Chamber less £10 ‘delivered to the king’s grace’, 
implying that he paid the king in person.7 It was not a department that facilitated 
political communication but it was one of the ways in which London was connected 
economically and personally with the Crown. 
 
                                                 
2 Reddaway and Walker, Goldsmiths’ Company, 176. 
3 Reddaway and Walker, Goldsmiths’ Company, 177, 303, 307-8. 
4 Reddaway and Walker, Goldsmiths’ Company, 176. 
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6 TNA, E405/75, m.24; Select Cases, ed. Baynes and Durham, 31. 
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The Exchequer played both practical and ceremonial roles in the life of the City. The 
sheriffs and mayor swore their oaths of office before the barons of the Exchequer.8 
Many of the merchants (or at least their trusted servants) would have been familiar with 
the personnel of the lower Exchequer, otherwise known as the Exchequer of Receipt, 
where the four tellers issued them with payments, receipts or tallies for financial 
transactions involving the Crown. William Kebill, Goldsmith, who died in 1509, is 
unlikely to have been the only Londoner to have named Exchequer staff in his will. 
Among Kebill’s beneficiaries were John Heron and Thomas Fowler ‘of the king’s 
receipt’ and their wives.9  
 
Personnel of the Chancery had long been familiar figures to members of the civic 
administration. The Journals of the Common Council contain many copies of letters 
from various Chancery clerks on behalf of the king excusing old and / or infirm citizens 
from serving on juries or other civic duties. Chancery clerks occasionally had to visit 
the Guildhall on business: in December 1504 Richard Boldey, Chancery clerk, wrote 
in the City’s Journal a notice of his receipt of the City’s charter, as confirmed by 
Richard III, from Nicholas Pakenham, the Common Clerk, so that a new letter patent 
could be made.10 Occasionally Chancery scribes were employed by the City to copy 
required items of legislation or produce copies of letters patent pertinent to the capital. 
In November 1505 John Studde of the Chancery was granted the freedom of the City 
‘with any felaship of this citee’ in return for the ‘diligent labour and besynes that he 
hath taken and sustained about the great charter’, and in December 1507 it was agreed 
to pay Studde £20 for his labour in writing and enrolling the same charter.11  
 
Communication between citizens and the central law courts was not of itself  ‘political’, 
though the procedure and outcome of various cases might on rare occasion have 
political repercussions. Jurisdictional alterations and their impact as well as the 
persecution of individual Londoners in the course of the reign will be considered 
elsewhere, but the inhabitants of the City had a functional relationship with the law 
courts as the place where they sought redress of grievances. The two busiest central 
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courts, Common Pleas or Common Bench, and King’s Bench, were more accessible to 
the citizens of London than to those from other parts of the realm simply by virtue of 
their location at Westminster. The court of Common Pleas dealt mostly with actions 
concerning land disputes, matters of account and debt of over forty shillings, trespass 
and, in common with the King’s Bench and Exchequer Courts, matters brought on 
breach of royal statute and trespass.12 The original function of the King’s Bench was 
to deal with matters pertaining to the king’s interest, though long before the fifteenth 
century it had come to be mainly a criminal court with unlimited criminal jurisdiction 
throughout England, including the supervision of all inferior courts.13 It was also the 
criminal court of first instance for Middlesex, though the employment of the fictitious 
trespass called the ‘bill of Middlesex’ allowed access for those in other areas of the 
country who wished to use the court in the first instance.14 This fiction, and the 
increased volume of debt cases it took, allowed it to eventually overtake the court of 
Common Pleas as the busiest court in the second half of the sixteenth century.15 
Attorneys working at these courts often lived in the City and employed Londoners as 
scriveners and notaries, and law professionals who practised within them often trained 
at the Inns of Court, adjacent to the City.16  
 
The focus of this chapter is the political communication between the Crown and the 
City. It is evident that the City-Crown relationship functioned on a number of highly 
sophisticated social, economic and functional levels. This highlights an intimacy the 
Crown shared with the capital that it did not have with any other urban centre. 
 
5.2. Communication from the Crown to the City  
By Henry VII’s reign four main channels had been long established through which the 
king communicated with his towns and cities. He could make a proclamation, which 
                                                 
12 Margaret Hastings, The Court of Common Pleas in Fifteenth Century England (New York, 1947), 3-
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was usually addressed to all subjects of the realm and left to the civic authorities of the 
king’s towns and cities to disseminate its contents to the people. He could write a letter 
which would usually be addressed to the mayor, aldermen and commonalty. 
Occasionally he would send a deputation of trusted courtiers with a request to the 
mayor and aldermen of the City. Lastly, he could summon the mayor and aldermen, or 
other representatives of the City, to his presence. As shall be demonstrated, Henry 
employed these traditional methods extensively, although the absence of comparable 
studies makes it difficult to undertake a quantitative comparison with earlier reigns. It 
is, however, clear that his day-to-day use of these channels deviated little from 
established practice. 
 
What differentiated communication via these channels with the capital as opposed to 
other urban centres was the proximity of the centre of government at Westminster to 
London, and the comparative financial and political importance of the capital to the 
Crown. London was usually the first place to receive news, usually two days before 
York. The City was used as a sounding board for royal policy and provided the acclaim 
needed for accessions and coronations on behalf of the kingdom, as famously 
demonstrated when representatives of the City were coerced to be present when the 
crown was offered to Richard III at Baynard’s Castle in 1483.17 As a consequence of 
the proximity of the City and the Court the mayor and aldermen, or other Londoners, 
were more likely to be addressed in person, either by being visited by representatives 
of the king or summoned to the presence of the king or members of his council, than 
citizens of other towns. Political dealings were therefore more personal than with other 
urban centres; the king and his council were personally familiar with more members of 
civic government than they would have been with those of other cities.  
 
Proclamations, defined by Hughes and Larkin in the introduction to their volumes of 
Tudor proclamations as ‘a public ordinance issued by the king, in virtue of his royal 
prerogative, with the advice of his council, under the Great Seal, and by royal writ’, 
had been used since the fourteenth century.18 The breadth of subject matter addressed 
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by them was considerable, covering matters of foreign policy, such as the making of 
truces or declaring of war; the broadcasting of statutes or ordinances; summons to 
Parliament; prohibition of certain practices or inviting subjects to have charters 
confirmed, join royal armies or other such activities.19 Some were directed towards a 
particular geographical area and occasionally a proclamation would be made at the 
request of a particular interest group.20 These royal writs, issued by Chancery, 
contained orders to local officials, usually sheriffs but often including mayors, justices 
and bailiffs, to proclaim the contents.21 The contents would then be proclaimed in a 
variety of public places, such as county courts or market places.22 In London the 
Common Crier proclaimed the king’s will in a variety of prominent places, such as the 
Standards in Cheap, Leadenhall, St Magnus in Bridge Street, St Martin in Vintry and 
the main entry ways into the City.23  
 
The instructions that accompanied the proclamations that ordered City officials to 
publicise the content as widely as possible were initially short, Latin missives.24  
Edward IV replaced these instructions with English texts that went to great pains to 
explain and justify royal policy.25 Henry followed this practice and also sought to 
justify policy through these lengthy prologues. The letter that accompanied a 
proclamation announcing the betrothal of the Princess Mary to the Castilian prince 
Charles, in June 1508, outlined at length the benefits of the match. Both the 
proclamation and the letter were carefully copied into the Journal of Common Council, 
suggesting that it had been read before that assembly. 26 On the same day, it was noted 
in the Journal, the Common Seal of the City, ‘by thassent of the … mayer aldermen 
and the Comon Counsell … at the instance and request of our said sovereign lorde 
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king’, was affixed to the bonds sealing the marriage treaty.27 The participation of the 
City and the trade implications of the treaty explain why this proclamation was copied 
into the civic records whereas that of 1502, announcing the marriage of Henry’s other 
daughter, Margaret, to king James of Scotland, was not.28 The Scottish alliance was 
noted by the London chronicles but held no direct relevance to the City government, 
illustrating the narrow focus and consequent limitations of the municipal records.29 
 
The frequency with which medieval kings sought communication with their capital 
often directly correlated with their financial situation, and this held true for Henry’s 
reign. It has already been established that the usual method for the king to request a 
loan from the City was to write a letter addressed to the mayor, aldermen and 
commonalty of the City.30 In 1486 and 1496 John Dinham the Lord Treasurer, Reynold 
Bray and unspecified others took the king’s request for a loan to the mayor and 
aldermen.31 The chronicles do not make clear where the 1486 deputation met the 
mayor, nor do the civic records mention the delivery of the request by Dinham and 
Bray. In 1496 Bray and ‘othir of the kyngs counsayll’ met the mayor and his ‘brethren’ 
after the City governors had attended mass at St. Paul’s.32 John Mathew, mayor 1490-
1, was summoned before the king so that a benevolence could be extracted from him 
and his fellow aldermen.33 
 
The king’s desire to influence civic elections was also a catalyst for communication 
from the Crown to the City. The extent of the king’s interference in civic appointments 
will be explored in the next chapter, but Henry was not the only one to write letters of 
support for candidates for posts in the civic administration. The letter from the king in 
1498 to the mayor and aldermen that, according to the Great Chronicle, expressed his 
wish that the Tailor John Percyvale should be chosen as mayor, echoed an earlier 
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request from Thomas Savage, bishop of London.34 Cardinal Morton wrote to the mayor 
and aldermen and requested that one Richard Staverton should be granted the next 
vacancy for an attorney that arose within the sheriff’s court.35 This was granted on the 
proviso that ‘this grante be ta[k]yn for no p[re]sident’.36 William Seint, Shearman, was 
made a sheriff’s servant at the request of the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, John 
Fyneux, even though it meant that sheriff Richard Shore would then have one more 
than the permitted eighteen servants to assist him.37 This sort of patronage was nothing 
new and would only become a problem for the City in the next reign.38 
 
Royal letters were frequently sent to the City for information purposes. In September 
1497 letters were exchanged between the king and the Common Clerk, Nicholas 
Pakenham, on behalf of the City, regarding the arrival in and progress through the West 
Country made by Perkin Warbeck. Warbeck, masquerading as the second son of 
Edward IV, had been proclaimed by his followers as King Richard IV. This posed a 
very real threat to Henry: it was supported by Margaret, dowager duchess of Burgundy, 
and the king of Scotland.39 Warbeck’s landing in England had been a much anticipated 
event, for Henry had arrived and taken the throne in not dissimilar circumstances nearly 
a decade previously. At least two letters were sent from the king in September 1497 
regarding the progress of Warbeck and his eventual capture.40 These letters were read 
out at meetings of the Common Council, as were a number of letters from the king 
which established Warbeck’s true origins on 12 October, a mere week after Warbeck’s 
submission to Henry at Taunton.41 By supplying his capital with information the 
support of the City was secured and possible panic averted once it became apparent 
that there was no danger of another battle, uprising or, even worse, usurpation. Though 
information missives from the Crown were not uniquely sent to London, the capital 
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was probably kept better informed than the rest of the country, given that this was the 
king’s primary source of funds and seat of government as well as the place that such 
rebels were eventually imprisoned and, if necessary, tried and executed.42  
 
As not all letters received were noted in the civic records we cannot be certain that 
London did not receive threatening missives from Henry VII like that received by York 
after reports of unrest in the city in summer of 1488, when the king stated that should 
the authorities fail to punish wrong-doers he would punish the city so severely as to 
make a ‘feirfull’ example of them.43 However, it is likely that if London had received 
such letters then the chroniclers would have noted it even if the civic records did not. 
Given the proximity of the City it may well just have been more convenient for the 
king to administer rebukes in person rather than by letter.44 
 
The chronicles often serve to supplement our knowledge of royal letters received or 
summons issued that are not recorded in the civic records. The Great Chronicle 
recounts how a letter from the king regarding the peace made with France in 1492 was 
read before the mayor, aldermen and Common Council, though no account of it appears 
in the civic records.45 Similarly absent from the civic sources was the content of a 
newsletter sent from the king to the City in August 1497 justifying and explaining the 
need to send an army into Scotland.46 It is apparent from the Great Chronicle that these 
letters were not always delivered to the Guildhall, but often were given to the mayor 
and ‘his brethren’ on a Sunday whilst they attended mass at St. Paul’s Cathedral. Such 
was the case in June 1500 when a letter was given to the mayor with an update on the 
king’s meeting with Archduke Philip at Calais, though once again this letter makes no 
appearance in the civic records.47 It is therefore impossible to assess how much Crown-
City intercourse was conducted via this medium, though it seems probable that the 
majority of business would have been so, given the limitations of the alternatives. 
Summons to discuss situations, requests for deputations to be sent to the king and his 
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council to consult on matters concerning the City and invitations of various kinds were 
all likely to have been initiated or arranged by letter.  
 
On rare occasions the king issued a social invitation to the mayor and aldermen. Mayor 
Ralph Astry and his aldermen were invited to a Twelfth Night feast at the Palace of 
Westminster, though it was presided over by the Lord Chamberlain, Sir William 
Stanley, rather than the king himself.48 After dinner the mayor and his company were 
ushered into the king’s presence, where Henry dubbed Astry a knight, and then 
remained for the evening’s entertainment at the king’s bidding.49 
 
Hence it can be seen that Henry utilised all the traditional methods of communication 
employed by his predecessors. Perhaps one area in which he differed from other 
medieval kings was in his use of the relatively new printing press for political purposes, 
which Henry used to disseminate information in his last years on the throne. The first 
printed broadside of a statute for the purposes of broadcasting over a wide area dates 
from 1504.50 Henry also used print for propaganda purposes, for he ‘causid to be putt 
In prynt the pedygrew [pedigree]’ and confession of Warbeck, and hence the London 
chronicles were able to include fairly accurate copies.51 
 
5.2.1. The Role of St. Paul’s in the Dissemination of Information 
Since the early thirteenth century St. Paul’s Cross had been a place where 
announcements were made, sermons (often with political undertones) were preached 
and political events enacted.52 It was here that Dr. Ralph Shaa, brother of Lord Mayor 
Edmund Shaa, preached his infamous sermon declaring the sons of Edward IV to be 
illegitimate.53 At the choir door to the cathedral, opposite the cross, Cardinal Morton 
informed the gathered mayor and aldermen along with ‘a grete multytude of Cytyzyns 
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In theyr lyvereys’ in April 1492 that Granada had been liberated from the Moors by 
‘valyant powar of the kyng of Spayn’.54 Te Deum was then sung and then a sermon 
was preached from the cross in which it was revealed that in that same year a piece of 
the true cross had been found in Rome.55 Later that year Morton once more delivered 
tidings from the steps of the choir door when he told a ‘grete audience’ the news that 
peace had been concluded with France and the king was to receive a great pension from 
the French king.56 The betrothal of the Princess Margaret to the king of Scotland was 
announced from the pulpit of St. Paul’s cross in January 1502, followed by the 
obligatory recital of Te Deum and celebratory fires set around the City. The 
announcement of such events from the cathedral in the heart of the City became a key 
to both the dissemination of the information and the means by which the Crown 
initiated celebration. 
 
The cathedral fulfilled other propaganda and public relations functions for the Crown. 
The public reading of a bull of excommunication and its subsequent execution by a 
preacher at St. Paul’s cross of Edmund de la Pole, earl of Suffolk, would have helped 
Henry in his quest to discredit and discourage support for the rebel.57 It was at the North 
door of St. Paul’s cathedral that Henry VII offered his battle standards after his entry 
into the City following his victory at Bosworth.58 The marriage of Prince Arthur and 
Kathryn of Aragon took place at the cathedral and, just months later, the mayor and 
aldermen attended two days of solemn obsequy for the young prince.59 
 
5.3. Communication from the City to the Crown 
The City, when it wanted to communicate with the Crown, ordinarily did so as a 
petitioner and often relied on the intercession of senior courtiers or councillors. This 
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section will look at how the City approached matters it wished to discuss with the 
Crown. 
 
5.3.1. The Recorder 
The Recorder was the only person with an official role as a key intermediary between 
the City and the Crown. His most important task was to act as the official mouthpiece 
of the City: 
 
…the mayor and aldermen have been accustomed commonly to set forth all other 
matters touching the City in the presence of his Lordship the King and his Council, as 
also in the Royal Courts, by the mouth of the Recorder.60 
 
Hence, continued John Carpenter, the Common Clerk of the City in the early fifteenth 
century, the man appointed to the post should be ‘conspicuous for the brilliancy of his 
eloquence’.61 It was the Recorder who welcomed and addressed the king on behalf of 
the City at ceremonial royal entries and other official occasions. He also was usually 
attendant in deputations from the City to the king and often served as one of the four 
City MPs returned to parliament.62  
 
The Recorder’s job and role in Crown-City relations was well established by the reign 
of Henry VII. In 1488 Thomas Fitzwilliam, Recorder, and Henry Colet, alderman, 
presented to the Court of Aldermen a revision of the oath that the Recorder was required 
to swear.63 Much of the text was obviously copied from the oath recorded in the Liber 
Albus, indicating that the post had changed little, if at all, since the early fifteenth 
century.64 As before, he was expected to swear to be good and true to the king and his 
heirs and to do all in his power to maintain the franchises and customs of the City.65 
His official duties ranged from keeping the secrets of the civic government, responding 
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to a muster in times when the City required defending, and acting as returning officer 
in mayoral elections.66 Much of the Recorder’s duties were of a legal nature in offering 
the City counsel and sitting with the mayor in the court of Husting, where he enrolled 
and recorded pleas, and the Mayor’s Court.67 The Recorder was accorded a status 
commensurate with that of the aldermen, for he attended meetings of the Court of 
Aldermen and wore aldermanic livery, with his clerk accorded the right to wear the 
same livery as the sergeants who served the Chamberlain.68 Only one minor addition 
was made: that the Recorder would contribute to taxes and ‘all other charges to you to 
be leyd within this citee during your office lyke as citezens of this Citee shall doo for 
their p[ar]te’.69 This was probably invoked when the collection of the 1497 loan to the 
king became so problematic that it was recorded that aldermen who refused to pay their 
share would be committed to ward and that this applied as well ‘to M[aster] Recorder 
as to other aldermen’.70 No other reforms were made and there is no evidence to suggest 
that the £66 13s 4d salary that the Recorder received in the early fifteenth century had 
been increased. 
 
Three men served as Recorder during the reign of Henry VII: Thomas Fitzwilliam, 
from 1483 to 1494, Robert Sheffield, 1494-April 1508 and John Chaloner who resigned 
in 1510.71 None of these men were Londoners though it is probable that all three studied 
within one of London’s Inns of Court.72 It is apparent, therefore, that the civic 
administration selected the Recorder according to his experience and professional 
connections rather than any connection to the City. Thomas Fitzwilliam’s connections 
to Richard III’s government probably served to bring him to the attention of his 
potential employers.73 The long tenure of office of Fitzwilliam and Sheffield is proof 
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in itself of the satisfaction of the City in their performances of the role. Only one 
criticism exists on record: Robert Sheffield was condemned for failing to serve the City 
as well as he should when MP for the City in the 1504 parliament by the clerk of the 
Merchant Taylors’ Company. The clerk attributed the passing of the 1504 statute which 
made the Livery Companies subject to the oversight of royal officials, to Sheffield’s 
‘great labour, subtle wit and crafty means’.74 His argument was that the act gave 
company members free access to the courts rather than requiring them to seek the 
arbitration of their companies, to the gain of all London lawyers.75 The clerk was either 
attempting to divert attention away from the role his own company had played in recent 
events or was misguided, for it was both implausible that the Recorder could promote 
his own interests at the expense of the City and not be in some way censured by the 
civic government and impossible that one MP could get such an act passed for his own 
gain. Sheffield received 40s per year pension from the City after he left office in 1508, 
increased to five marks annually when he became Speaker in 1512, and it is likely that 
Fitzwilliam received a similar pension, though no record of it survives.76  
 
John Chaloner’s appointment was not entirely meritocratic, for Dudley recorded in his 
notebook the day after Chaloner’s appointment that the Recorder had paid £100 in 
ready money ‘for the king’s most gracious favour showed him in that room’.77 This 
does not necessarily mean that Chaloner was imposed upon the City: the civic 
administration had been anxious to curry favour with Dudley as recently as the previous 
December when they agreed that Dudley should receive an annuity of £3 6s 8d, so they 
may have been happy to accommodate Dudley’s wishes in this matter.78 That Chaloner 
survived the witch hunt conducted by William Capell during his second tenure as 
mayor which ousted men foisted upon the City’s administration, and served as Capell’s 
feoffee in August 1510, suggests that he was an acceptable choice to even the most 
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irascible within the civic government.79 Chaloner’s resignation in July 1510 on the 
grounds of ill-health might therefore be taken at face value.80  
 
The Recorder was expected to attend all meetings of the Common Council and Court 
of Aldermen and to be loyal to his employer. Fitzwilliam’s appointment as an MP for 
Lincolnshire after his selection as a London MP in December 1488 was probably only 
tolerated as he needed a county, rather than a borough, seat to be eligible for the 
position of Speaker in parliament.81 The civic government considered this of benefit to 
the City and rewarded Fitzwilliam with a gift of ten marks, though the capital reaped 
no tangible benefit as no legislation was passed in the City’s favour in that parliament.82 
Robert Sheffield narrowly missed out on being selected as Speaker in the 1497 
parliament, when Sir Giles Daubeney tried to buy the position for him but was outbid 
by Reynold Bray for his candidate, Thomas Englefield.83  
 
As the Recorder was expected to act as an intermediary between the Crown and the 
City with a foot maintained in both camps, he became, of necessity, familiar with the 
king and the personnel of the court. This was reflected in the further careers of men 
who had served as Recorder. Those who had held the position during the reign of 
Edward IV reached high positions within the government administration:  Thomas 
Billing ended his career as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench and Thomas Urswyk 
and Humphrey Starkey both became Chief Barons of the Exchequer.84 The Recorders 
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of Henry VIII’s reign were frequently appointed at the king’s request and recruited 
into royal service after they had rendered service to the City, suggesting that the king 
used the position as a proving ground for talented lawyers.85 The three Recorders who 
served in Henry VII’s reign did not go into royal service, but it is probable that was a 
reflection on the individuals who held the position rather than a break with traditional 
practice. Thomas Fitzwilliam was an old man by the time he took the position of 
London’s Recorder, Robert Sheffield fell out of favour with Henry VIII’s government 
and John Chaloner had resigned on grounds of ill health.86 
 
5.3.2. Negotiations and Committees  
London’s civic government ordinarily followed the same procedure when it wanted to 
discuss a matter with the king. Initially a committee was created, composed of members 
of the Common Council and, occasionally, men deemed to be particularly 
knowledgeable in the subject to be discussed. The committee would then be told to 
investigate the matter and make a formal report back to either the Common Council or 
to the Court of Aldermen. A deputation of aldermen and common councillors would 
be formed which would then approach the king, his council or his representatives. The 
Recorder would head the deputation and deliver the wish of the City orally. Paperwork 
regarding the matter would often be left with the Crown and follow-up meetings would 
be arranged. This was precisely the course of events when a dispute about the liberties 
of Portsoken ward was brought before the king and his council in 1508. A committee, 
headed by the mayor and composed of seven aldermen, including the Prior of Holy 
Trinity in his capacity as ex officio alderman of Portsoken ward, met with the king’s 
council and even went with Sir Thomas Lovell on a ‘perambulation’ of the ward.87  
 
Some cases were far more involved and took several meetings over a space of a number 
of years to resolve. One such involved the regulation of brokers, particularly alien 
brokers, active within the City, which had historically been a problem for the civic 
authorities. The solution applied in Henry VII’s reign, though it proved to only be 
temporary, is a fine illustration of Crown-City cooperation. Repeated attempts to limit 
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the number of brokers active in the City enjoyed limited success at best.88 The rehearsal 
to an ordinance passed by a meeting of the Common Council in March 1485 stated that: 
 
the mair and the aldermen of this citee of London have often tymes afore this in divers 
comon counseills ben grevously vexed and troubled by the grete compleynts made unto 
theym uppon the grevous losse and damages incomp[ar]able the which not only the 
said citee of London but also the com[mon]altie of all the realme of England susteyneth 
and suffreth and of very necessite in tyme to come is likely to susteyn… thurgh the 
grete subtiltie and deceite of the grete multitude of brocours aswell English as aliens.89 
 
Furthermore, the complaint continued, these brokers, particularly alien brokers, 
inflated the price of merchandise and made false bargains to the harm of all of the 
king’s subjects.90 Alien brokers tended to acquire merchandise at a beneficial price 
which, upon departing England, they would then distribute ‘among[st] the enemyes of 
the kyng our sov[er]aign[e] lord’.91 The ordinance therefore dictated that henceforth 
the number of brokers should be limited to twenty-six Englishmen named and chosen 
by the crafts of the City.92 
 
In practice this, like previous attempts to limit brokers, proved difficult to enforce. The 
Great Chronicle’s account of action taken by the City during the reign of Henry VII is 
somewhat confused and not much supplemented by the civic records. It is apparent that 
the system of regulating alien brokers had so broken down by the second mayoralty of 
Sir Henry Colet (1495-96) that the City was forced to bring actions against certain alien 
brokers which were then removed to the king’s council.93 The Great Chronicle claims 
that there were by this time so many stranger-brokers that when it came to their 
regulation ‘the alyauntis [aliens] Rulis as much In this mater as the mayre & the 
bench’.94  
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In February 1497 the king’s council requested to see all such ‘sta[tutes] and other 
records as the Cite haith to shewe for their right as touchyng the forfeates of foren[s] 
bying and sellyng’.95 Two months afterwards four aldermen were appointed to go ‘with 
the brokers’ to the Lord Chancellor.96 That John Morton, the Lord Chancellor, was 
heading the council’s negotiations indicates that the Crown recognised the importance 
of the matter to the City. In the absence of more information it might be speculated that 
these ‘brokers’ were citizen brokers who wished to petition to have aliens prohibited 
from practising brokerage in the City, as they were to do early in the next reign.97 
Another deputation of four aldermen went to Morton in February 1498 to discuss the 
‘mater of brokers and for the nombre of strangers brokers’, indicating that negotiations 
had reached a stage where they were able to discuss specifics, including various legal 
matters, as might be implied by the attendance of the Chief Justice, John Fyneux.98 
Specific, though unnamed, alien merchants were invited to the Guildhall in July to 
submit the names of prospective brokers for their nations to the tune of two Venetians 
and three men each from Genoa, Florence, Lucca and Spain.99 A further meeting 
between the Chancellor and a delegation of aldermen took place in the November, 
presumably to report upon the stranger-brokers selected to be sworn and to fine-tune 
the details of the arrangement.100 
 
The matter was not finally settled until March 1499, when the mayor issued a 
proclamation on behalf of the king stating that no man, stranger or denizen, was to 
engage in acts of brokerage before being sworn and admitted to the said occupation by 
the mayor and aldermen upon pain of disenfranchisement for denizens or imprisonment 
‘and fferther punysshement according to the anncyent custmnes granntes’.101 Invoking 
the name and authority of the king may have lent weight to the pronouncement, though 
ultimately this did not make this solution to the problem of broker-strangers any more 
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durable than past ones and the next decade would see the problem return.102 Details of 
the arrangement were added to the Letter Patent granted to the City by Henry in 
1505.103 
 
According to the Great Chronicle, the entire negotiations took three years (though the 
civic records suggest it was two), which was of no little inconvenience to the City.104 
Yet the matter of stranger-brokers had become an issue too unwieldy for the City to 
deal with by itself as past attempts to impose regulatory ordinances had proved to be 
temporary. The City had been desperate enough to seek a legal solution to the problem 
and though Crown involvement may not have been sought initially, cooperation 
between the two entities did serve to create a workable solution, albeit not an original 
one.105 
 
It is difficult to see what the Crown had to gain by involving itself in this matter. It is 
possible that the king had been petitioned by alien merchants though no evidence exists 
to suggest this. It may simply be that in this instance the Crown sought to give good 
governance in seeking a workable solution for the good of the City. This was not 
without precedent, for the governments of Henry VI and Edward IV had worked with 
the City to tackle the problem of illegal nets and weirs in the Thames.106 
 
5.3.3. Trade, Diplomacy and Unrest  
Cooperation between the City and the Crown was not restricted to when the City 
needed assistance. The Crown regularly requested the help of the City and the expertise 
of its merchants on matters pertaining to trade and diplomacy, notwithstanding the 
presumption of the Merchant Adventurers in negotiating their own safe-conduct with 
Maximilian in the early years of the reign. In January 1496 the Lord Privy Seal, Richard 
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Fox, requested that the Merchant Adventurers should forward to him remembrances of 
their grievances and wishes prior to the arrival of ambassadors from the Netherlands.107 
The Adventurers then put together a committee of twelve men to consider the matter.108 
The resulting treaty of 1496, often known as the Intercursus magnus, saw a resumption 
of trade on almost identical terms to the previous intercourses that had been in operation 
since 1447, yet the City was not prepared to compromise its principles to make it 
happen.109 It was noted in the king’s council proceedings, 29 April, that communication 
was to be had with the mayor, aldermen and Common Council of the City to persuade 
them to agree to ‘bind’ to the said charter.110 This concerned the City’s reluctance to 
affix its Common Seal to the charter, as it had been agreed that sundry of the main 
towns of both lands would do. This was more pertinent to the towns and cities of the 
continent than London, which were far more likely to find themselves at variance with 
their rulers and therefore extra assurance of their intention to abide by the charter was 
desirable.111 The Common Council had been assembled and resolved not to affix its 
seal to the treaty, whereupon they were ordered to assemble again by the king, who 
sent Bray, Lovell, Dinham and others to reason with them, and hence this may have 
been the ‘communication’ referred to in the council minutes.112 According to the Great 
Chronicle, ‘long debatyng’ of the matter ensued between the king’s council and the 
Common Council which was only resolved when the mayor, Henry Colet, agreed to fix 
his personal seal to the document.113 
 
Further debate between king’s council and the mercantile community came later that 
year with the imposition of the ‘Andrew Guilder’, a toll imposed upon each piece of 
imported English cloth into the Netherlands.114 The Recorder and the alderman Robert 
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Fabyan rode to the king with certain unnamed commons in September to ask for the 
king’s help, and the king duly sent a letter to the archduke requesting the repeal of the 
new toll.115 Trade was not forbidden at this time (though it was later to be) but cloth 
was to go via Calais until the situation had been resolved.116 The situation was still 
unresolved in January 1497, when the Recorder was sent to the king to discover the 
king’s pleasure as to how the merchants should proceed when trading cloth and the 
imposition was not lifted until July.117  
 
The exemption of the Hanse merchants residing in the City from the embargoes 
imposed upon English merchants at various points in the reign understandably caused 
resentment, which led to the most unsettling instance of unrest within the City walls 
during the reign. Unrest, always the most basic way subjects had of communicating 
their grievance to the authorities, was perpetrated by a group of young men who the 
Great Chronicle described as being servants of members of the Mercers’ Company. 
They broke into the Hanse enclosure, known as the Steelyard, to ‘ryfle & to spoyle 
such Chambyrs & othyr howsys as they mygth wyn Into’.118 The crowd quickly 
dispersed as soon as it was known that the mayor was making his way there. A watch 
was arranged, which apparently lasted seventeen days, and the wardens of the 
companies were told to keep the peace.119 The ringleaders were apparently two servants 
of the Mercer John Pykton, and through them were implicated some eighty more, all 
servants or apprentices.120 Their grievance was common to their masters, that: 
 
The Restreyntys made by the kyng soo long & soo offtyn, cawsid the adventurers Into 
Flaundyrs to decay … The Estyrlyngys … were at theyr lyberte had had all theyr trayt 
Into those partyes.121 
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It is valid to wonder if the young men were encouraged in their action by their masters, 
who had too much to lose to riot themselves. Such acts had precedent and merchants 
might have felt unable to do much to bring their plight to the attention of the king.122 
Certainly Chancellor Morton, who summoned the wardens of the Mercery to him the 
following day, required assurance that this was not the case, charging the wardens to 
ensure that henceforth all such ‘inconvenyent Ryott’ be avoided, both by masters and 
those in their charge.123 
 
The king and his council acknowledged that the best way to remain informed about 
trade relations with the Low Countries was to be briefed by the mayor and aldermen, 
many of them Adventurers themselves. A note in the council minutes dated 6 
November 1498 stated that the mayor and his brethren were to advise the king’s grace 
‘upon this entercourse betwene England and the Dukes Landes’.124 Possibly this was 
early preparation for the diet held at Calais the following April which produced a new 
treaty that addressed many of the more practical problems recently experienced by the 
Adventurers.125 Henry and Archduke Philip attended the diet in person and amongst 
the king’s attendants was one prominent Londoner, the Goldsmith John Shaa. Shaa, as 
well as acquiring prominence in civic life, was a royal servant at this time and was the 
only one of thirty-four knights there without a formal household position and the only 
merchant in the gathering.126 He was accompanied by the Common Clerk of the City, 
Nicholas Pakenham. 
 
Despite the fact that many Staplers were also Adventurers, relations between the two 
fellowships were not always cordial. Richard Fox, then bishop of Durham, Giles Lord 
Daubeney, Lord Dinham the Lord Treasurer and Lord Audeley were involved in 
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mediating between the two fellowships in 1490.127 It was probably in gratitude for their 
assistance that the Mercers admitted Fox and Daubeney into their company.128 The 
removal of the cloth trade by the king to Calais in 1494, 1496-7 and 1505 led to further 
confrontations. In 1504 the king and council, meeting in the Star Chamber at 
Westminster, stated that both parties, when making use of the privileges of the other, 
‘should be subject to all the regulations and penalties by which the other is bound’.129 
  
The interdependent nature of the relationship between the City and the Crown found 
true expression in trade matters, for the king utilised the diplomatic and other 
knowledge of the merchants to inform his foreign policy, and the merchants needed the 
king and his ministers to orchestrate embassies and treaties to facilitate their trade. Yet 
in this, as in other matters, the king’s will always prevailed over City interest. 
Mercantile expression of frustration with foreign policy was minimal, suggesting that 
they saw the need for the embargoes that they were subject to, erupting into small-scale 
violence only when it was apparent that denizen and alien merchants were not subject 
to the same restrictions. 
 
5.4. Parliament 
From the mid-fourteenth century London returned four Members of Parliament (MPs), 
normally two aldermen and two members of the Common Council.130 London’s 
members, along with the two from the City of York, were traditionally accorded seats 
of honour beside the privy councillors on the front bench of the House of Commons.131 
By Henry VII’s reign the City’s Recorder was usually returned as one of London’s MPs 
in place of one of the aldermen.132 These men were appointed at meetings of the 
Common Council.133  
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London’s engagement with parliament was characterised by a centrally orchestrated 
programme by the civic government. The members of the Common Council were 
frequently asked for suggestions regarding bills that could be promoted for the 
commonweal of the City. The Court of Aldermen occasionally created committees to 
investigate the capital’s needs. Such committees were appointed in 1489 and 1497 to 
assist the London MPs and help compose ‘suche articles as they thynk wold be spoken 
in the next parliament for the weale of this Cite’.134 No other parliamentary borough is 
known to have made such thorough preparations for parliamentary meetings, nor did 
they present bills to parliament with the same regularity as the City did.135 The success 
rate of London’s corporate parliamentary programme, however, though higher than any 
other borough at three acts over seven parliaments, was far from being absolute. The 
committee of 1497 failed to secure any acts and in 1504 a drafted proposal for the 
reform of the Church’s testamentary jurisdiction within the City disappeared without a 
trace.136  
 
Parliament was also a forum in which other boroughs sought redress against perceived 
abuses perpetrated by the capital itself. The mayor and aldermen felt compelled to 
conduct an audit of all company and craft ordinances after accusations were levied in 
the 1487 parliament that the livery companies colluded to inflate prices.137 The City 
may have felt justifiably under attack in the 1504 parliament, for not only was oversight 
of the livery companies removed from the jurisdiction of the mayor and aldermen, but 
the City’s right to levy ‘scavage’ was also undermined.138 Scavage, a custom levied on 
imported goods sold by non-citizens of London, was understandably unpopular with 
other urban centres but most recently had been the subject of complaints by the cities 
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of Salisbury and Exeter.139 Parliament passed an act that declared that henceforth 
scavage was only to be levied upon aliens, though the City did manage to secure a 
concession that permitted it to levy the toll upon denizens’ goods if the consent of the 
king and council was obtained.140 
 
Individual London citizens and livery companies appear to have been somewhat more 
successful in their lobbying of parliament than the civic government.141 The Mayor and 
Aldermen may have sought to have knowledge and control of all bills put before 
parliament by London citizens. In April 1497 the Court of Aldermen assigned two men 
to view a bill the Upholders’ craft intended to put before parliament.142 Not all the bills 
presented by livery companies and crafts leave a trace in the civic records so it is 
impossible to judge how successful the civic administration was in coordinating City 
parliamentary activity.143  
 
London’s ability to transform petitions into legislation did not improve in the next 
reign. Attempts early in the reign to repeal the acts passed by the 1504 parliament 
regarding the regulation of livery companies and the levying of scavage both failed.144 
Attempts to regain control of the City offices of garbeller, common weigher and keeper 
of Blackwell Hall were equally unsuccessful.145 
 
Londoners were also invited to participate in the Great Councils of the reign. Hugh 
Brice and John Pickering were nominated by the Common Council in November 1488 
to attend upon the king in his council on the tenth of that month, which given the timing 
was undoubtedly the Great Council that took place then.146 The focus of the meeting 
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was the state of affairs in Brittany, and the choice of Pickering as a City representative 
indicates that matters of trade were foremost in the minds of the Aldermen, since he 
was the governor of the Merchant Adventurers. A further six men were chosen to attend 
with Brice and Pickering two days later.147 Whether this was on the City’s initiative 
after discovering that they were no better represented than Ipswich, Norwich or 
Reading, or at the king’s behest, is unknown.148 The City’s priorities were still firmly 
focused on trade, for among the new attendees were the aldermen, Mercers, Merchant 
Adventurers and Staplers, Hugh Clopton and Nicholas Alwyn, and the Stapler and 
Grocer Richard Nonneley.149 That Nonneley and Pickering were selected to serve as 
MPs for the City the following month reinforces the impression that the City looked to 
its trading interests.150 At a Common Council meeting held 4 November 1490, the 
Recorder Thomas Fitzwilliam, alderman Hugh Clopton and Mercer Thomas Grafton 
were appointed to attend the king and his great council in Windsor.151 No further details 
about the meeting appears in the civic records. 
 
5.5. Pageantry and Celebration 
John Stow, in his Survey of London, written at the end of the sixteenth century, 
recounted London’s tradition of celebrating royal arrivals, marriages, victories and 
entries with pageants of varying degrees of magnificence.152 The first recorded was that 
of the reception provided by the City for Eleanor of Provence, bride of Henry III, in 
1236, when the City was adorned with silks, pageants were performed and 260 citizens 
clothed in garments embroidered with gold and silks rode to meet the royal couple.153 
Pageants became more elaborate as time passed: that for the victory of Edward I over 
the Scots in 1298 involved several pageants organised by the crafts.154 In the course of 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century these proceedings contained common, 
customary elements: the mayor, aldermen and citizens wore special clothing and 
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processed with song along symbolically important routes, houses were decorated with 
tapestries or textiles, elaborate pageants and wine flowing from the conduits became a 
recognised part of City-based ceremonies.155 
 
By the fifteenth century these events were becoming more frequent and elaborate. 
Pageantry increasingly came to serve a political purpose in transmitting the legitimacy, 
ambitions and image of the monarch and his family.156 Consequently the considerable 
amount of organisation required by royalty meant that these events were rarely 
spontaneous or voluntary.157 That is not to imply that the City was coerced rather than 
complicit in the provision of such displays as it was to the glory of the capital to be 
seen as the seat of a strong and glorious monarch, and at the same time to assert its own 
civic identity.  
 
5.5.1. Small Events 
Anne Lancashire observed the importance of distinguishing between major royal 
entries into the City and smaller civic events such as visits by ambassadors or minor 
royal entries, when the king might return from an extended stay away from the City 
and required little more than ‘courtesy civic escorts through the City’.158 Visits by 
ambassadors, papal emissaries or other dignitaries came somewhere between the two, 
requiring an impressive display by the capital to awe the visitors, usually involving 
decorated streets, citizens turned out in full livery company regalia, musicians and an 
escort through the City. Henry received the papal cap and sword of maintenance from 
three different popes during his reign and each occasion was marked with two days of 
solemn ceremony, the cost of which was met by the City.159 Present at the first of these 
occasions in 1488 were the ambassadors of Castile, Brittany, Flanders and from 
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Maximilian, the King of the Romans, thus providing the opportunity to impress once 
more upon these visitors the magnificence of the monarch and his capital.160  
 
The civic celebrations provided for ambassadors depended upon the status of the 
individuals within the ambassadorial parties, the aim of the embassy and the result of 
any negotiations. The ambassadorial party sent from Maximilian in 1503 included a 
bishop, a marquis and a count with ‘othyr knygthis and men of ffame’ who were, with 
their great company of servants, richly dressed.161 Oaths of amity were sworn between 
the king and the ambassadors, on behalf of their master, and the event was celebrated 
with great fires in the City and pipes of Gascon wine made available for the citizens to 
drink.162 The visit of the Scottish ambassadors to London for negotiations regarding 
the marriage of their king to the king’s daughter, Margaret, took place just after the 
civic celebrations for the marriage celebrations of Prince Arthur and Kathryn of 
Aragon.163 Even so, they were duly met and escorted to their lodging in Smithfield and 
probably attended some of the jousts and other festivities that occurred in the following 
weeks.164 The mayor, John Shaa, hosted a dinner for the ambassadors at which the 
guests appeared to have gone to great pains to praise the City. A ‘Scottysh preyst 
Syttyng at oon of the syde tablys’ created a ballad which included praise for the mayor:  
 
Thy famous mayer… Noo lord of parys, venyze or Floraunce / In dygnyte or honour, 
gooth to hym nyy / He ys exampler, loodster and Guy / Pryncypall patron, & Rose 
orygynall / Above all mayrys, as mastyr most worthy / London thou art. the fflowyr of 
Cytees all.165  
 
The priest is thought to be the celebrated Scottish poet and courtier William Dunbar.166 
It is possible that this flattery may have been a reflection on the fact that Shaa was 
known to be uncommonly intimate with the king and his court, though we cannot know 
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how likely it was that Shaa’s standing with the king was known in Scotland. More 
probable is that the ambassadors were keen to curry favour with their hosts, which 
almost certainly included members of the king’s inner circle, as they identified the 
monarch closely with his capital.167 
 
The cost of smaller celebrations for royal entries into the City after the monarch had 
spent an extended period away from the capital was often absorbed by the livery 
companies. The Drapers’ Company accounts record that they paid 21s for the hire of a 
barge to join the City flotilla that met the king at either Fulham or Sheen after his return 
from his northern progress of 1486.168 Expenses for bargemen, musicians and food and 
drink for the occupants of the boat amounted to a further 10s 4d.169 The Tailors spent 
a total of £1 4s 10d, including provision for an organ and singing children in the barge 
on the same occasion and the accounts of the Ironmongers and Leathersellers reflect 
similar expenditure.170  
 
In the first two years of Henry’s reign there were five royal entries with associated 
celebration and street decoration; it is unlikely that Edward IV had enjoyed so many in 
his entire reign.171 The mayor, aldermen and citizens in their liveries met the king at 
Hornsey Park and accompanied him into the City via Shoreditch after his victories at 
Bosworth and Stoke.172 Henry’s entry into the City by barge in 1486 has already been 
mentioned. The entries prior to Henry’s and Elizabeth’s coronations in 1485 and 1487 
respectively were the other two. This profusion of civic provision for royal events in 
the early years of the reign perhaps set Crown expectations of future City generosity 
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high. The large number of royal events in the first few years of the reign correlates with 
the insecurity of Henry VII’s position at this time and perhaps reflects the City’s 
eagerness to win the favour of the new king and the king’s desire to visibly reinforce 
his legitimacy and authority. London was not the only city to do this: when the king 
entered York in spring 1486 the citizens of York put on an extravagant royal entry into 
the city with four pageants established at various points within the city walls despite 
the ‘povertie, decay and ruyn of this citie’.173  
 
As well as the regular pomp and ceremony it provided for royal occasions, London did 
enjoy a number of purely civic occasions, though perhaps not on the scale of the annual 
Corpus Christi plays celebrated by York and Coventry.174 Midsummer Watch was 
celebrated sporadically and in varying degrees in the City. This was originally a 
marching event and varied from year to year in its scale, sometimes including 
pageants.175 It is hard to discern if such events took place with any regularity. Evidence 
exists for watches arranged in 1503, 1504 and 1507 but few details remain.176 The 
processions accompanying the mayor and the sheriffs for their oath-takings in front of 
the barons of the Exchequer became gradually more elaborate in the course of the 
fifteenth century, though they did not reach their zenith until well into the sixteenth 
century.177 By the mid-fifteenth century it was tradition for the mayor, aldermen and 
other senior Londoners to walk from the Guildhall to an inn called the Crane, where 
they would board a barge to Westminster.178 The livery companies, also in barges, 
would accompany the mayor upriver to Westminster. John Shaa, when he decided that 
the party escorting him to his barge would ride, gained the derision of the Great 
Chronicler who disapproved of the expense involved in purveying horses and attributed 
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Shaa’s whim to the fact that he was ‘lytill of Stature’ and therefore would look more 
impressive on a horse.179  
 
5.5.2. Coronations and Funerals 
Coronation entries into the City were large-scale occasions that took place over at least 
a couple of days. On the first day the king (or queen) would be met outside the City by 
the mayor, aldermen and liverymen, usually at London Bridge and then escorted to the 
Tower, where they would stay at least one night prior to the coronation itself.180 Usually 
a pageant of greeting would be at the Bridge, marking it as the entrance to the capital.181 
The day of the coronation the king was taken on a route traditionally used for royal 
entries: through the City via Gracechurch Street, Cornhill, Poultry, Cheapside and on 
to Westminster.182 This gave the citizens the opportunity to see the monarch and took 
the king through the richest, widest parts of the City. Cheapside, in a crowded City, 
was an area of rare openness and space, being the broadest and longest of London’s 
streets.183 At both ends were conduits which were frequently the sites of pageants, as 
was the cross and standard in the middle of the street. At the west end, adjacent to the 
little conduit, was the entrance into St. Paul’s churchyard which was often the 
termination point of City entries and ceremonies.184 Cheapside was lined with rich 
houses and fine shops which were decorated with textiles, tapestries and rich hangings 
during civic celebrations and hence was an area of wealth and finery.185  
 
Royal funeral and coronation ceremonies were closed affairs, but the Londoners had 
rare access and a role in the accompanying celebrations. Between seven and eight 
leading Londoners were selected to attend upon the Chief Butler at the coronation feast 
and the mayor had the honour of serving the king wine at the end of the feast, for which 
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he received the cup used by the king and the ewer that held the water used to temper 
the wine.186 Both cup and ewer were borne before the mayor as he and the aldermen 
exited after the feast through Westminster Hall.187 In royal funeral ceremonies, the 
mayor would make his offering during the service itself directly after the lords temporal 
and members of the episcopate, but before the chief justices and lesser justices, the 
knights of the royal household and the barons of the Exchequer. The aldermen of the 
City would follow the Exchequer barons.188 Hence in royal ceremonial occasions the 
predominance of the capital over the other urban centres of the realm was made plain, 
as was the status of the mayor and aldermen in the social hierarchy. 
 
Though the cost incurred by the capital on these occasions was by no means small it 
was mostly expended upon craftsmanship, materials and goods sourced within the City. 
Ian Archer has calculated that for Henry VII’s funeral approximately 20,772 yards of 
black cloth was purchased from fifty-seven merchants at a cost of £3,952.189 Other 
expenses included 5,113 pounds of wax and £898 worth of torches provided by forty-
two waxchandlers, and a payment of £709 to sixteen painters.190 This accounts for only 
a small portion of total expenditure within the City for this event. The funeral of 
Elizabeth of York in 1503 was smaller in scale but still represented a considerable 
economic boost to the merchants of London: 9,485 yards of black cloth costing a total 
of £1,483 15s 10d was purchased from thirty-nine suppliers.191 Though these are 
considerable sums what is not known is the mark-up on these goods, and therefore the 
profit made by the Londoners from such events is impossible to quantify. The short-
term financial gain experienced by some of the citizens upon the occasion of the 
queen’s funeral would have been negated by the loss of a valuable customer for the 
London merchants of the queen’s household, representing some 130 persons of various 
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social standing.192 A dead king would soon be replaced by a successor, but there was 
no assurance that a queen would be so readily replaced. 
 
Economically speaking, there were more gains to be made than just direct expenditure 
by the Crown. Magnates, dignitaries and other attendees of royal occasions would 
require suitable apparel, including jewels, decorations and trappings for horses and 
other accessories. The Great Chronicle, recounting some of the gold collars worn by 
some of the noble attendees of Kathryn and Arthur’s wedding celebrations, was able to 
record accurately the value of such items as he had ‘report of Goldsmythis & othir 
werkmen that theym wrought & delyverd’.193 Such events gave London’s craftsmen 
and merchants an opportunity to display their artistry and wares to visiting foreign 
dignitaries, nobles and royalty. The rich textiles that house owners hung outside their 
houses on Cheapside, for example, may have served a secondary purpose of advertising 
the luxury wares on sale from that property.194 Shopholders and inn keepers would have 
enjoyed additional business generated by the influx of visitors who desired food, a 
place to stay and perhaps souvenirs and trinkets.195  
 
5.5.3. The Marriage of Arthur and Kathryn 
The largest and most impressive royal-civic celebration of the reign, that of the entrance 
into the City of the bride of Prince Arthur, Kathryn of Aragon, in 1501, has received 
much scholarly attention.196 This pageant was a substantial organisational achievement 
that required the close cooperation of representatives of the Crown and the City. In 
November 1499, two years before the pageant was eventually to take place, a 
committee of eight men were appointed ‘to have [conversation] from tyme to tyme 
w[ith] the kynges comyssioners touchyng preparacion to be made for receyvyng of the 
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prynces that by godes g[ra]ce shall coym oute of Spayne’.197 Seven of the men were 
aldermen and the eighth was the Recorder, the status of its members reflecting the 
importance the City accorded this task and possibly the expected status of the Crown 
committee.198 It is impossible to know who was actually responsible for devising the 
pageants or even how much input the relative committees of the Crown and City had.199 
The official plans devised to be read and followed by magnates and courtiers attending 
the event, though incredibly detailed in all matters pertaining to the princess’s journey 
from the south coast to London and the royal ceremonies and festivities thereafter, 
skims over the London pageants by stating that there would be ‘such pageantes and 
cerymonies as thei [i.e. London’s civic government and citizens] have devised for 
thonor of the citie’, thus implying either that the Londoners had been largely left to 
their own devices as they were well practised in such displays, or that the author of the 
plan was unaware of or unconcerned with the details of the procession through 
London.200 The plan suggests that George Neville, Lord Bergavenny, acted as a liaison 
between the court and the City, for he was charged with informing the mayor and his 
brethren of the details of the feast and their role after the wedding had concluded.201  
 
Francis Bacon claimed that Richard Fox, bishop of Winchester, oversaw all 
arrangements for the marriage, a claim which may be substantiated by the notations in 
Fox’s hand on the official plans devised for court use.202 The pageants to be placed 
along the traditional procession route through the City were carefully set out in these 
plans, including the presence of the mayor, aldermen and liverymen of London at the 
cross in Cheapside.203 It was here that the mayor and the Recorder approached the 
princess and the Recorder welcomed her in the name of the City and presented her with 
a gift of 500 marks.204 This was also where the king, queen, the earl of Oxford, the 
king’s mother, the French ambassadors and various magnates chose to view the 
                                                 
197 Rep.1, f.63. 
198 Rep.1, f.62v. 
199 Anglo, ‘Reception’, 55. 
200 LP Hen.VII, i, 411. 
201 LP Hen.VII , i, 411. 
202 LP Hen.VII, i, 404-419; Bacon, Henry VII, 141-2. 
203 LP Hen.VII, i, 411; Jo.10, f.238; Vit. XVI, 246. 
204 GC, 307; Vit. XVI, 246; Rep.1, f.87. 
  208 
proceedings, apparently commandeering the use of the house of a Haberdasher, 
William Geffrey, to ensure a prime view.205 
 
Later in the week the wedding party took barges to Westminster accompanied by the 
mayor, aldermen and livery companies, also in barges. The barge of the Mercers’ 
Company, though, was ‘not garnysshid and apparaylid accordyng unto theyr worshyp, 
nor so well as othyr which were of lasse auctoryte’ and therefore they were sent away 
and later fined.206 A certain standard commensurate with the perceived dignity of both 
the company and the City was expected and policed by the civic authorities. 
Appropriate display was a civic duty. 
 
The scale of these pageants was unprecedented in the fifteenth century, if ever their 
like had been seen in the City.207 The Londoners appear to have regarded the 
celebrations as exceptional and unlikely to be repeated, for rather than keep elements 
of the pageants for future use, the same citizens who had been charged with oversight 
of the creation of the individual pageants were given the task of selling the materials 
that went into their construction.208 For a monarch who is traditionally viewed as 
personally abstemious of entertainments and luxury, the reign of Henry VII might be 
said to have represented a high point of civic pageantry. It is probable that Henry VII 
enjoyed more civic ceremonial for royal occasions that any of his predecessors in the 
fifteenth century and it was not to be equalled until Elizabeth’s coronation.209  
 
The staging of large celebrations was not cheap and taxation was the usual means of 
raising the funds necessary. A tax of one fifteenth and a half was imposed by the City 
upon its citizens to finance the pageant that celebrated the arrival of Kathryn of Aragon 
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into the City.210 Each of the seven pageants cost approximately £120 each.211 The last 
pageant was, according to the Great Chronicle, ordered and devised by the king’s 
commandment, ‘the Cityzyns thereof noo thyng made of counsayll’ but which the City 
was expected to pay for.212 It is possible to read bad feeling into the chronicler’s refusal 
to describe this last tableau after supplying lengthy descriptions, complete with 
accounts of the prose spoken, of the other six pageants, though it is also possible that 
Fabyan had access to the text of the speeches of the City pageants but not to this one. 
 
Such display was effective two-way communication: it impressed upon the monarch 
the City’s loyalty and desire to serve whilst simultaneously projecting and reinforcing 
the legitimacy and authority of the new king upon all witnesses. Later in the reign the 
pageants became more elaborate and the king’s agenda took on a more outward-looking 
demeanour. The pageant for Kathryn was not primarily for the young bride’s benefit 
but to impress upon the dignitaries from Spain accompanying her the magnificence of 
the Tudor royal line and that it was a worthy player in the game of international politics. 
 
5.6. The Role of Individuals in Crown-City Communication 
Ian Archer observed that relations between the Crown and the City were ‘lubricated to 
a far greater extent than has been appreciated by a variety of informal contacts between 
members of the business elite and the government’.213 Certainly rich merchants who 
were financially useful to the king had always played a role in facilitating relations 
between the monarch and his capital. The Mercer Richard Whittington was a useful 
intermediary between the Crown and the City when the relationship became fraught in 
the last years of Richard II’s reign; the Goldsmiths Drew Barrentyn and Nicholas 
Twyford served both the City as mayors and aldermen and the Crown as royal servants 
during the reigns of Richard II and Henry IV.214 Henry VI and Edward IV similarly 
                                                 
210 Jo.10, ff.187v, 190v. 
211 Anglo, ‘Reception’, 54, n.5. 
212 GC, 310. 
213 Ian Archer, 'The Government of London, 1500-1650', London Journal, xxvi (2001). See also James 
Lee, ‘Political Communication in Early Tudor England: the Bristol Elite, the Urban Community and the 
Crown, c.1471-c.1553’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of the West of England, 2006), 103-138. 
214 Caroline Barron, ‘Richard Whittington: the Man behind the Myth’, in A.E.J. Hollaender and W. 
Kellaway ed. Studies in History Presented to P.E. Jones, 197-248; Lutkin, ‘Goldsmiths’, 277-8. 
  210 
enjoyed close relationships with London merchants who both provided them with 
finance and held high civic office, notably the Mercers William Eastfield and William 
Cantelowe in Henry VI’s reign and the Goldsmiths Hugh Brice and Edmund Shaa in 
Edward IV’s.215 
 
This section will look at the power-brokers, defined in this instance as those capable of 
deliberately affecting the distribution of political power, within the London elite with 
particular reference to the means by which they garnered the attention of the personnel 
of central government and the role they fulfilled within both Court and City circles. 
Given the significance of individuals in facilitating communication between the king 
and his capital, how did the nature of communication change with the turnover of these 
power-brokers?  
 
5.6.1. Personal Networks between the Personnel of the Crown and the City. 
Few members of Henry’s inner circle were Londoners by birth and many were new 
faces within the City when Henry came to the throne. Reynold Bray, one of Henry’s 
principal administrators along with Sir Thomas Lovell and John Morton, archbishop of 
Canterbury and Lord Chancellor, apparently enjoyed a reasonably extensive network 
of associates within the City prior to Henry’s accession. Bray had raised money for 
Henry amongst the capital’s mercantile elite in the lead up to Bosworth, and it may 
have been at this time that he made the acquaintance of Henry Colet and Edmund Shaa, 
who became close friends as well as business allies.216 Bray and Shaa were already 
business associates by early summer of 1486 when they, along with Edmund’s nephew, 
John Shaa, were granted the wardship and marriage of John Wrytell.217 Both Shaas and 
Colet regularly acted as feoffees for Bray alongside men who had served with Bray in 
the household of the king’s mother.218 Edmund was to make Bray an executor of his 
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will, made in March 1488, referring to him as his ‘right especiall and tender loving 
Frende’.219 Thomas Wyndoute, who lent considerable amounts to Henry VII in the 
early years of the reign, also named Bray as an executor of his will.220  
 
John Shaa and Bray entered business arrangements together, including the purchase of 
at least two wards, shipments of wool, collaboration on Bray’s building works at his 
manor of Heggecote, and cooperation within the Mint and upon the reform of the 
coinage in the late 1490s.221 Evidence of affection between the two men might be 
construed from the presence in the post-mortem inventory of Shaa’s properties a 
number of cushions bearing the arms of Reynold Bray.222 Moreover, Shaa’s second son 
was given the reasonably uncommon name of Reynold, raising the possibility that Bray 
acted as his godfather, though there is no direct evidence of this.223 Shaa was also 
named as an executor of Bray’s will.224  
 
Bray was not the only member of Henry’s intimate circle to enjoy City connections. 
Giles Daubeney had served Edward IV as a knight of the body and therefore had been 
required to spend long periods resident in the royal household at Westminster. His links 
with the mercantile community were substantial, not least because his brother-in-law 
was the wealthy and prominent Draper, William Capell.225 Thomas Lovell enjoyed 
relations cordial enough with the Goldsmiths and aldermen Sir John Shaa and Sir 
Bartholomew Rede to be named overseer of their wills, the latter in conjunction with 
Edmund Dudley.226 John Ward, alderman and Grocer, referring to Lovell as ‘my 
master’, bequeathed him a cup of silver gilt and gold with a ring to his wife.227 The 
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alderman and former mayor John Mathew named Sir Richard Empson as his 
overseer.228  
 
Members of the episcopal bench were popular choices as overseers of wills: the 
aldermen Nicholas Alwyn, Robert Drayton, John Percyvale and John Broun named the 
Bishops of Winchester (Richard Fox), London (William Warham), the Archbishops of 
York (Thomas Savage) and Canterbury (John Morton) respectively as overseers.229 
Percyvale went further to state that Savage had been influential in his decision to 
establish a grammar school.230 One assumes that the other Londoners also had more 
than a passing acquaintance with the churchmen in order to ask them to perform the 
duty, even though a small bequest in the will as compensation was usual. Lord 
Chancellor John Morton was a familiar face in the City, having served Edward IV for 
many years and being at the forefront of mercantile-government negotiations in the 
1470s. 
 
Many courtiers and magnates made use of the credit services some merchants were 
able (and willing) to provide. The bishops of Norwich, Ely and Lincoln received 
financial aid from John Shaa in paying for the temporalities of their new sees.231 
Between May and October 1501 Margaret Beaufort received from Shaa a total of £586 
in ten payments, mostly via the hands of his trusted colleague, John Mondy.232 It is not 
noted what the payments pertain to, nor does it make clear whether they were given as 
a loan, but it seems likely that they were connected with the refurbishments taking place 
at Margaret’s residence in Croydon prior to the anticipated stay there of Kathryn of 
Aragon. The queen took loans from merchants such as William Bulstrode and William 
Capell, and many of the loans were still outstanding at her death.233 The former also 
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orchestrated some of the queen’s gift-giving.234 William Capell also lent money to the 
earl of Kent and Richard, Lord Beachamp and others.235 
 
5.6.2. The Goldsmiths 
Through their trade in often bespoke high-value goods, ability to raise finance swiftly 
and involvement in the Royal Mint, medieval goldsmiths enjoyed access to the court 
and royal household not shared by merchants of other professions. Their privileged 
access to the royal household brought particularly talented individuals to the king’s 
personal attention. Four goldsmiths in particular can be identified as being both close 
to the royal administration and prominent in the civic life of the capital in Henry’s 
reign. Edmund Shaa, Hugh Brice, John Shaa and Bartholomew Rede were remarkable 
in the breadth of duties they were to undertake for their royal master and were key 
contacts for a monarch who sought information about the mechanisms of civic 
government and the personnel therein. All four men appear to have prioritised their 
duties as royal servants over civic duty. All became aldermen after they became royal 
servants, though naturally they would have served some years on the Common Council 
before reaching the Aldermanic Court, all served as mayor and all were regular 
suppliers of items of their craft to the king and his household, all were knighted and 
died very wealthy men.236 
 
The intimate relationships that Edmund Shaa and Hugh Brice shared with the court of 
Edward IV have already been described.237 Edmund continued to be a supplier of goods 
of his trade and lender to the Crown under Henry VII and Hugh Brice was honoured 
by being made a knight of the Bath at Henry VII’s coronation, perhaps in recognition 
of his recent election as mayor, though it is possible that he had already come to Tudor’s 
                                                 
234 TNA, E36/210, f.83. A page was sent to Bulstrode with the gift of two bucks to be given to the 
duchess of Suffolk and to John Vandelf, Goldsmith. 
235 TNA, C1/84/33; TNA, C1/227/45 
236 BL, Add. Ms.7099, ff.21-24; TNA, E101/414/6, f.61v; TNA, E101/414/16, ff.13, 35, 53v; TNA, 
E101/415/3, ff.10, 45, 94v, BL, Add. Ms.59899, ff.22v, 26v, 49, 50, 62r, 92r-93r; TNA, 
PROB11/11/2028, 11/8/187, 11/14/763 and 11/14/156; Cal. IPM., Hen .VII, (i) 20, (ii) 679, 719, 863, 
(iii) 29, 42, 51-3, 62, 63, 70, 94, 103, 123-4, 200, 207-8, 358, 425, 677; Reddaway and Walker, 
Goldsmiths’ Company, 285-288; Beaven, ii, 15. 
237 See Chapter 2, section 2.1.4. 
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attention in some other way.238 Close connections between Edmund Shaa, Brice, John 
Shaa and Rede imply that Edmund Shaa and Hugh Brice, a generation older, paved the 
way to royal service for John Shaa and Bartholomew Rede. John was both the nephew 
and apprentice of Edmund and Rede had served as Brice’s apprentice. Rede was a close 
friend of James, Brice’s son, and was godfather to James’s son.239 John Shaa was 
named as executor to both his uncle and Brice. Similarities in the provision for the 
establishment of schools in the wills of Edmund Shaa and Rede suggest that the two 
were intimate enough acquaintances to have discussed the matter in detail.240 Rede and 
John Shaa were also close, for Rede was named in John’s will as his executor and as 
guardian of his eldest son.241  
 
Of the four Goldsmiths, arguably the most influential was John Shaa. The Great 
Chronicle of London described him as a man 
 
…of a sharp wytt and therwyth of a good and bold spyryt by Reson of the ffavour that 
he stood In wyth the kyng and Quene & many othir astasis [sic] of [th]e land In soo 
much that he was sworn of the kyngis counsayll as the ffame went.242 
  
Regrettably it cannot be proved that he was appointed to the king’s council as evidence 
survives for only one attendance, with Rede, to discuss the matters related to the 
Mint.243  
 
The value the king placed upon John Shaa’s ability and willingness as a financier is 
eloquently expressed in a warrant for payment demanding that the Exchequer pay an 
outstanding debt to Shaa of £4,000 from the first money available, ‘considering his 
kind and ready disposition always to serve our pleasures in laying out his money’.244 
Shaa appears to have fulfilled the role of financial handyman for the king, and was 
                                                 
238 For discussion on this point see Chapter 2, section 2.1.4. 
239 Reddaway and Walker, Goldsmiths’ Company, 177, 307. 
240 TNA, PROB11/8/187 and PROB11/14/763; Reddaway and Walker, Goldsmiths’ Company, 180. 
241 TNA, PROB11/11/2028, 11/8/187, 11/14/156; Shaa also acted as feofee for Rede, CCR, 1485-1500, 
nos.986, 1087. 
242 GC, 320. 
243 Select Cases, ed. Baynes and Durham, 31. 
244 TNA, E404/81, dated 12 April, 1493. 
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trusted with a variety of tasks unconnected with his trade or work within the City. Of 
thirty-two payments totalling £10,297 9s made to him from the Chamber in the ten year 
period of 1494-1504, only eleven payments, totalling nearly four thousand pounds, 
could possibly be related in any way to his trade.245 Six payments were made between 
May 1496 and March 1501 for the building works at Windsor and one for works at 
Richmond, implying that he held some sort of supervisory capacity there, possibly as 
paymaster.246 During Henry’s reign such supervisory roles were more usually awarded 
to clerics connected to the royal household.247 Two payments relate to the provision of 
currency exchange services, from French Crowns into Sterling.248 Two further 
payments saw Shaa receive money with which to pay the household allowance of 125 
marks per month of the widowed Kathryn of Aragon for the months of July to October 
1502.249 In 1492 Shaa was appointed Searcher of the Port of London, a post he held 
until his death.250 This was a potentially lucrative role, not only for the office holder 
but also for the Crown, which gained half of all goods seized by the searcher. The 
award of such a position can be perceived not only as a reward and sign of royal favour, 
but also one to be given to a man who could be trusted to given the Crown its financial 
due.  
 
Perhaps the most curious payment, and one that illustrates the trust placed in him by 
the king, was for over £650 made to him in October 1495 to reimburse Shaa for money 
he had laid out 
 
                                                 
245 Of the £3,800 for possible goldsmith work an unspecified amount was payment for works at Windsor 
and amounts for unitemised bills of reckoning, which may not have related to goldsmiths work. 
246 TNA, E101/414/6, ff.31, 36; TNA, E101/414/16, ff.7, 36v; TNA, E101/415/3, f.45; BL, Add. 
Ms.59899, f.27v; TNA, E404/81 & 82; King’s Works, iii, 1485-1660, pt.1, 14. 
247 Subsequent payments for the works at Windsor were paid to John Seymour, a canon of St. George’s 
chapel, Windsor. King’s Works, 14. 
248 TNA, E101/415/3, ff.59v, 62v. 
249 TNA, E101/415/3, ff.101, 101v. A similar payment was made in Oct. 1503 (BL, Add. Ms.59899, 
f.27v). 
250 CPR, 1485-1494, 372; BL, Add. Ms.59899, f.118; TNA, E36/214, f.382. 
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…for th[e] enterment and byriall of oure dought[er] Elizabeth late passed out of this 
transitory lif[e] as also in sending the residue of the same sume unto us at oure last 
being at Chestr comprised more at large in a bill which he hath delivered unto us.251  
 
The four year old princess was, according to the Great Chronicle, buried on the north 
side of St. Edward’s shine in Westminster, with some ceremony with livery company 
representatives in attendance.252 The implication is that Shaa had direct involvement in 
the arrangements, which begs the question why? If finance was needed for the burial 
the more usual route would have been for the Lord Treasurer, Lord Dinham or Bray to 
act as a middle-man.  
 
A clue to Shaa’s standing within the hierarchy of the court and royal household can be 
found in the account book of William Cope, cofferer and deputy of the treasurer of war, 
Reynold Bray, for expenses incurred during the French campaign of 1492.253 The first 
part of the book details receipts from various individuals and collectors of the 
benevolence. The list commences with the money gathered by county, not including 
the capital, then progresses to individual members of the episcopate and other senior 
clergy, followed by members of the royal family and Lords Temporal.254 Next follows, 
beside the margin note of ‘Sundry members of the lai fee’ what appears to be a list of 
royal servants and household members. Reynold Bray and Thomas Lovell top the list, 
donating £500 and £400 respectively. Various household knights follow, and then two 
thirds of the way down, fourteenth on the list, is Shaa, not even yet a knight at this 
point, paying £100. Significantly, he is not listed with the Londoners, but with the court 
personnel. The second part of the document details expenses incurred in the 
preparations for the campaign, and Shaa again features heavily. Referred to as ‘the 
King’s Goldsmith’, he received just over £1,970 for the garnishing of the ‘king’s hede 
peces and salads’.255 In addition he received two large amounts, of £17,392 12s 5d and 
£6,396 9s 11d, at the Mint for the coining of new money.256 His position on the list of 
                                                 
251 TNA, E404/82 warrants dated 23 and 26 October 1495. 
252 GC, 260; Drapers’ Company, WA2, f.61b. 
253 TNA, E36/285. 
254 TNA, E36/285, ff.3-15. 
255 TNA, E36/285, f.79. 
256 TNA, E36/285, ff.19, 84. 
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royal servants and the vast sums Shaa is trusted with suggest he was seen by the court, 
and indeed by the king, as far more than merely ‘the King’s Goldsmith’. 
 
That Shaa was key to facilitating City-Crown relations is demonstrated by the 
frequency with which his intercession with the king was sought by citizens and 
companies. In 1502 the Drapers’ Company sought Shaa’s help in their quest to have 
the Merchant Taylors’ charter repealed.257 This was not the only time the Drapers had 
tried to invoke Shaa’s help, for in the same year £6 13s 4d was spent on a tun of wine 
for Shaa to be minded to aid their candidate in his quest for position of overseer of 
Blackwell Hall, the place used for cloth trading.258 Nor were those seeking Shaa’s help 
all within the City: Henry Frowyk, when seeking the position of Chief Justice of the 
Common Pleas in 1501, sought the help of Shaa, who wrote to Reynold Bray offering 
500 marks on Frowyk’s behalf for the post.259 Sir John Raynesford, a retainer of the 
earl of Oxford who was later to become prominent in prince Henry’s household, sought 
Shaa’s help with securing assent for his marriage to Amy, Lady Grey in 1498.260 
 
The City government also sought to use Shaa’s access to the king to its advantage. He 
was appointed to take part in a number of deputations to the Lord Chancellor, John 
Morton, and other members of the government administration to discuss matters of 
trade.261 He was appointed as MP twice, though he died before he could serve in the 
1504 parliament.262 In December 1503 he was appointed, in his absence, to go to the 
king to offer £5000 for the renewal of the City charter and repeal of the Tailors’ patent, 
though Shaa died before he could undertake this task.263  
 
The deaths of Shaa, at the end of 1503, and Rede, in 1505, deprived the king of two 
conduits of information about the civic government and the City of potential 
intermediaries. Coming as they did at a time of flux in the personnel of both the court 
                                                 
257 Drapers’ Company, WA2, f.74v; TNA, E154/2/11; TNA, PROB11/14/156. 
258 Drapers’ Company, WA2, f.77. 
259 TNA, E101/415/3, ff.299; TNA, E101/413/2/2, f.89; BL, Add. Ms.59899, f.146v. 
260 TNA, E101/414/16, f.134v; Ross, John de Vere, 186, 194. 
261 Jo.10, f.24v, 238; Rep.1, ff.34v, 44, 63, 72v. 
262 Jo.10, f.58v; Rep.1, f.151. 
263 Rep.1, ff.149, 151. 
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and the City and as changes in the structure of the royal household led to access to the 
king becoming more restricted, these deaths were to have wide repercussions that have 
not previously been examined.  
 
5.6.3. The change in personnel in the City and central government 
The turn of the sixteenth century saw the deaths of many of those closest to the king. 
Of particular note were Cardinal Morton (1500), John, Lord Dinham, the Lord 
Treasurer (1501), Reynold Bray (1503), Thomas Stanley earl of Derby and Sir John 
Mordaunt (1504).264 Most disastrous was the loss of members of his own family, 
including his uncle, Jasper Tudor duke of Bedford (1495), his eldest son, Arthur (1502) 
and his queen (1503).265 John de Vere earl of Oxford and Margaret Beaufort were 
becoming increasingly absent from the court, thus leaving no one at court willing, or 
most likely able, to rebuke as well as influence the king, as Vergil claims Bray did.266 
Dinham, Bray and Mordaunt had perhaps been the best connected of Henry’s courtiers 
within the City. Dinham and Bray have been examined already, but it was the vacuum 
left by the death of Sir John Mordaunt, Steven Gunn theorised, that Edmund Dudley 
filled, at least initially.267 Whilst this may be true in the sense that Mordaunt’s 
unexpected death left a vacancy, this was filled in a large part by Richard Empson, who 
assumed his responsibilities as head of the council of the duchy of Lancaster.268 
Dudley’s early patronage by Reynold Bray, expertise as a lawyer and, crucially, his 
intimate knowledge of the capital’s government and personnel, made him invaluable 
to the king in light of the loss of a number of servants with established City connections. 
 
Over approximately the same time period as the higher echelons of the royal court 
experienced substantial turnover of personnel, the civic government suffered from the 
same phenomenon. Of the twenty-eight aldermen who served during the year 1499 (not 
                                                 
264 To this list might be added John, Lord Cheyne and John, Viscount Wells (1499), Robert, Lord 
Willoughby de Broke (1502) and George Stanley, Lord Strange (1503). Gunn, ‘Henry VII (1457-1509)’, 
ODNB. 
265 One might also include his third son, Edmund, who died in 1499. 
266 M.M. Condon, ‘Bray, Sir Reynold (c.1440-1503)’, ODNB; Vergil, 128. 
267 S.J. Gunn, ‘Dudley, Edmund (c.1462-1510)’, ODNB. 
268 This was initially in the capacity of keeper of the seal of the duchy until promotion a year later to 
chancellor of the duchy. M.M. Condon, ‘Empson, Sir Richard (c.1450-1510)’, ODNB. 
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including the alderman of Portsoken) seventeen had either died or been excused from 
their post by the end of 1504, with the deaths of a further three aldermen the following 
year. Amongst the dead were men well known to the royal administration, including 
Henry Colet, John Fenkill, John Percyvale, Bartholomew Rede and John Shaa. The 
influx of new personnel largely unknown to the Crown administration accentuated the 
hole left in Henry’s City intelligence network by the death of men like Bray, Rede and 
Shaa. Unknown, that is, except to Edmund Dudley. 
 
Aldermen who died 1505 
Aldermen who died 1499-1504  
 
Name Occupation From  To Notes Reference 
Nicholas Alwyn Mercer 1496 1506   
John Broke Grocer 1488 1502 Discharged Rep.1, ff.94, 96v. 
William Capell Draper 1485 1515   
Richard Chawry Salter 1481 1509   
Henry Colet Mercer 1476 1505 Died  
Henry Cote Goldsmith 1490 1505 Died  
Robert Fabyan Draper 1494 1503 Discharged Rep.1, f.137v, 138. 
John Fenkill Draper 1485 1499 Died  
Richard Haddon Mercer 1499 1516   
William Issak Draper 1487 1503 Discharged Rep.1, f.141v 
Stephen Jennings Merchant Taylor 1499 1523   
John Mathew Mercer 1482 1499 Died  
William Martyn Skinner 1483 1505 Died  
Hugh Pemberton Tailor 1491 1500 Died  
John Percyvale Merchant Taylor 1485 1503 Died  
William Purchase Mercer 1492 1502 Discharged  
William Remington Fishmonger 1485 1511   
Bartholomew Rede Goldsmith 1498 1504 Died  
John Shaa Goldsmith 1496 1503 Died  
John Tate Mercer 1485 1515   
Robert Tate Mercer 1479 1500 Died  
Robert Tilney Grocer 1485 1499 Died  
John Warde Grocer 1479 1501 Died  
William Welbeck* Haberdasher 1492 1504 Discharged Rep.1, f.167 
William White Draper 1482 1504 Died  
Thomas Wood Goldsmith 1496 1504 Died  
Thomas Wyndoute Mercer 1499 1500 Died  
John Wyngar Grocer 1498 1505 Died  
Table 5.1: Aldermen sitting from January 1499.  
Source – Beaven unless otherwise stated. 
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Edmund Dudley was the man who would step into the vacuum created by the loss of 
personnel who had facilitated City-Crown communication earlier in the reign. Dudley’s 
rise within the king’s service was swift. As a lawyer who probably studied at Gray’s 
Inn, Dudley would have spent many years living in London.269 After serving as an MP 
twice and on various commissions of the peace in Sussex he was appointed, in 1497, 
to be one of two undersheriffs of London, serving with Thomas Marowe, and remained 
in that post with Marowe until March 1502.270 He was Speaker of the House of 
Commons in the first quarter of 1504 and sworn of the king’s council in October that 
year, becoming president of that body by July 1506.271 To the king’s other, long 
serving, councillors such as Richard Fox, bishop of Winchester and Lord Privy Seal, 
Sir Thomas Lovell and William Warham, archbishop of Canterbury and Lord 
Chancellor, Dudley’s rise in royal service must have seemed meteoric. 
 
Dudley’s duties as undersheriff included serving with the sheriffs in their courts, and 
in this capacity he would have worked alongside many of the new aldermen made at 
the turn of the century as well as consolidating his relationship with some of the older 
ones. Certainly Dudley managed to cultivate some friendships during this time: 
Bartholomew Rede, who was sheriff in 1497-8, named Dudley as an overseer of his 
will. Also serving as sheriff at this time were Thomas Wyndoute, who had given Henry 
funding in the first few years of the reign; Stephen Jennings, who was to become mayor 
at the king’s behest in 1508; and James Wilford, who became an alderman in 1500 but 
was suspended from the Court of Aldermen for a year and reinstated after the king’s 
intervention.272 It is possible that Dudley also made enemies during this time: one of 
the sheriffs he served with, Laurence Aylmer, was imprisoned on spurious charges late 
                                                 
269 D.M. Brodie, ‘Edmund Dudley: Minister of Henry VII’, Transactions of the Royal History Society, 
xv (1932), 136. 
270 Jo.10, f.268v. Marowe resigned as undersheriff in Nov. 1502 (Jo.10, f.273). Dudley and Marowe 
were rewarded for their service the following December by the City with an annuity of 20s each and a 
livery (Rep.1, f.119). 
271 Though he may have been active in the king’s service prior to this. J.A. Ross, ‘“Contrary to the right 
and to the order of the lawe”: New Evidence of Edmund Dudley’s Activities on behalf of Henry VII in 
1504’, EHR, cxxvii (2012), 24-45); S.J. Gunn, ‘Dudley, Edmund’. 
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in the reign, though there is evidence to suggest that this was more at the behest of 
Richard Empson than Dudley.273 
 
Dudley would have spent many years living in the City by the time he became Speaker 
of the House of Commons in January 1504, and worked with and possibly legally 
represented or given advice to many members of the mercantile community. This 
combined with likely patronage from Reynold Bray made him the perfect man to 
become Henry’s source of information about the City and its personnel after the loss 
of intermediaries such as Bray and Shaa.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
A variety of factors made London and the Crown’s communication unique, namely the 
proximity of the two entities, the multitude of points of contact, the need to service the 
economic needs of the royal household and London’s role as a centre for royal 
ceremonial. Ritualised communication between departments of the government and 
civic government, such as occurred when the sheriffs and mayor were sworn in by the 
barons of the Exchequer, served to emphasise strong links between the two and reiterate 
the uniqueness and intimacy of the relationship. Communication between the Crown 
and the City took place in many different forums and for a variety of reasons, and the 
mediums of exchange in the reign of Henry VII did not differ from those used 
previously. Though it is impossible to gauge whether communication between the City 
and the Crown took place more frequently than it had in previous reigns, it can be 
confidently stated that during Henry VII’s reign communication was regular, driven by 
a variety of factors including the king’s need for finance, matters of trade, Crown 
interference in civic elections or planning for large scale royal celebrations. 
 
The demands made upon the City for pageantry on occasions of royal celebration were 
more frequent than at any other time in the previous century, with five royal entry 
pageants in the first two years of the reign. Possibly this was driven by Henry’s 
perceived need for legitimation and acclamation in light of his weak blood-claim to the 
throne. The pageant to celebrate the arrival of Kathryn of Aragon in London 
                                                 
273 See Chapter 6, section 6.4.2. 
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represented the highpoint of such entertainment in the City and was not matched until 
the reign of Elizabeth. The agenda this time was to impress upon the royal visitors the 
magnificence and status of the ruling house and its worthiness of a prominent role on 
the world political stage. 
 
Parliament was used by the Londoners in much the same way as it was by the rest of 
the realm, though as it sat on the doorstep of the City the citizens had more opportunity 
to lobby influential individuals or enlist the cooperation of other MPs. Though it did 
not affect Crown-City communication directly, the presence of parliament at 
Westminster led to an influx of personnel into the capital, facilitating intercourse 
between the citizens and the gentry and magnate classes who would have been present 
for its sitting. Naturally Londoners would have enjoyed some economic benefit from 
the influx of visitors, from the vendors of luxury goods to the innkeepers and the 
craftsmen. The frequency of parliament reduced towards the end of the reign, with the 
last held in 1504, as the king no longer needed grants of taxation from this assembly. 
Though this may have inhibited London’s legislative programme it did not affect the 
quality or quantity of Crown-City communication. 
 
The changes in the structure in the royal household that took effect after around 1495, 
with the establishment of the Privy Chamber, meant that access to the king became 
more difficult.274 Merchants, even Goldsmiths, were rarely found in the king’s inner 
circle after the deaths of Rede and John Shaa, and the new royal domestic arrangements 
meant that they would not be replaced either. Yet with the deaths of Bray and Shaa in 
particular the king was bereft of insider knowledge of the civic government and 
intermediaries with personal contacts and networks within the capital. Dudley, with his 
knowledge of the City administration and its personnel, including the new men within 
the Court of Aldermen, was able to step into this void. In short, the deaths of Bray and 
Shaa, and the king’s need for a new ‘London man’ meant that Dudley was the right 
man at the right time, propelling his rise in government. 
 
                                                 
274 David Starkey, ‘Intimacy and Innovation: the Rise of the Privy Chamber, 1485-1558’, in David 
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Once Dudley was established as the Crown’s main intermediary with the City the 
character of City-Crown relations changed. When Shaa and Rede worked with the likes 
of Bray and Morton, neither appeared to have been outwardly divided in their loyalties 
to either the City or the Crown. In contrast, as will be seen in the next chapter, Dudley 
saw his duty as lying firmly with the Crown and his previous service with the City 
worked very much to the king’s benefit at the expense of the capital. Subjugation, rather 
than co-operation, became the defining characteristic of Crown-City relations once 
Dudley became the focal point of relations between the two entities. 
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Chapter 6: The Last Years, 1502-1509 
 
In the last chapter it was shown that both the City and the Crown experienced a turnover 
of personnel shortly after the beginning of the new century. This chapter will explore 
the implications of that change and discuss whether the historical perception that the 
City  was oppressed by the likes of Empson and Dudley is borne out in reality.  
 
Historians of this period have had a tendency to ‘cherry-pick’ stories of persecution 
from the City, particularly those told in the Great Chronicle, to substantiate their 
arguments regarding the tyranny of the reign, usually without setting them in context 
or telling the tale in its entirety; this chapter will provide some of the missing context. 
A reappraisal of the alleged persecution of the City will follow after a brief 
consideration of the careers of Empson and Dudley and the relationship each had with 
the City. Lastly, it is essential to consider the immediate aftermath once Henry VII died 
and the state of the relationship upon the accession of his son, Henry VIII.  
 
6.1. Contemporary and Near-Contemporary Perceptions of Henry’s Reign 
Henry VII had been seriously ill many times in the years leading up to his death, giving 
his ministers time to plan for the event of his demise. The account of the king’s death 
by Thomas Wriothesley, Garter King of Arms from 1505 to 1534, makes it clear that 
Henry’s death was concealed from the court by the grooms of the Privy Chamber and 
certain of the old king’s leading ministers until the succession could be secured and 
orders made for the arrests of Empson and Dudley.1 This action seems to suggest that 
these ministers were not only unpopular with the general public but also with their 
colleagues, who appeared ready to sacrifice them in order to emphasise the break with 
the old regime that the new reign was to represent. 
 
A common theme in the complaints made of underperforming medieval kings was that 
they had fallen victim to ‘evil counsel’, offered by men, usually of low birth, who 
sought to oust the king’s natural counsellors, the magnates of the realm. The two 
                                                 
1 S.J. Gunn, ‘The Accession of Henry VIII’, Historical Research, lxiv (1991), 279-288. 
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medieval English kings who had lost their crowns, Edward II and Richard II, had both 
endured the execution of their favourites prior to their own depositions. In the fifteenth 
century Henry VI and Edward IV had both been presented with manifestos during their 
respective reigns demanding the removal of favoured ministers, named as ‘false 
traytours’ whose intentions were their ‘own promotion and enrich[ment]’.2 Henry VII 
himself had been accused of surrounding himself with ‘caitiffs and villains of simple 
birth’ in the manifesto of Perkin Warbeck.3 It therefore was natural that the ministers 
surrounding Henry VIII upon his accession, who had faithfully served the old king, 
would seek scapegoats for unpopular policies of the last reign, and thus protect 
themselves and preserve the reputation of their former master and their sovereign’s 
father. In keeping with the long tradition of blaming royal favourites for unpopular 
royal policy and preventing the king’s natural counsellors from advising the monarch, 
Empson was accused at his trial of attempting to ‘separate and remove all the Dukes, 
Earls, Barons and other Magnates of England from the favour and council of the king’.4 
 
The author of the Great Chronicle, believing that he had witnessed a time of tyranny 
and oppression, stated that the worst of the financial exactions were perpetrated by 
Empson and Dudley. Referring to a season of ‘gret sorwe thorw the land’, Fabyan laid 
the blame for this misery at the feet of ‘a fewe ungracious personys which namyd theym 
self the kingis promoters’, meaning Empson, Dudley and their network of London 
henchmen.5 That is not to say that he thought the king blameless, for after praising the 
late king’s wisdom, cunning, eloquence and prudence Fabyan stated that the old king 
had no vice but avarice, which ‘was a blemysh to his magnyficence’.6 Polydore Vergil, 
in his 1513 manuscript of his English history, accused the king unequivocally of 
avarice, a charge he toned down somewhat in the printed edition of his work in 1534.7  
 
                                                 
2 Ralph Griffiths, Henry VI, (1981, repr, Stroud, 1998), 628-640; Ross, Edward IV, 97. 
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Stephen Hawes, a groom of Henry VII’s Chamber and a poet, writing in celebration of 
the accession of Henry VIII, sought both to acknowledge and excuse the ‘avarice’ of 
the late king: 
 
Our late Soverayne his fader excellent 
I knowe ryght well some holden oppynyon 
That to avaryce he had entendement 
Gadrynge grete rychesse of this his region 
But they lytell knowe by theyr small reason 
For what hye entente he gadered doutles 
Unto his grace suche innumerable ryches8 
 
Hawes went on to justify the king’s hoarding of riches by stating his belief that they 
were intended to fund a crusade against the Turks.9 Furthermore, he praised the new 
king’s sense of justice in prosecuting those who had gathered those riches.10 John 
Skelton, again writing in celebration of Henry VIII’s ascent of the throne, stressed the 
evils of the last reign and the restoration of natural order. In an allusion to Empson, 
Dudley and their henchmen, Skelton referred to wolves and bears that ‘brought 
England in woe’.11 Thomas More added that ‘Now it is a delight to ignore informers. 
Only ex-informers fear informers now’.12 
 
Despite the crown-sponsored promotion of the notion that the fiscal oppression of 
Henry VII’s reign was the work of Empson and Dudley, they were not tried for these 
crimes. Both were found guilty of treason: Dudley was accused of gathering a ‘great 
force of men and armed power’ so that he might ‘hold, guide and govern the king and 
his council against the wishes of the king,’ and if the new king refused to cooperate 
                                                 
8 Stephen Hawes, The Minor Poems, ed. Florence Gluck and Alice Morgan, EETS, cclxxi (Oxford, 
1974), 86. 
9 In a letter to the Grand Master of Rhodes, Henry VIII stated that his father had wished to assist in the 
crusading effort against the Turks (LP Hen.VIII, I, 77 no.540). 
10 Minor Poems, 88. 
11 John Skelton, The Complete English Poems of John Skelton, ed. John Scatergood (Harmondsworth, 
1983), 9. 
12 Sir Thomas More, The Complete Works of Sir Thomas More, ed., C.H. Miller and others (New Haven, 
1984), vol. 3.2, 100-113. 
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then Dudley planned to ‘completely destroy the king and to depose, remove and deprive 
him from his royal authority’.13 Empson was similarly accused of seeking to govern 
the new king against his will.14 It is likely that these accusations were fabrications, 
designed to see the downfall of the ministers popularly blamed for Henry VII’s fiscal 
exactions, though Steven Gunn argues that these charges of treason cannot be 
dismissed out of hand for, in the knowledge of their own unpopularity within the City, 
Empson and Dudley may have sought to protect themselves by gathering their retainers 
in the event of the old king’s demise.15 Either way, it would have been impractical to 
bring them to trial for alleged crimes committed on behalf of their royal master as their 
defence was likely to be that they had merely followed the late king’s wishes and which 
would destroy the fiction constructed to protect the memory of the new king’s father. 
 
The chroniclers of Henry VIII’s reign mostly maintained this narrative. Hall’s 
chronicle, printed a year after the author’s death in 1548, states that Empson and 
Dudley were sacrificed ‘to shifte the noyse, of the straight execucion of penal statutes 
in the late kynges daies, by a punishement of those persones, and other promoters, for 
to satisfie and appeace the people’.16 It was an end they deserved, argued Hall, for 
‘these two ravenynge wolves’ had enriched themselves and the king through the 
perversion of the law to their purpose.17 The Grafton and Holinshed chronicles, based 
in large part upon that of Hall, agreed, as did Stow, who erroneously claimed that 
Empson and Dudley were imprisoned after a flood of complaints were made to the 
king’s council about the injustices wrought in the last reign.18 
 
Yet despite the best efforts of Henry VII’s former ministers to shift the blame onto 
Empson and Dudley, ever since Vergil accused the old king of avarice a consensus has 
existed amongst historians that a period of oppression was attributable largely to 
Henry’s financial greed. Bacon, writing an otherwise complimentary portrait of the 
                                                 
13 Third Annual Report, 226-227. 
14 Third Annual Report, 227. 
15 Gunn, ‘Accession of Henry VIII’, 286. 
16 Hall’s Chronicle, 505. 
17 Hall’s Chronicle, 502-3. 
18 Grafton’s Chronicle, 231; Raphael Holished, Holinshed’s Chronicles of England, Scotland and 
Ireland, 6 vols. (London, 1808); Stow, Annals, 834. 
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king, confessed that avarice was a defect in the king’s character.19 More recently 
Geoffrey Elton and J.P. Cooper famously argued about the extent of Henry’s financial 
exactions upon his subjects in the last years of his reign and any consequent remorse 
shown; though they disagreed on a number of subjects, particularly the legality of some 
actions undertaken in the king’s name, both accepted that oppression prevailed as a 
consequence of Henry’s desire for riches.20  
 
Labelling a king ‘avaricious’ excuses the historian from seeking any other motivation, 
political or otherwise, for any persecutions that took place. Avarice has become a 
convenient cover-all for all actions in which the Crown stood to gain financially, but 
to indulge such greed on a wide scale would have been dangerous. Henry was not 
politically inept and therefore it should be asked whether there may have been other 
motives for the spate of prosecutions that occurred within the City. It is important first 
of all to consider the involvement of Empson, Dudley and their associates and then the 
extent to which the mercantile community of London warranted the measures taken 
against them.  
 
6.2. Edmund Dudley, Richard Empson and the Promoters 
The official line adopted after the death of Henry VII was that the oppressions of the 
reign were the work mainly of two men, Richard Empson and Edmund Dudley who, 
according to Vergil, ‘competed in gaining greater favour with their sovereign, and from 
the beginning, armed with a crew of tattle-tales who would denounce men by name’.21 
It is apparent that Dudley was far more active in London than Empson, partly as a 
consequence of his familiarity with the City and partly because Empson had a far wider 
remit. Empson was primarily concerned with the Duchy of Lancaster, of which he was 
made chancellor in 1505, and the expansion of duchy-style equity proceedings in the 
formalities of the Council Learned and General Surveyors.22 Empson served as 
                                                 
19 Bacon, Henry VII, 150-151. 
20 Elton, ‘Rapacity and Remorse’ and ‘A Restatement’; Cooper, ‘Last Years’. 
21 Vergil, 46. 
22 Empson was a leading member of the duchy council under Bray’s chancellorship. Bray’s place was 
taken by Mordaunt, who died in 1504. Empson was initially made ‘keeper of the duchy seal’ on 
Mordaunt’s death and granted the chancellorship in October 1505. Horowitz, ‘Richard Empson’, 40-41. 
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Recorder of Northampton in 1490 and of Coventry by the end of the following year, 
suggesting that his focus was the Midlands and North-West rather than the South.23 
Though he retained chambers in the Middle Temple until at least 1503 he only acquired 
a substantial base in the City, in the parish of St. Bride’s, in 1507.24 This was a key year 
in the career of Empson and Dudley, for the king’s increasing incapacity from this time 
meant that they became more visible in acting on his behalf.25 
 
The geographical division of duties between Empson and Dudley was acknowledged 
at the time of their respective treason trials, for Empson’s took place in his native 
Northamptonshire whilst that of Dudley was held at the Guildhall and presided over by 
Stephen Jennings, mayor of London.26 There is little evidence to suggest that they 
worked any more closely together than any other of Henry’s ministers, though their 
names are frequently linked. Stow’s story of their meeting in their adjoining gardens to 
discuss business is probably fictitious as Dudley’s house in Candlewick Street and 
Empson’s in St. Bride’s were not close enough to make this possible.27 Though a 
number of bonds name the two ministers as counterparts, few, if any, show them acting 
without a clutch of other royal servants. The prosecution of Thomas Sunnyff is a rare 
example of their cooperation in such matters.28 
 
Dudley’s close association with the capital is apparent in the way in which the City 
courted him when he became prominent in the royal administration. Dudley’s role 
within the City as undersheriff has already been mentioned, a position he resigned in 
March 1502 and for which the City rewarded him with a pension and a livery gown.29 
Interestingly the City waited until after the resignation of Dudley’s colleague, Thomas 
Marowe, as undersheriff, before bestowing their gift.30 Whether the City had known of 
                                                 
23 M.M. Condon, ‘Empson, Sir Richard’. 
24 Condon, ‘Empson, Sir Richard’. This property was leased from Westminster Abbey. 
25 Horowitz, ‘Richard Empson’, 43. Henry was gravely ill in March 1507, recovered in July and relapsed 
the following March. 
26 Third Annual Report, 226-228. 
27 Stow, Survey, i, 224. 
28 Horowitz, ‘Agree with the king’, 327. 
29 Jo.10, f. 119. 
30 Jo.10, f. 273. 
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Marowe’s intention to resign in advance of his actual resignation or it was thought that 
a reward could not be given to Marowe without remembering the service done by 
Dudley is a matter of speculation. Either way, it is strange that Dudley had to wait nine 
months after his resignation to be so remembered. A hint that the City may not have 
been entirely satisfied with Dudley’s performance as undersheriff came in October 
1503 when a petition, addressed to the mayor, aldermen and Common Council, stated 
that in times past the undersheriffs of the City had ‘for the most parte… been given and 
granted to stranngers neither beyng fremen nor frends of this Citee lytyll or nothing 
regarding the lib[er]ties of the same’ and therefore they had not always acted in the 
City’s interests.31 The petition went on to request that henceforth the position would 
only be given to ‘hede officers undre the mayor or sheriffs’ or to men who have dwelt 
in the City for at least four years who were likely to be sympathetic to the needs of the 
City.32 As Marowe had been a Londoner by birth and heritage and Dudley’s and 
Marowe’s successors, Richard Broke and Ralph Legh, were still serving it is tempting 
to believe that the petition was presented with Dudley in mind.33 
 
The annuity paid by the City to Dudley was increased in 1507 to £3 6s 8d per year.34 
Dudley successfully petitioned the City in autumn 1507 for permission to have a 
waterway off an existing City conduit into his house, requesting that the mayor, 
aldermen and Common Council take ‘in consideration the grate zele love and favour 
that [he] hath heretofore borne, now bereth and faithfull[y] and contynuelly entendeth 
to bere unto this Citie’.35 The livery companies of the City also sought to court Dudley; 
the Drapers’ Company gave a gift of £10 to Dudley in 1504/5 so that he might be 
‘friendly’ towards them and admitted him to their company.36  
 
                                                 
31 Jo.10, f.296v. 
32 Jo.10, f.296v. 
33 Dudley had lived and studied at Gray’s Inn, but he was not a citizen and the Inns were not part of the 
City proper. 
34 Rep.2, f.37. This annuity replaced an ‘old fee’ of 26s 8d, implying that his annuity had been raised 
since 1502. 
35 Jo.11, ff.20v-21. The City promptly put together a commission to investigate the feasibility of the 
proposal and the request was granted. It passed to Henry Marney when he was granted Dudley’s house 
in October 1509 (Rep.2, f.73v). 
36 www.londonroll.org, site accessed 23 June, 2015. 
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6.2.1. The Promoters, Informants and Corrupt Juries 
Though the presence and activities of informers, who sought information for the Crown 
for personal profit, within London is most commonly associated with the ascendancy 
of Empson and Dudley, royal informers were active within the City long before 1504, 
the year Dudley was sworn of the king’s council. Both John Baptist Grimaldi and Henry 
Toft were active as king’s informers in the 1490s, probably working in close 
association with the king’s attorney, James Hobart. A report from Toft to the king 
directly, written probably at the end of the 1490s, demonstrated that Toft was engaged 
in the prosecution of a number of actions, mostly regarding breaches of penal statutes.37 
Toft was also active in Star Chamber and Chancery, where he brought actions against 
Sir William Capell amongst others.38 
 
Toft’s focus appears to have been mainly the home counties and the Midlands, whereas 
Grimaldi was based in London. Grimaldi’s work for the king concentrated upon 
identifying and giving information about customs offences. On occasion he worked 
with Toft: a recognisance dated June 1495 held Grimaldi in a bond of £1,000 on the 
condition that he assist Toft to seize £500 worth of luxury textiles within the port of 
London.39 Quite how this was to be achieved when neither of them held a formal post 
in the port of London is not clear, especially as part of their brief was to identify an 
officer complicit in fraudulent activities in the City’s port.40 Ten years later, in autumn 
1505, Grimaldi was rewarded for the ‘good and faithful service done to us’ with the 
right to claim one of every four pennies seized of the increase in revenue generated by 
cloth seizures over the next three years, thus implying that his work in that area had 
been consistent over that time period.41  
 
                                                 
37 TNA, STAC1/2/124. This document is undated but reference to a statute made in the 1496 parliament 
places it after that date. 
38 For example, TNA, C1/227/45, C1/53/300 and C1/346/32; TNA, STAC2/18/138. 
39 TNA, E159/272, recorda, Trinity 1496, rots. 18-19, recto. 
40 This may have been part of a wider effort to crack down on corrupt customs officials. 134 informations 
were laid against customs officials in the Exchequer court in Henry VII’s reign. DeLloyd Guth, 
‘Exchequer Penal Law Enforcement, 1485-1509’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 
1967), 140, 228-33. 
41 TNA E159/284, Mich. 1505, recorda, rot. 45, dorse. 
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As an unofficial informant operational in the port of London, Grimaldi would have 
been a familiar figure to the mercantile community. Certainly he was known to Sir 
William Capell, as Robert Fabyan, the author of the Great Chronicle, blamed 
Grimaldi’s ‘malice’ for Capell’s series of prosecutions in the court of the Exchequer in 
1494.42 Fabyan was disgusted when, at the end of the reign, Grimaldi escaped 
punishment by taking sanctuary at Westminster.43 Describing him as the ‘most crewell 
and subtyllst wreech’ of all the promoters active in London, Fabyan stated that 
Grimaldi had taken sanctuary after Empson, ‘wyth whom he was Reteynyd’, was 
arrested.44 Fabyan’s hatred of Grimaldi was so fierce that he was prompted to include 
in his text a fourteen-page ballad condemning the Genoan for, amongst other things, 
usury, sabotaging mercantile ships, perjury, murder, fratricide, serial adulteries, and 
taking his own daughter’s virginity.45 
 
Grimaldi was also well known in court circles. The Spanish ambassador, Rodrigo de 
Puebla, had in 1507 suggested to Ferdinand that he use the Genoese Grimaldi banking 
firm as one of their London agents, John Baptist, enjoyed ‘great credit’ and was ‘well 
known to the king of England’.46 It was Grimaldi’s cousin, Francesco, who orchestrated 
payment of Kathryn of Aragon’s dowry. 47 It was perhaps in the knowledge of this 
‘great credit’ John Baptist enjoyed with the king that he disregarded the authority of 
the City officials and failed to appear to answer a summons to the court of Husting in 
1508, for which the king pardoned him.48 
 
Promoters were also to be found within the civic administration itself. John Camby was 
a member of the Grocers’ Company, a sergeant in the sheriffs’ house and keeper of the 
Poultry Compter.49 The Great Chronicle, after a description of how Dudley exercised 
mayoral authority within the City, stated that Camby served as the equivalent of 
                                                 
42 GC, 258. 
43 GC, 337. 
44 GC, 337. 
45 GC, 352-364. 
46 CPSP, Supp., no. 19. 
47 LP Hen.VIII, i, nos.3, 5, 9 and (i), no.39. 
48 CPR 1495-1509, 564. 
49 Rep.2, f.72; GC, 349. 
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Dudley’s chief alderman and ‘fferre In auctoryte above any of the Shyrevys To whom 
of Rygth he awgth to have been subject and servaunt’.50 Fabyan continues to describe 
Camby as a brothel keeper who survived in civic office despite complaints of bribery 
and ‘forcyble Injuryes’, and was eventually rewarded with the office of weigher of 
wools in the port of London, though he had to pay £100 for the position.51  
 
Richard Page was a servant of Dudley’s and an active informant within the City.52 
Originally from Kent, Page may have enjoyed connections to the duchy of Lancaster, 
and particularly to Bray and Empson.53 He was named in Dudley’s trial as the 
messenger in the alleged treason plot between his master and other conspirators.54 
William Smyth and ‘Mitchell’ were also mentioned by the Great Chronicler as 
promoters who worked closely with Edmund Dudley.55 Smyth was named by Fabyan 
as ‘of kyng Henryes wardrobe’ and thereby in good favour with Henry VII.56 Smyth 
certainly was well rewarded by Henry, receiving grants of tenements near the Barbican 
in London, and various stewardships of royal lands.57 He was exempted from Henry 
VIII’s royal pardon of 1509 but appears to have re-emerged at court as a Chamber usher 
a year later.58 ‘Mitchell’ was probably Thomas Mitchell, whom Dudley described as 
‘late my clerk’ in his will and who was also exempted from the royal pardon.59 A 
number of other names appear in the civic records who may have been cooperating 
with Dudley but little evidence of their activities remains and most are traceable only 
by the action taken against them after Dudley’s fall. Robert Hall and Thomas Bate, 
keeper of Ludgate gaol and bailiff of Billingsgate respectively, were deprived of their 
offices at the same time that Camby was ejected from his post as keeper of the Poultry 
                                                 
50 GC, 349. 
51 GC, 349; CPR, 1495-1509, 470; BL, Lansdowne Ms.127, f.13. 
52 TNA, STAC2/25/8; CCR, 1500-1509, no.774; GC, 337, 348, 365; Cooper, ‘Last Years’, 121. 
53 Cooper, ‘Last Years’, 121 & n.113. 
54 Third Annual Report, 226-228. 
55 GC, 337, 365. 
56 GC, 365. 
57 CPR, 1495-1509, 8, 16, 496. 
58 LP Hen.VIII, I, i, nos. 11 (10); GC, 455. 
59 LP Hen.VIII, I, i, nos.11 (10), 559. 
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Compter, thereby implying their involvement in activities detrimental to the citizens of 
London.60  
 
These men doubtless served a role in gathering information for Dudley. Collecting 
information in this way allowed Dudley to identify appropriate ‘victims’ rather than 
selecting them arbitrarily. Those prosecuted for misdemeanours by Dudley and his 
associates had usually already merited legal attention, as will be seen.  
 
6.3. The ‘Persecution’ of the City 
Helen Miller reflected the views of many of her contemporary historians when she 
wrote: ‘The closing years of the reign of Henry VII were marked by a series of incidents 
which, to Londoners at any rate, bore the impress of tyranny.’61 Acts of fiscal 
persecution against the City as a whole are frequently given as evidence of Henry’s 
rapacity. Most commonly cited are four cases in which the king and his ministers are 
deemed to have acted in a particularly harsh manner: first, that confirmation of the 
City’s charter was obtained only after the payment of 5,000 marks was extracted from 
the City; second, that the king, his ministers and their ‘promoters’ embarked on a 
campaign against the mercantile community in the Court of the Exchequer; third, that 
the king and his ministers sought to undermine the administration of City justice; lastly, 
that the king interfered in the appointment of civic officials. This section examines 
whether there is sufficient extant evidence to justify these conclusions. 
 
6.3.1. The City Charter 
J.P. Cooper claimed that Henry VII procrastinated in granting a charter to the City 
confirming its traditional liberties and privileges, and when he did eventually do so it 
was ‘at the price of 5,000 marks, in a charter that did not wholly satisfy the City.62 
Elton, in his riposte to Cooper’s article, did not deny this but instead perceived ‘conflict 
between Henry and the City over its charters and liberties’ as part of a wider 
                                                 
60 Rep.2, f.72. 
61 Miller, ‘London and Parliament’, 128-49.. 
62 Cooper, ‘Last Years’, 110. 
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governmental effort to ‘trim the powers of franchise holders everywhere’.63 These 
statements cannot be denied, yet the story of the charter is not as straightforward. It 
was not simply that the king sold the City a unsatisfactory charter for an extortionate 
price.  
 
A deputation of six aldermen and six members of the Common Council were sent to 
the king, in January 1504, to negotiate the repeal of the Merchant Taylors’ charter and 
the terms of renewal for the Great Charter of the City.64 Whether the civic 
administration had wanted to make any changes or enhancements to the liberties 
enshrined in the most recently granted charter is not specified, but it is likely that the 
delegation went with a list of requests of additions to the charter, as was traditional, 
including formal acknowledgment in the charter of the earlier negotiated restrictions 
on foreign brokers.65 The king had already been offered 5,000 marks for the renewal 
of the charter and a further 2,500 marks for the repeal of the Merchant Taylors’ charter, 
an offer that was reiterated in May 1504.66 The king agreed only a new City charter, 
and by March 1505 negotiations had been concluded and the City agreed to pay the 
king 5,000 marks in five tranches for the new charter.67 
 
The terms of the charter were clearly not what the City had hoped for. It was not a 
renewal of the most recent one with the customary addition of clauses that further 
enhanced the privileges of the City, but confirmed instead those of Edward III in 1376 
and Richard II in 1396.68 In theory, therefore, the additional privileges granted by 
Henry VII’s fifteenth-century predecessors were thereby invalidated. Some additional 
privileges granted by subsequent charters were also included, such as the right for the 
mayor and select aldermen to act as justices of the peace and there was a new addition 
regarding the restriction on foreign brokers.69 However, the City lost more than it 
gained. For example, the City offices sold by Edward IV to the City for the sum of 
                                                 
63 Elton, ‘A Restatement’, 15-16. 
64 Rep.1, f.151. 
65 Rep.1, f.151. 
66 Rep.1, f.149; Jo.10, f.312v. 
67 Jo. 10, ff. 330v, 333v; BL, Lansdowne Ms.127, f.4v. 
68 Birch, Charters, xxxii. 
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£7,000, enshrined in the fourth charter that Edward granted to the City in 1478, were 
resumed by the Crown except for that of gauger, which was specifically stated to belong 
to the City.70  
 
It is possible that the City had sought to re-establish its authority and safeguard its 
existing privileges from further Crown encroachments, in which case the Crown sent a 
clear message in restricting the traditional privileges of the City. The new charter was 
a sharp reminder to the City that all of its privileges and liberties it held were at royal 
sufferance. That this charter did not satisfy the City did not affect the agreed price and 
the City had to levy five fifteenths in civic taxes to raise the 5,000 marks it had agreed 
to pay in five tranches.71 Yet it should be stressed that the City volunteered to pay this 
sum. It was not demanded by the Crown but once offered the king may have been 
determined to see it delivered. It may even have represented a point of principle to the 
king, proof that the City was subject to his authority and would be subjugated to his 
will. This was particularly important after the City had challenged the royal prerogative 
over the Merchant Taylors’ charter. That principle, not money, was the prime driver 
for the king in this matter is demonstrated by his refusal to repeal the Merchant Taylors’ 
charter, for which he would have received 2,500 marks. The City had sought to solve 
a problem by throwing money at it and was stumped when it transpired that money was 
no longer the answer to their problems. 
 
Record of a meeting of the Court of Aldermen on 28 April, 1509, a mere matter of days 
after Henry’s death, shows that the City felt that Henry VII’s charter deprived them of 
their traditional liberties. It was agreed that the ‘whole council of the City’ was to be 
gathered and ‘with gud deliberacion and diligence oversee all the Articles of the 
charter’, most importantly, ‘such Articles of libertes as the Citizens been enterupted of’ 
were to be recorded in a book that was to be shown to the mayor and aldermen to allow 
them to ‘sue for a remede thereof.’72 
 
                                                 
70 That is, the offices of packer, garbeller and wine-drawer. Birch, Charters, 90-93, 96. 
71 Jo.10, f.333v, 335. 
72 Rep.2, f. 66. 
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It was not until 1518 that a new City charter was granted. Two possible reasons exist 
for the City’s uncharacteristic patience. Firstly, for many years the Crown 
administration consisted of many of the same personnel that the City negotiated the 
1504 charter with, and therefore reinstatement of the missing liberties was unlikely. 
Secondly, it may have been that in practice the missing privileges did not alter the 
modus operandi of the City, and in the same way that livery companies slowly began 
to ignore the statute that dictated that they have their ordinances approved by Crown 
officials rather than the mayor and aldermen, so too did the usual privileges of the City 
begin to reassert themselves. 
 
It should be noted that the City was not the only body to pay a large amount for a 
charter. The county of Cheshire was charged £2,000 for a charter of liberties in 1507; 
the main city of that county was Chester, which had paid £50 the previous year for a 
charter that was superseded by this new one.73 
 
6.3.2. The Court of the Exchequer 
This charge stems from the often quoted passage in the Great Chronicle, where Fabyan 
condemned the prosecution of William Capell and others in the Court of the Exchequer, 
stating that ‘many unleffull and fforgotyn statutis and actis made hunderyth of yeris 
passid were now quykenyd and sharply callid upon to the grete Inquyetnesse of many 
of the kyngis Subgectis’.74 The derision shown by the chronicles for this court has led 
to claims that it became a weapon of persecution against the mercantile community of 
the capital.75  
 
The remit of the Court of the Exchequer was to prosecute matters pertaining to the 
king’s interest and specifically in cases of breach of statute or violation of royal 
proclamation where the penalty incurred was financial.76 Certainly the prosecution of 
                                                 
73 Horowitz, ‘Henry VII, English towns’, 42. 
74 GC, 334; Horowitz, ‘“Agree with the King”’, 345; Cavill, English Parliaments, 97. 
75 Sutton, Mercery, 343; Sidney Anglo, ‘Ill of the dead: the posthumous reputation of Henry VII’, 
Renaissance Studies, i (1987), 27-47; P.R. Cavill, ‘The Enforcement of the Penal Statutes in the 1490s: 
Some New Evidence’, Historical Research, lxxxii (2009), 482-492. 
76 Guth, ‘Exchequer Penal Law Enforcement’, 9-11. 
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breaches of penal statutes escalated in the course of the reign, with 37 per cent of 
actions brought in the reign falling within its last five years.77 The fourteen actions 
brought against Capell in the Exchequer court are often taken to epitomise the attacks 
on the mercantile community undertaken in this forum.78 Yet this was not as 
exceptional as is often claimed. John Marchall, Mercer, also faced fourteen actions in 
the Court of the Exchequer in 1479 for offences committed at least ten years previously, 
suggesting that he may have been selected to serve as an example to other customs 
dodgers, of which, if the complaints of Edward IV to the Mercers’ Company at around 
that time are to be believed, there were many.79 Like Capell, Marchall was fined £2,500 
but whereas Capell was able to get his fine reduced to £1,615 after the intervention of 
his wife’s brother-in-law, Giles, Lord Daubeney, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Marchall was similarly blessed.80 The Great Chronicle, written by Capell’s business 
associate and fellow Draper, Robert Fabyan, claimed that the architect of the charges 
brought against Capell was the Genoese merchant, John Baptist Grimaldi.81 Yet in this 
instance, at least, Fabyan’s allegation was not entirely accurate: Grimaldi was involved 
in two of the cases, but as the counter-party, not the bringer of the informations.82  
 
A clamp-down upon the activities of the mercantile community was probably merited. 
Edward IV had struggled with customs evasion and brought a total of 312 actions in 
the court of the Exchequer for alleged customs evasions in the Port of London.83 Henry 
VII, in a reign of a similar length to that of Edward IV, brought only 230 such actions.84 
Nearly all of the actions in Henry VII’s reign were brought by customs officials, which 
                                                 
77 Guth, ‘Exchequer Penal Law Enforcement’, 284-5. 
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79 Acts, 118-123, 139. 
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82 TNA, E159/271, Mich. 1494, recorda, v-viii. 
83 Cobb, ‘Introduction’, Overseas Trade. 
84 Cobb, ‘Introduction’, Overseas Trade; Guth, ‘Exchequer Penal Law Enforcement’, 142. 
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suggests that the number of actions brought was, at least in part, a consequence of an 
increased efficiency of the paid bureaucracy that regulated foreign trade rather than any 
covert attack upon the mercantile community.  
 
This undermines the argument that a large proportion of the cases presented in this 
court were brought by private informants hopeful of a reward shared with the Crown if 
the action was successful. Though Henry’s government did encourage informing for 
profit, it is unwise, argues Paul Cavill, to ‘assume that Henry’s reign broke new ground’ 
in the employment of professional informers or ‘promoters’ given that the statutory 
division of forfeitures pre-dated the reign.85 DeLloyd Guth, in his analysis of the 
Exchequer cases brought in Henry VII’s reign, concluded that ‘the notion of an army 
of private informers is pure myth, at least for Henry VII’s Exchequer.’86 A full 
investigation into the activities of royal informers in the port of London before 1485 
has not yet been undertaken, but it may be noted that the proportion of cases brought 
by private individuals in Edward IV’s reign at the Exchequer court was again higher 
than that of Henry VII’s reign.87 
 
Paul Cavill argues that Henry’s enforcement of penal statutes should be seen in terms 
of good governance and a determination to enforce neglected areas of the law, as 
opposed to a means for fiscal advancement.88 Cavill presents the instance of a statute, 
passed in Richard III’s parliament of 1484, addressing the fraudulent finishing of cloth 
as further evidence of this point. In a proclamation addressed to the sheriffs of London 
in the mid-1490s the king stated his intention to enforce the said statute, but gave a 
period of grace, indicating both a desire to implement the law and a fair-mindedness in 
notifying his subjects ‘not willing rigourously without due monycioun to put theyme 
to eny losse or daunger’.89 Cavill’s point is two-fold, firstly, that by giving a period of 
grace the king did not press his financial advantage, and secondly that an emphasis on 
                                                 
85 Cavill, ‘Penal Statutes’, 482. 
86 Guth, ‘Exchequer Penal Law Enforcement’, 277. 
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law enforcement was apparent earlier in the reign than its last decade. That the fiscal 
fruits of the labour of this enforcement only entered the royal coffers once the central 
bureaucracy had mastered its application in the latter years of the reign perhaps 
contributed to the contemporary perception of these years as a time of fiscal oppression.  
 
6.3.3. City Justice and the Crown 
The third accusation commonly levelled at the Henrician government during its last 
years is that the king and his ministers sought to undermine the administration of City 
justice. Mark Horowitz, in his article about the unfortunate Draper, Thomas Sunnyff, 
stated that ‘summary imprisonments… seem to have been ubiquitous during the reign’ 
and quotes as his evidence a Common Council meeting of 1502 in which it was noted 
that through the City courts ‘divers and many p[er]sones daily been and tyme past have 
been arrested atte div[er]s mennes su[i]ts uppon div[er]s and sev[er]all playnts and 
accons’, many of which failed to proceed to judgement.90 Horowitz’s argument is that 
imprisonment was used as a ‘coercive means to settle royal matters with cash payments 
and obligations’. What Horowitz failed to mention was that the passage he quoted from 
the Journals of Common Council was an extract from a petition heard before the 
Common Council for the reform of such practices in the City courts. This cannot be 
taken as a reflection of the practices of the central government of the time and it does 
not demonstrate that imprisonment was used to coerce debtors.91 However, such 
practices did happen, as will be seen later in the cases of Capell, Sunnyff and 
Kneseworth, but there is no evidence to suggest they were widespread. 
 
The accusation of fixed juries is on firmer ground. The author of the Great Chronicle 
complained that Empson and Dudley ‘hadd they theyr ffalse Juryes soo ffyxid unto 
theym that they were assurid they they wold not passe agayn theyr meyndis’.92 The 
City had made an attempt to address the problem of corrupt juries in 1505, when it was 
declared that six men who had committed ‘detestable perjury’ would henceforth ‘in 
nowise be putte or somoned in any juries or enquest to be somoned w[ith]in this 
                                                 
90 Mark Horowitz, ‘“Agree with the King”’ 
91 Jo.10, ff.246-246v. 
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Citie’.93 Whether these men had been active in the City or central courts, or both, is 
impossible to ascertain. It is entirely possible that they had come to the attention of the 
City authorities in their capacity as jurors on cases in the central courts on cases 
concerning Londoners.94 Three years later three of these men served upon the 
presenting juries for three trials brought against Sir William Capell and one against 
Laurence Aylmer at the King’s Bench.95 It would surely have been known within the 
law circles at Westminster that certain jurors still employed by the central courts had 
been censured by the City. The City eventually succeeded in punishing the offending 
jurors after the death of Henry VII when, along with other corrupt jurors, the three men 
who had both been accused of perjury in 1505 and had served on the juries that indicted 
Capell and Aylmer were disenfranchised and sent to the pillory.96  
 
6.3.4. Crown Interference in Civic Appointments 
The fourth charge, that Henry VII and his government interfered in the appointment of 
civic officers, cannot be denied.97 If anything Crown inference is, unusually, 
understated as collectively Henry’s interference in civic elections appears to constitute 
the most blatant royal intervention in the capital’s civic appointments since Richard 
II’s reign.98 Two mayors and three sheriffs were appointed at the king’s behest, one 
disgraced alderman was reinstated and a clutch of more minor appointments were 
made. 
 
John Percyvale became the first Tailor to become mayor after the king wrote to the 
City requesting his election to the post in 1498.99 Though there was no overt opposition 
                                                 
93 Rep.1, f.172v. 
94 It is likely that they all served in the court of Common Pleas as well as in the King’s Bench. Two of 
the men condemned by the City in 1505, for example, John Wright, alias Derby, and John Bramston, 
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Simpson, Fuller and Richard Smith, Carpenter. 
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239. 
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to the king’s wish it is likely that Percyvale was not a popular choice, for he had been 
the losing candidate in mayoral elections on four previous occasions.100 Percyvale was 
not unique in this – William Capell was also rejected four times – but it does perhaps 
illustrate both his unpopularity and possibly a reluctance to elevate the Tailors by 
having one of their number as mayor.  
 
Two more Tailors were to benefit from the king’s sponsorship in civic elections. At a 
meeting of the Court of Aldermen in October 1508 it was agreed to gather the wardens 
of every fellowship ‘to th[e] entent that the kyngs letter adresid for the eleccion of M 
Jennings to th[e] office of maraltie shalbe redde to theym’.101 If there were objections 
they were not recorded and Stephen Jennings was duly elected mayor. There is no 
evidence that Jennings paid for the support of the king in this matter and he was to find 
himself in the peculiar situation of sitting on the commissions into the abuses of his 
patrons.102 
 
The king’s request for William Fitzwilliam to be elected sheriff in 1506 caused far 
more controversy. On 19 September 1506 the wardens of the crafts were assembled at 
the Guildhall to have the king’s letter regarding his wish for Fitzwilliam’s election read 
to them.103 The Great Chronicle states that it was the king’s wish that the commons 
should elect Fitzwilliam as their choice of sheriff as the outgoing mayor, also at the 
king’s behest, had chosen William Copynger, Fishmonger.104 The commons rebelled 
and chose instead the Goldsmith Robert Johnson who was sworn and admitted into the 
position.105 The barons of the Exchequer, who took the oaths of the sheriffs of London, 
refused to accept Johnson, though Johnson continued with his duties for a number of 
days thereafter.106 The king commanded that a new election should be held, which it 
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was, with Edmund Dudley in attendance to ensure that the king’s will was obeyed.107 
Fitzwilliam was elected, though many of the commons ‘a while w’stood, saying It was 
an uttyr derogacion unto the lybertees of the Cyte’.108 Royal assistance in such matters 
did not come cheap, though, as Fitzwilliam had to pay £100 ‘for the king’s gracious 
favour for being sheriff’.109 The king’s sponsorship of William Copynger in this 
election is not noted in the civic records, and perhaps did not need to be as Copygner 
became the choice of the outgoing mayor, Thomas Kneseworth, for sheriff rather than 
that of the commons. This raises the possibility that the king had made similar requests 
of other outgoing mayors, and if so the true extent of his interference in civic elections 
is unknowable.  
 
The opposition to Fitzwilliam’s election is in direct contrast to the muted response of 
the London commons to the king’s earlier interference in a shrieval election. On that 
occasion, in September 1504, it was William Copynger’s election as sheriff that was 
overturned in response to a letter from the king declaring his preference for William 
Brown, Mercer.110 Given the king’s sponsorship of Copynger in 1506, the object was 
obviously to get Brown in post rather than oust the incumbent. Copynger had been the 
commons’ choice to serve as sheriff but his replacement at a meeting of the Common 
Council a matter of days after his election appears to have passed unnoticed by the 
London chroniclers and unchallenged by the commons. Why was the election of 
Fitzwilliam resisted by the City whereas the Brown one was not? The answer probably 
lies in the personal unpopularity of Fitzwilliam and the general unpopularity of the 
Tailors. Fitzwilliam had been instrumental in negotiating the unpopular charter of the 
Merchant Taylors. His motives for seeking the role were apparently suspect and he was 
accused of a desire to ‘put in question the franchyse of the Cyte’ or to demonstrate to 
his peers how high he stood in the king’s favour, ‘that he mygth opteyne of his Grace 
that many othir mygth nott’.111  
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The reinstated alderman was another Merchant Taylor, James Wilford. Wilford had 
been absent from the aldermanic court for a year after insulting the then mayor, William 
Capell.112 Upon his readmission to the court in February 1505 he was asked by the 
Recorder if he had anything to say, to which Wilford replied that the mayor ‘knew the 
kyngs mynde welynough and therfor he desirid to knowe the mayors pleasure and 
theruppon he wold make relacion to the Kyng’.113 The entry carries on to note that 
Wilford at no time spoke any ‘words of submission’ and that Wilford’s presence was 
tolerated only because of the king’s intervention, though what form that intervention 
took is unrecorded.114  
 
It was not just civic governmental offices that Henry interfered with. A letter from him 
to the Merchant Adventurers in April 1496 stated that John Pickering, Mercer and 
former governor of the Adventurers, was once more their governor, but this time by 
royal appointment rather than free election.115 John Challoner, who replaced Robert 
Sheffield as Recorder of London in 1508, paid £100 for the king’s favour in securing 
the position.116  
 
What was Henry trying to achieve by interfering with City appointments? This thesis 
has argued that his sponsorship of the Merchant Taylors was an attempt to widen the 
oligarchic base of the civic government and dilute the hold of the mercantile companies 
on the capital’s administration.117 Seeking the promotion within civic government of 
individuals from this company can be seen as part of this strategy. This is particularly 
striking when one considers that this policy was contrary to Henry’s efforts in other 
urban centres, where, according to James Lee, his primary aim was to narrow the 
oligarchic municipal power-bases into groups of ‘smaller, royally-approved group[s] 
of individuals’ and ensure they had the means to provide ‘crown-sponsored self-
government’.118 Henry’s actions in championing the Merchant Taylors did exactly the 
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opposite to what he had done in York, Exeter, Bristol, Leicester and Northampton, 
where he had taken an active part in reforms of the civic constitutions allowing them 
to reshape their civic administrations using London as a model.119 That he broke with 
this practice in his relations with London substantiates the theory that he sought a 
counter-balance to the mercantile companies of the Mercers, Drapers and Grocers. 
 
6.4. ‘Persecution’ of Individuals 
Edmund Dudley was sentenced to death in July 1509, a mere three months after the 
death of the king he had served, but it was a year until his sentence was carried out.120 
Sometime in the month following his sentence he wrote a petition, addressed to his 
former colleagues on the King’s Council, Richard Fox bishop of Winchester and 
Thomas Lovell, which listed all those he felt had been wronged by his actions on behalf 
of the late king.121 This list has been itemised by its editor, C.J. Harrison, and comprises 
eighty-four articles, of which one, number eighty-three, is further broken down into 
seventeen separate cases, making a total of 101 men, women or institutions listed as 
having been particular victims of Henry’s fiscal exactions applied through Dudley. Of 
these 101 cases only sixteen relate to London institutions, residents or citizens. This 
raises a number of questions. Was perhaps Dudley not as active in London as is often 
stated, though it does seem apparent that he was more involved in London matters than 
Empson? Is it possible that Dudley did not feel his conscience sufficiently pricked by 
London cases? The list comprises only those he felt were hard done by; William Capell, 
for example, is not on the list, suggesting that Dudley may have felt that the merchant’s 
treatment was not unwarranted.122 Whatever the reason, 16 per cent is a small fraction 
of the total, given the population and concentration of wealth in the capital at the time. 
One would have expected the richest pickings were to be found in London if the 
primary aim was simply to enrich the king. 
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6.4.1. Sir William Capell 
The persecution of individual Londoners, particularly rich ones, has featured heavily 
in secondary literature about the period and the case of Sir William Capell has been 
frequently used as an example of extortion.123 Yet Capell’s case is not so 
straightforward. He had brought himself to the attention of the king during his tenure 
as mayor through his leadership of the City in pursuit of the repeal of the Merchant 
Taylors’ charter. He may not have been found guilty in all the actions brought against 
him in the Court of the Exchequer in 1494, but he was still culpable for many.124 He 
was certainly guilty of the illegal practice of usury contrary to the statutes of 1487 and 
1496.125 His modus operandi in such deals is revealed in a Chancery case brought 
against him by Richard, Lord Beauchamp. As is the nature of such petitions the 
document is undated, but its address to ‘John, archbishop of Canterbury and 
Chamberlain of England’, places it before Morton’s death in 1500.126 Through the 
mediation of a friend Beauchamp had arranged to borrow from Capell £200 ‘under 
such forme of wynnyng as he had delte wt other lords and gentlemen’; that is that 
Capell would receive £120 for every £100 he lent. Capell apparently showed 
Beauchamp writings of such arrangements he had entered into with the Lord Audeley 
and others of the peerage. Repayment was to be doubly secured on certain of 
Beauchamp’s property and an additional bond made before the mayor of the 
Westminster Staple, Sir John Brown for £300. The latter bond would be declared void 
once Capell received £240. Unfortunately, though, Beauchamp claimed he never 
received the £200, which was meant to be delivered by one Henry Rabet as Capell did 
not want to give the money himself for fear that he would be accused of usury. 
However, that did not stop Capell from pressing for payment of the £300 bond. Capell 
answered the case by stating that the bill of complaint was insufficient and ‘none other 
but matter subtily and craftily imagined’ in order to debar Beauchamp from paying his 
true debt, which was for a monstrance of gold and jewels he had purchased.127 The 
outcome of this case is unknown. The case of Beauchamp is only one of many brought 
in Chancery against Capell accusing him of usury. Henry Toft brought to the attention 
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of the Chancery court Capell’s loan of £400 to Sir Edward Burgh and Capell was also 
one of the earl of Kent’s many creditors.128 
 
Capell’s tenure as mayor in 1503/4 drew much controversy. As well as drawing 
attention to himself in the matter of the Merchant Taylors’ patent he also apparently 
questioned the king’s jurisdiction in his own capital. A case brought in the Court of 
Requests just after Capell completed his year as mayor, if the plaintiff can be believed, 
is suggestive of Capell’s cavalier attitude towards royal authority. John Tucker, a 
coriour, or curer of hides, aged 74, complained that in May 1504 goods of his trade to 
the value of £300 had been confiscated from his house by John Halle, one of the 
sergeants of the mayor, upon the commandment of mayor Capell and the then 
chamberlain of the City, William Milborne. Tucker was then imprisoned. When Tucker 
complained to Capell and Milborne about his treatment and argued that he had a royal 
licence to go about his business, Capell apparently stated that the king had no authority 
to grant or give such a licence within the City.129 Tucker fled to sanctuary and filed a 
suit against the executors of the now deceased John Halle, who defended themselves 
by stating that Tucker had been found guilty of fouling waterways by the Fleet, by 
dyeing his hides there, and therefore the case against Halle ought to be dismissed and 
Tucker fined and imprisoned. Tucker, then, may not be the most reliable witness, but 
whether Capell did question the king’s authority in this case or not it is unlikely that 
such an accusation would have gone unnoticed. 
 
In 1508 three cases were brought against Capell at the Kings Bench for three very 
different misdemeanours. The first alleged that Capell had spoken to one Thomas 
Kyme on 4 April 1507 ‘in words false, malicious and against the honour and dignity of 
the king’: 
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… that the king’s grace hath had of me oon thowsand pounds for my son as wrongfully 
[as any] prince had of man And also two thowsand marc[s] in a nother mater as 
wrongfully as the [one thousand] And also that the king had of hym since… he was 
king [£10,000] or marks as wrongfully as eny prince had of any man.130  
 
He then went on to add that such a donation did him little good! The £1,000 was an 
obvious reference to the pardon of May 1500 for Capell and his son, Giles.131 
 
The second case is the one most widely reported, for it is the reason given by the Great 
Chronicler for the persecution of Capell at this time, and saw the former mayor accused 
of letting a coin-shaver go at large whilst he was in office. The third indictment stated 
that on the last day of September 1508 William Capell argued with Richard, Earl of 
Kent: 
 
[Capell said] My Lord ye have undon[e] me Whereunto the said Erle then and there 
answerd It was not so And then and there the said [Sir] William answerd and said by 
godds body ye and the kings grace have undon[e] me And the said Erle Answerd hym 
and said the kings grace undoyth no man And yf the kings grace had not beyn ye and 
suche other had undon[e] me Whereunto the said [Sir] William then and there answerd 
and said that thenne the king doth for you that he doth for few men for and yf I had 
beyn a Frenchman or a horeson Lombard I might have lyved in rest as other doo. 132 
   
Capell’s accusation to Kent that he had ‘undone him’ was possibly a reference to 
information Kent gave to the king back in 1501, pertaining to Capell’s involvement in 
the practice of usury, for which Kent received the sum of five marks.133 
 
All three inquests were held at Guildhall. The first two were in July and October 
respectively and were presided over by the mayor, Laurence Aylmer. The third was in 
November of the same year, by which time the mayor was Stephen Jennings. Though 
separated by a number of months, all three cases share a remarkable number of the 
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same jurors, and many of these jurors also sat in judgement upon Laurence Aylmer and 
his sheriffs in January the next year.134 
 
It is apparent that Capell was not targeted simply because of his wealth. He had started 
the reign in royal favour; can he be seen to be, was he ultimately the architect of his 
own downfall? He hit many raw nerves with the Henrician government: his extensive 
involvement in the practice of usury, a sin particularly frowned upon and legislated 
against by Henry VII, is inferred from the plethora of entries in the Close Rolls 
regarding legal actions initiated by him against debtors. He apparently failed to 
prosecute a coin-clipper whilst mayor, even though the prosecution of those engaged 
in such practices was a priority given the government’s attempt to control the bullion 
supply and implement fully the recoinage programme started early in the reign. He had 
led the City in a campaign to see the repeal of the Merchant Taylors’ charter, which 
was perceived by Henry and his council as an assault upon the king’s prerogative. 
Lastly, he allegedly spoke seditiously and publicly of his treatment by the king. 
Capell’s cavalier attitude towards authority and law was perhaps too blatant to be 
allowed to go unpunished.  
 
The veracity of the charges against Capell will never be known, but he was imprisoned 
in the Tower, rather than any of the City prisons, until after the death of Henry VII. 
That he was excluded from Henry VIII’s general pardon implies that the new king’s 
ministers considered that there may have been some justice in the treatment of 
Capell.135 It was not until January 1510 that John Yong, Master of the Rolls, was 
informed that Capell had leave to sue for pardon.136 
 
6.4.2. The ‘Victims’ of Empson and Dudley  
The cases of Laurence Aylmer and Thomas Sunnyff are two genuine examples of 
persecution and wrongful imprisonment. Both cases have been written about, the latter 
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in great detail recently by Mark Horowitz.137 The aim here is to examine a few of the 
most commonly recited cases in detail to illustrate that there are often two sides to the 
story and that ‘victims’ frequently were not entirely innocent of all wrongdoing. 
 
Laurence Aylmer, who served as mayor March-October 1508 was arrested soon after 
his mayoralty ended and tried together with his sheriffs, William Butler and John 
Kirkby, for allowing an arrested felon, one Gabriel Pynell, to go at large during his 
tenure.138 They were imprisoned and, like Capell, remained so until the end of the 
reign.139 At the time of his arrest Pynell had warned that the mayor and sheriffs had no 
authority over him, for he ‘had a master that was a gret gentilman borne which payed 
the king CC li a yere for custome… as for the maire and the benche were but beggers 
to them’.140 Who this gentleman might have been is unclear. It could have been one of 
the Italian merchants that did profitable business with the king as it is possible that 
Pynell himself was an Italian.141 It is possible that it was John Baptist Grimaldi, who 
frequently acquired funds for the Crown through his role as an informant of customs 
infractions. The Great Chronicle stated that Grimaldi had been retained by Richard 
Empson, whom Fabyan blamed for Aylmer’s predicament.142 It is unlikely that Pynell 
was referring to Empson himself, as to describe him merely as a man who paid £200 
annually in customs to the king would be a profound understatement. Evidence of 
Empson and Grimaldi’s involvement is to be found in an indictment of conspiracy 
brought in 1510 against Empson, John Camby, John Baptist Grimaldi and Pynell for 
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having induced Aylmer and his sheriffs to release Pynell and then imprisoning and 
fining them for doing so.143 This, then, appears to be a case of entrapment. 
 
The case of Thomas Sunnyff has been examined in some detail and therefore the 
following only briefly summaries the details. The unfortunate Haberdasher and his wife 
were accused by John Camby of murdering a baby. Sunnyff was brought before 
Empson and committed to the Fleet for six weeks before being taken before Dudley 
who demanded payment of a £500 fine.144 In Dudley’s 1509 petition he claimed that 
Sunnyff’s fine was payable ‘for light matters onely upon surmyse of a lewd queane’.145 
The ‘lewd queane’ or prostitute in this case was one Alice Damston, who had initially 
testified against the Sunnyffs in a case of child murder.146 This case appears to have 
particularly bothered Dudley’s conscience, for whilst imprisoned in the Tower he wrote 
to Sunnyff begging for his forgiveness and stating that ‘ther ys no matt[er] [tha]t I have 
more remorce yn’.147 Elton claims that the case of Thomas Sunnyff was ‘the only one 
known in which a man seems to have suffered quite innocently’ though he 
acknowledged that it was ‘not likely to have had no companions’.148 Cooper refuted 
this and gave a number of other examples, including that of Aylmer above, though his 
account of that episode was erroneous.149 Few writers thereafter have given Henry and 
his ministers the benefit of the doubt. Yet many of the most often recited cases against 
individuals fail to tell the entire story. 
 
                                                 
143 TNA, KB9/453/456 & 458. 
144 Cooper, ‘Last Years’, 120-121. Horowitz connects this fine to an outstanding recognisance made 
before the Chamberlain of London, though this is unlikely as it supposes that Dudley or his servants had 
open access to the civic records and could collect on a bond not made to the king (Horowitz, ‘“Agree 
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Moreover, the other men party to the bond were not similarly pursued. 
145 Harrison, ‘Petition’, no. 76. Though the named unfortunate is ‘Simmes’ I agree with Horowitz that 
this is likely to be Sunnyff (easily misread – 5 or 6 minims, ‘s’ for ‘f’) as the amount, location and 
occupation of the man fits with Sunnyff’s case. 
146 Horowitz,‘“Agree with the King”’, 332. 
147 WAM, 12249, quoted in full in Horowitz,‘“Agree with the King”’, 336-7. 
148 Elton, ‘Rapacity and Remorse’, 15. 
149 Cooper, ‘Last Years’, 109-110. 
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Thomas Kneseworth, another former mayor imprisoned with his sheriffs, was accused, 
according to the Great Chronicle, of having ‘mysusid the charge of their offycis’.150 
There may have been some truth in the accusation, for Kneseworth and his sheriffs 
were audited in 1507 and the relevant entry in the civic records suggest that 
irregularities may have been found.151 Nor was it the first time that Kneseworth’s 
financial integrity had been called into question: two aldermen were selected to audit 
the shrieval accounts of Kneseworth and his colleague Henry Sommer in 1497.152 
Kneseworth’s colleagues in the Guildhall were willing to at least investigate the 
possibility of acting on his behalf. In December 1507 the chamberlain of London was 
charged with the task of approaching Dudley in order that he:  
 
shall fele M[aster] Dudley[‘s] mynde wheder it will stande w[ith] the kyngs pleasure 
that the mayer [and] aldermen shuld macke labor and sute to his gr[ac]e for m[aster] 
Kneseworth and other aldermen that been audited And also to understande his mynde 
touching a gen[er]all pardon.153  
 
This implies that even if Kneseworth had been guilty of any financial impropriety the 
City did not seem to feel that it merited interference or punishment by the central 
government. Kneseworth had certainly been released from wherever he had been 
imprisoned by 17 February 1508 when he attended his first meeting of the Court of 
Aldermen of the year.154 The requisite pardon did not come cheap: Kneseworth paid 
£1,133 6s 8d and the sheriffs £500 each. 155 Dudley himself was later to confess that 
this was unjust, that they paid large amounts ‘for a light cause’.156 Sheriffs and mayors 
who served after this might have worried about the scrutiny their accounts might be 
subjected to in the future. 
 
                                                 
150 GC, 336; Arnold’s Chronicle, 44 
151 Rep.2, f.37v. 
152 Rep.1, f.23. 
153 Rep.2, f.37v. 
154 Rep.2, f.40. It is likely that Shore and Grove were released around the same time, though Shore did 
not attend the Court of Aldermen until 24 February (Rep.2, f.41) and Grove, 14 March (Rep.2, f.42.) 
155 BL, Landsdowne Ms.127, f.56. 
156 Harrison, ‘Petition’, 90. 
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The case of Richard Gittens, like that of Kneseworth, concerns a victim who was not 
entirely unblemished. Gittens, a Mercer and Stapler, had an action of trespass brought 
against him and his deputy, Thomas Popelot, by the Chamberlain of London at the 
beginning of 1506, at the behest of the mayor and aldermen, for falsely occupying the 
office of Common Meter within the City.157 Both men were then committed to ward. 
Apparently Gittens had served as executor to William Norton, the late Common Meter 
of woollen cloths, and in this capacity had assumed the role, established Popelot as his 
deputy, and taken the proceeds of the office.158 This would have brought Gittens to the 
attention of the law if not Dudley directly. Gittens was still in prison in July 1506 when 
he was once more brought before the Court of Aldermen. He was accused of having 
married the widow of one William Fowler, Dyer, and failing to give Fowler’s children 
their portion of the inheritance. Additionally, it was found that he had failed to perform 
his duties as Constable of the ward of Breadstreet or make his contribution towards the 
Breadstreet share of the 1,000 marks paid to the king at Pentecost.159 In October Gittens 
was held in a bond with three sureties for £60 to ensure his attendance before the 
mayor’s court and that he kept the peace against one Giles Claybroke.160 This bond, 
though it was made in the Guildhall, was made to the king rather than the City 
Chamberlain as was the norm, implying that the king’s agents, probably Dudley, had 
become interested in Gittens’s fate, especially as the entry goes on to state that Gittens 
already owed the king £40 for a previous forfeited recognisance.161 It is probable that 
Gittens failed to appear at the mayor’s court as Dudley’s notebook records that Gittens 
was fined £120 for failing to honour a bond.162 It is possible that the total amount he 
paid came to more, for Dudley was later to write that Gittens was ‘longe in prison and 
payed much money upon a light surmise.’163 Even so, whilst Gittens may have been 
                                                 
157 Rep.2, ff.1, 4. 
158 Rep.2, f.1. 
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against him in Chancery (TNA, C1/313/54, C1/413/60, C1/393/32 & 33) and tried to sue William 
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innocent as far as Dudley was concerned he was certainly a flawed character who had 
attracted legal censure on several occasions. 
 
It is worth briefly perusing the other London victims mentioned in Dudley’s petition. 
Robert Hawkyns was a Hattermerchant who, according to Dudley, paid 100 marks for 
a light matter ‘upon a surmyse of a lewd fellowe’.164 Yet once again there is more to 
this than the exploitation of a rich merchant. Hawkyns was involved in a dispute with 
William Capell in 1497, though before the case could be fully investigated by the 
aldermen Hawkyns was confined to Newgate gaol for ‘divers contempts done by hym 
agaynst the autorite of the mayre and aldermen’.165 The conclusion of the dispute is 
unknown.166 Hawkyns later paid 200 marks for a pardon for his part in the death of a 
man and entered into a bond of £100 for his allegiance and good behaviour.167 It is 
possible that the incident involving a man’s death was the one to which Dudley was 
referring, but his previous imprisonment does not speak well for his character. 
 
Also in the petition were Richard Haddon, the alderman and Mercer, who paid heavily 
for his role as beneficiary and executor of his friend, Thomas Wyndout.168 Fellow 
alderman Henry Kebill was charged 1,000 marks for a pardon.169 Sir William Martyn, 
together with Nicholas Milborne, Chamberlain of London, paid 400 marks by 
obligation ‘for the forfeiture of Clopton’s wools’.170 This is likely to be related to the 
estate of Hugh Clopton, the former mayor and alderman, who died in 1496 and for 
whom Martyn and Milborne served as executors.171 Hugh Acton, Merchant Taylor, was 
                                                 
Fitzwilliam, the sheriff who arrested him in 1507, for trespass in 1515. He died a poor man, according 
to his will (TNA, PROB11/19/393). 
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confined to the Tower and paid £100 for his discharge, though the details of this case 
are not apparent.172 Lady Thomasine Percyvale, the widow of the Merchant Taylor 
John Percyvale, paid £1,000 for a pardon which Dudley later explained was ‘for a light 
matter onlie upon the surmyse of a lewd Priest.’173 Not named by Dudley in his petition 
but mentioned by the Great Chronicle is the alderman and Mercer, Christopher Hawes, 
who died in October 1508 apparently after being harassed by the king’s ‘promoters’.174  
 
Two cases seem to suggest that there were occasions when Dudley had knowingly acted 
on perjured evidence. William Curties, customer of London, paid £500 for a pardon for 
offences committed whilst in office, which in the petition Dudley states was deemed 
payable ‘upon the light information of an untrue man’.175 James Yarford, Mercer, and 
future alderman, paid 100 marks in cash and was bound to pay a further 400 marks in 
January 1508 for a pardon regarding an indictment of felony, in which matter, Dudley 
later confessed, ‘my conscience was untrue’.176 Why these men would have been 
targeted is not quite so clear. Certainly an effort was made in the reign to cut down on 
fraud by customs officials, and therefore Curties may have been used as an example to 
would-be fraudsters. Yarford’s case requires further investigation. 
 
This is not a comprehensive list of members of the mercantile elite who were subject 
to Henry VII’s financial exactions; we do not have any evidence of those financially 
investigated by Empson, for example, but from it two observations can be made. The 
first is that, given the size of London’s population and its proportion of the realm’s 
wealth, this is a reasonably short list. As a list of individuals one could compare it to 
the crop of merchants Edward IV persecuted in the late 1460s for no discernible motive 
other than financial gain.177  
                                                 
172 Harrison, ‘Petition’, no.83(l). 
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Secondly, the majority of those on this list merited legal investigation of some manner 
into their activities. Capell, Kneseworth, Aylmer, Gittens, Sunnyff and Hawkins came 
into the crosshairs of the promoters for reasons other than their wealth, though their 
wealth was exploited thereafter. They all warranted some legal investigation and 
therefore were exposed to scrutiny. With the exception of Gittens, these were rich men 
prominent in London society, and their treatment would have made examples of them 
within the capital, deterring other citizens from law-breaking or failing to observe the 
rights of the king. The punishment meted out may have been disproportionate to the 
crime, but this may have been part of a deliberate policy to deter would-be wrong-
doers. 
 
Doubtless not all of the Londoners that feature in Dudley’s petition were guilty of a 
crime or misdeed: several times Dudley, in his petition, claimed that an individual had 
paid much ‘on a light surmise’, implying that prosecution had taken place on the 
strength of an allegation not firmly based in evidence.178 It is not possible to discern 
the motive for the pursuit of all of these people by Dudley and his agents, but where it 
has been possible to uncover the full story motive for the persecution appears to be 
based at least as much on a desire to uphold the law as to obtain money. 
 
At a time where an institutionalised policing body did not exist, measures such as the 
creation of such exemplars and holding men in high-worth bonds for good behaviour, 
were effective law-keeping expedients. That the punishment was frequently 
disproportionate to the crime added to the deterrent. The promoters were exploiters of 
information and extant situations and distributors of rough justice, but not generally 
creators of fiction. It would be too broad a generalisation to state that this was always 
the case but it is worth making the point that, in the City at least, persecution did not 
come out of nowhere and ‘victims’ were not arbitrarily chosen. 
 
                                                 
178 Seven of the 16 London-related items express this sentiment. Many of the others appear only in a list 
of names (no.83). 
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6.5. Epilogue 
The king’s promoters were imprisoned shortly after the death of Henry VII; not just 
Empson and Dudley, but also Henry Toft, William Smith, Richard Page and John 
Camby amongst others. Camby, together with Robert Hall, keeper of Ludgate gaol and 
Thomas Bate, bailiff of Billingsgate, were forbidden to hold further office within the 
City.179 Grimaldi, much to Fabyan’s disgust, fled to sanctuary and so escaped 
punishment.180 Toft and William Smith were amongst twelve informers imprisoned 
‘for such unlawful demeanours as they used in the time of our dearest father’ who were 
released on bail from prison in December 1509.181 
 
Just over a month after Henry VII’s death the jurors who indicted Capell in 1508 were 
prosecuted and found guilty of perjury. On May 22 1509, Thomas Young, Saddler, was 
committed to Newgate gaol for various crimes contrary to the liberties of the City.182 
In June 1509, John Derby, William Simpson, Richard Smith and Henry Stokton were 
disenfranchised and sentenced to the pillory.183 Later that month Robert Jakes, 
Christopher Rotherey and George Jackson were also accused of perjury and held in 
bond for £200 pending their appearance before the mayors’ court.184 They too were 
later disenfranchised.185 Thomas Chycheley presented to the mayor and aldermen 
letters of pardon from the new king and so escaped punishment.186  
 
In January 1510 the mayor, Thomas Bradbury, died. Capell was elected to replace him, 
despite it being less than the regulation seven years since he last served, though not 
without notable opposition. 187 George Hayward, a tailor, was brought before the Court 
of Aldermen for having objected to the election on the grounds that Capell was ‘far in 
                                                 
179 Rep.2, f.72; Robert Hall was later charged with dishonestly extracting an obligation of £40 from one 
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danger with the king’, a reference to the fact that Capell had been exempted from the 
General Pardon granted by Henry VIII upon his accession and had only that month 
obtained a pardon.188 Five witnesses testified to derogatory words spoken by Hayward, 
who was consequently imprisoned in Newgate and fined a total of £20.189 Hayward’s 
dislike of Capell was probably fuelled by the long-standing enmity between the Tailors 
and the Drapers, as was Hayward’s subsequent harsh treatment. Hayward was not the 
only one who was opposed the new mayor: later in the year it was reported to the Court 
of Aldermen that one William Grownyng had called the mayor a whoreson and churl, 
a story verified by three witnesses.190 This was particularly extraordinary as reports of 
outspoken insulting language against an incumbent mayor were rarely recorded in the 
civic records at this time. 
 
Capell used his time in office to deal with those deemed to have acted contrary to the 
City in the previous reign. Capell gave vent publicly to a grudge he still held against 
the Tailor, James Wilford. Wilford had been temporarily suspended from the 
aldermanry in 1503 for insults given to Capell when he was first mayor.191 In October 
1510 it was recorded that during a meeting of the Court of Aldermen, the mayor had 
said to Wilford, ‘some men have lost their heads that have not done so much harm to 
this City as ye have done.’192  
 
William Fitzwilliam, the sheriff imposed upon the City against opposition at the 
instance of Henry VII in 1506, was elected sheriff a second time in 1510.193 The 
financial imposition of the post meant that it was unusual for a man to serve as sheriff 
twice. It was argued that Fitzwilliam should serve again as he had not been duly elected 
the last time he had served as sheriff, as indeed he had not. The aldermen strongly 
suspected that members of the electing body, the Common Hall, had been coerced by 
the mayor, Capell, into electing Fitzwilliam, and so summoned the wardens of the 
mercantile fellowships of the Mercers, Grocers, Fishmongers, Goldsmiths, 
                                                 
188 Rep.2, ff.79, 80, 86v &87; LP Hen.VIII, I, i, no.357(22). 
189 Rep.2, ff.86v, 94v. 
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Haberdashers and Skinners so that they could be ‘examined whether my lord mayor 
laboured unto them to make M[aster] Fitzwilliam sheriff’, to which they replied that he 
had not.194 That the aldermen saw fit to question the mayor’s integrity demonstrated 
their distrust of this man. Fitzwilliam refused to serve and so was disenfranchised and 
fined 1,000 marks.195 It was only after the intervention of Wolsey that the fine was 
diminished and his citizenship restored, though he chose to go into Wolsey’s service 
rather than resume his seat in the Court of Aldermen.196 
 
The wardens of the Merchant Taylors eventually came to realise that universal 
unpopularity within the City was undesirable, and sought to make amends. An entry in 
the records of the Court of Aldermen for February 1511 states that the wardens of the 
‘Tailors’ [sic] came before the mayor and aldermen desiring their good lordship and 
‘said if thei hadde offended thei wulde make amends’.197  
 
6.5.1. The Early Years of the New Reign  
One of the first acts of the new king was to issue a new general pardon.198 The pardon 
rolls make interesting reading. Londoners appear to make up a small proportion of the 
total of those suing for pardon, and of those the majority tend either to have held civic 
office, to be holders of lands in other counties or to have served as executors of wills.199 
This suggests that the citizens did not perceive themselves to be in peril of accusations 
of wrong-doing, an assumption possibly based upon experience and a knowledge that 
those in the provinces were more at risk from the attention of those still investigating 
the feudal and prerogative rights of the king. More interesting is the list of those 
exempted from the pardon alongside Empson and Dudley. Sir William Capell comes 
fairly near the top of the list. The promoters Henry Toft, John Baptist Grimaldi, John 
Camby, and Richard Page are in the body of the text, as are the false jurors William 
                                                 
194 Rep.2, f.100. Note the omission of the Merchant Taylors. The Great Chronicler believed that the 
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195 GC, 367 
196 Rep.2, ff.107v, 108, 108v, 109v. 
197 Rep.2, f.107. 
198 LP Hen.VIII, I(i), no.11. 
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Smith, John Derby, Richard Smith, Robert Jakes and Henry Stockton.200 Capell was 
eventually allowed to sue for a pardon in January 1510 and Grimaldi and William 
Smith in February.201  
 
The general pardon covered ‘all things except debt’.202 Consequently the outstanding 
bonds from the last reign were not voided by the king’s death but were still, in many 
cases, pursued. Eleven were cancelled as, after examination, it was found they had been 
made ‘without any cause reasonable or lefull’ and by the ‘undue menes of certeyn of 
the lerned counsell of our late father… contry to all lawe and good consciens to the 
manyfeste charge and perell of the soule of said late father’.203 Of these only two were 
Londoners, Sunnyff and Sir Robert Dymmock.204 Further recognisances were 
cancelled without the same preamble. Capell and his son Giles were to have two of 
their recognisances cancelled and Capell a further one, suggesting that at least some of 
the money taken from him was deemed to have been unfairly extracted.205 As J.P. 
Cooper pointed out this was not many at all, but there may well have been more as 
these cancellations only relate to recognisances enrolled in Chancery.206  
 
This raises a central question: did the Londoners experience much of a change in their 
relationship with the Crown after the accession of the new king? The optimistic 
citizenry might well have anticipated an age of more enlightened rule and an end to the 
financial exactions of the last reign. A general commission of oyer and terminer was 
established to look into the abuses of Henry VII’s reign, and the removal of Empson 
and Dudley served to underline the intention that the new reign would be of a different 
character to the old one. Yet, with largely the same personnel serving the new king as 
sat on his father’s council fundamental change was unlikely. The civic administration 
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still treated with the same governmental personnel and still courted the same 
councillors. 
 
The City government fell foul of Henry VIII early in the reign. In August 1509 the Lord 
Treasurer, Thomas Howard earl of Surrey, sent a servant to the mayor to relay his 
displeasure that many merchants importing goods into the country were refusing to 
declare their wares for customs in anticipation of the grant of the usual exemption from 
tonnage and poundage that followed the death of a monarch until its grant to the new 
king.207 The mayor summoned the wardens of the mercantile companies to discuss the 
matter and it was decided to petition Henry for an exemption from the payment of 
customs until the revenue was granted to him by parliament as the previous grant of 
tonnage and poundage had expired with the death of Henry VII.208 Moreover, they 
sought to have the exemption added to the bill granting customs to the king, along with 
a request that henceforth the rates paid should be no higher than those paid in the fourth 
year of Henry VII’s reign.209 In vain they sought the help of the bishop of Winchester, 
Richard Fox, Thomas Lovell and the Lord Treasurer, only to be told that to pursue the 
matter would run the risk of offending the king.210 The parliament granted the subsidy 
to the king without the exemption period, and consequent payment holiday for the 
merchants, from the death of the old king until the formal grant of the subsidy by the 
new parliament.211 Unwisely a petition was put to the king for pardon and reinstatement 
of the exemption, and the goodwill of various members of the court was aggressively 
pursued, so aggressively, in fact, that it had the opposite effect. The king eventually 
chose to remit only a third of the amount due that was traditionally exempted.212 A 
clear message was sent to the City, that though there was a new king on the throne, his 
council was proceeding with business in the same fashion it had done in the previous 
reign. 
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The long-standing problem of the City monopolies also came to the fore early in the 
reign. Though the office of gauger was specially stated to belong to the City in the 1505 
charter, whereas the other City offices sold back to the City by Edward IV were not, it 
was awarded to William Pawne in 1510 as a reward for his services overseas.213 This 
was to become more of a problem as the reign progressed with many City offices 
distributed through royal patronage.214 
 
Thomas More was eventually to enter royal service by a similar route to that taken by 
Edmund Dudley. Initially a lawyer who represented various livery companies in legal 
matters, work which eventually gained him the freedom of the City as a member of the 
Mercers’ Company, he became an undersheriff of the City before becoming a royal 
servant.215 A biographer of More has claimed that the king recruited him as he desired 
‘a man on the council who had the confidence of the City and who could represent the 
royal interests among merchants and professionals who directed City affairs’.216 It is 
outside of the remit of this thesis to attempt to verify this statement, but it is an 
interesting parallel with the career of Dudley. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
There can be no denying that the Londoners considered themselves harshly dealt with 
by the late king and his ministers, but the existence of the information-rich sources of 
the London chronicles, coupled with the absence of nationwide chronicles for this 
period, tends to give the impression that the City suffered more than the rest of the 
kingdom. London chronicles are, not surprisingly, focused upon London events and 
therefore the prosecutions they detail tend to become commonly quoted as examples 
of a fiscal oppression. The temptation is to take these stories of prosecutions and believe 
them to be entire: they are not, as supplementary information garnered from the judicial 
and civic records of the time clearly demonstrates.  
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There is evidence to suggest that London and Londoners suffered the ‘fiscal tyranny’ 
far less than other parts of the realm and even, in proportion to the capital’s wealth and 
population, escaped lightly. The enforcement of Crown feudal rights and extension of 
the royal prerogative affected the gentry and nobility, particularly tenants in chief of 
the king, more than it did the citizen. Urban centres, though they tended to be 
concentrations of wealth, did not suffer as much as those in the localities or who 
possessed old, landed wealth, probably because the legal basis for land-owning made 
it easier for the king’s agents to follow appropriate paper trails to establish the 
boundaries of his prerogative rights. Professor Lander estimated that only a quarter of 
English peerage families escaped Henry’s financial threats in 1509; it is unlikely that 
proportion of the mercantile elite who suffered in this way was anywhere near as 
high.217  
 
The king and his ministers were preoccupied with the enforcement of law and order, 
after a period of over fifty years when old statutes and laws had been neglected. This 
reassertion of law and the royal prerogative generated discontent and complaints of 
unfair treatment, but, as Margaret McGlynn has recently observed, it is natural that 
complaint was forthcoming from ‘those whose behaviour was being modified and 
whose pockets were being tapped’.218 The Londoners who were targeted by Empson, 
Dudley and their promoters were not, in the main, selected for their wealth or by 
arbitrary means but had, as shown, already engaged in activities that had merited legal 
scrutiny. The king’s primary motivation in financially penalising members of the 
mercantile elite was not to fill his coffers, but rather to restrict and control behaviour 
and provide exemplars of high profile individuals to deter others from wrong-doing.  
 
Did the City and the Crown consider themselves at odds in the last few years of the 
reign? The evidence suggests not. City and Crown still cooperated, without 
impediment, on a number of issues. Henry VII, when putting in place complex 
arrangements for commemorations and provisions for his soul, relied upon the City as 
a guarantor of his wishes. In 1504, when Sir William Capell was mayor, the City 
                                                 
217 Lander, ‘Bonds, Coercion and Fear: Henry VII and the Peerage’, in J.G. Rowe and W.J. Stockdale 
ed. Floreligium Historiale: Essays Presented to Wallace K. Ferguson (Toronto, 1971), 292. 
218 Margaret McGlynn, ‘Standards of Conduct for Henry VII’s Chamber Officials’, Historical Research 
(2009), 548. 
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undertook to act as guarantors for the foundation of a chantry, an anniversary and other 
services centred on the new Lady Chapel in Westminster built to house the bodies of 
Henry VII and his queen.219 This was a potentially onerous duty, burdening the City 
with policing the observance of the pious elements of the king’s will in perpetuity.220 
Two years later the wardens and fellowship of the major livery companies unanimously 
agreed, in perpetuity, to participate in an annual commemorative service held in the 
king’s chapel in Westminster after the annual appearance of the mayors and sheriffs at 
the Exchequer to swear their oaths of office.221 This is not the action of a City at odds 
with its ruler, or the result of a request by a ruler unsure of his capital’s loyalty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219 Rep.1, f.161; Margaret Condon, ‘God Save the King! Piety, Propaganda and the Perpetual Memorial’, 
in Tim Tatton-Brown ed. Westminster Abbey: They Lady Chapel of Henry VII (Woodbridge, 2003), 66, 
78 
220 Condon, ‘Perpetual Memorial’, 79. 
221 Rep.2, f.10v; Condon, ‘Perpetual Memorial’, 79. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Bishop John Fisher, in his eulogy at Henry VII’s funeral, claimed that before his death 
the late king had made three promises to his confessor, the first being ‘a true 
reformation of all them that were officers and ministers of his laws to the intent that 
Justice from hence forward truly and indifferently might be executed’.1 This was a clear 
reference to the ‘fiscal judges’, as Polydore Vergil had called them, Sir Richard 
Empson and Edmund Dudley, who at the time were languishing in the Tower of 
London.2 Fisher’s inference, that Empson and Dudley had overreached their authority 
and thus were in need of reform, exonerated Henry to some extent of the financial 
oppression of his people. Hence started the crown-sponsored vilification of these men.  
 
Elton, and more recently Paul Cavill, argued that the tone of Henry’s rule did not 
change in the last few years of the reign, but rather there was a continuity in policy, 
that policy being primarily the extension of law-enforcement and the royal 
prerogative.3 This thesis argues likewise in that it demonstrates that the king and his 
government had a vision of law-enforcement and extension of royal control that they 
sought to impose upon the capital from the earliest years of the reign. However, whilst 
in broader terms Henry’s rule may have remained consistent, the timbre of the City-
Crown relationship did alter in the latter years of the reign. 
 
The king’s determination to establish his unquestioned authority was felt early in the 
reign by the City. Though the City’s acceptance of the new king was passive and his 
reception was warm, the mercantile elite displayed a lack of confidence in Henry’s 
ability to conduct a foreign policy that would serve their needs, and a lack of respect 
for his position in conducting their own negotiations with the Low Countries contrary 
to the king’s wishes. Mutual distrust was the inevitable result, and this may account for 
the king’s apparent reluctance to take financial aid from the City, preferring instead to 
take finance from individuals rather than become indebted to any corporate body. This 
                                                 
1 The English Works of John Fisher, John Mayor ed., EETS (London, 1876), i, 271 
2 Vergil, 129-130. 
3 Elton, ‘Rapacity and Remorse’ and ‘A Restatement’; Cavill, ‘Henry VII and Parliament’, 95-97. 
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episode was the first of two key events that served as a catalyst for change in the City-
Crown relationship in the reign of Henry VII. It may well have been the actions of the 
Merchant Adventurers, in 1486-7, that convinced the king that the ruling mercantile 
oligarchy was a dangerous interest-group that should be neutralised when the 
opportunity arose.  
 
The tenor of the City-Crown relationship became more amiable after the battle of Stoke 
in June 1487. The king’s position was visibly more secure than it had been in autumn 
1485. Henry had not only vanquished his enemies, but by now had a young heir, a 
fertile wife, papal acceptance, and broader magnate support. The City was more certain 
of Henry’s ability to retain his throne and administer effective rule. Henry was extended 
finance, which he took care to repay within a year in contrast to his fifteenth-century 
predecessors. To a large extent the City-Crown relationship functioned the same as 
before. The king and his ministers were accessible to even the smaller livery 
companies, who sought royal charters to obtain powers and validation that the mayor 
and aldermen could not. The cooperation of the mercantile community was sought once 
again in the formulation of foreign policy. This was a matter of practicality, for the 
diplomatic knowledge and expertise of the mercantile community of London exceeded 
that of the government. It also served to secure the patience of the merchants whose 
livelihood was affected by the trade embargoes imposed in the middle of the reign. 
Channels of communication were established, some traditional, some through key 
individuals who facilitated Crown-City relations. The close relationship of Bray with 
leading merchants, such as the Goldsmiths Edmund and John Shaa and Bartholomew 
Rede and the Mercer Henry Colet, was to the benefit of both the Crown and the City. 
Shaa and Rede in particular came to play dual roles as royal servants and aldermen, 
and there is no evidence to suggest that they felt a conflict in their duties. The City used 
these men to intercede on its behalf, and the Crown took their advice on matters 
pertaining to the capital.  
 
Once the king became solvent in the late 1490s the City lost its main bargaining chip, 
and the king was able to deal with the City more forcefully than he had before, 
particularly in negotiations surrounding the Merchant Taylors’ charter and the renewal 
of the City charter, the second key series of events in terms of City-Crown relations. 
The opportunity to provide a counter-balance to the narrow faction of the City’s 
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mercantile ruling elite was presented by the incorporation of the Merchant Taylors’ 
Company. Through the promotion of the Tailors (and, a year earlier, the Haberdashers) 
to mercantile status the king and his ministers may have hoped to dilute the 
overwhelming influence in the City of the existing mercantile companies, particularly 
the Mercers, Grocers and Drapers. To this end individual members of the Merchant 
Taylors’ Company were sponsored in election to civic office. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Henry’s promotion of the Merchant Taylors was part of a long-conceived 
plan to widen the City’s oligarchy, but rather it is likely that Henry was able to make 
the most of the opportunity provided by the Tailors’ ambitions. It is possible that the 
Crown was aware that such a grant would be divisive, and that a ‘divide and rule’ 
strategy coexisted in the Crown’s plan alongside that to expand the ruling oligarchy. 
This was the antithesis of Henry’s usual urban policy, where he and his ministers strove 
to help towns and cities establish oligarchic governments modelled on that of London, 
and consequently ‘a greater degree of urban autonomy was witnessed during the 
reign’.4 
 
The opposition to the Merchant Taylors’ charter by the City, led by the Drapers’ 
Company, was perceived as an assault on the king’s prerogative and pushed the king 
to centralise oversight of the livery companies, which affected all municipal authorities. 
The City was penalised in another way: instead of receiving a new charter confirming 
its traditional liberties and privileges, recently granted by Richard III, it received a far 
more limited version which, by default, resumed many of the liberties granted in the 
fifteenth century. The 1505 charter was a pivotal point in City-Crown relations, crucial 
in understanding why the London of 1509 was a different place, politically, to that of 
1485. It fundamentally altered the Crown-City relationship, for though it had always 
been clear that the Crown was the senior force in the relationship the City had believed 
that it was entitled to Crown-granted privileges. Henry reminded the City that what the 
king granted could also be taken away. City progress towards autonomy was arrested 
for the first time since the reign of Richard II. 
 
An agglomeration of factors and events served to make the king a more imposing figure 
to the citizens of the capital in the last decade of the reign. This period saw measures 
                                                 
4 James Lee, ‘Henry VII and his towns’. 496. 
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initiated earlier in the reign come to fruition, the most relevant of which to the City was 
the tighter imposition of statute law, and its prosecution through the Court of the 
Exchequer, and the increased efficiency of bureaucratic personnel within the 
government’s financial departments and the port of London. A substantial turnover of 
personnel occurred around the turn of the century in both the king’s intimate circle and 
in civic government, removing men who had facilitated City-Crown relations on both 
sides. Morton and Bray, who apparently had the ability to rebuke as well as serve the 
king, were replaced by men who were perceived to be more grasping on their master’s 
behalf. The innovation in the royal household of the Privy Chamber meant that access 
to the king became harder and citizen-royal servants such as Shaa and Rede were not 
replaced. Henry’s need for a servant with connections and knowledge of his capital led 
to the employment of Edmund Dudley, who had served as the City’s undersheriff. 
These factors contributed to the impression that the Crown squeezed its subjects for 
monetary gain. 
 
The City felt the effects of this increased efficiency and personnel change, but as its 
inhabitants tended, on the whole, not to be tenants-in-chief of the king (unless they held 
land elsewhere), or subject generally to the king’s traditional prerogative rights, they 
did not suffer from the king’s financial exactions as much as members of the peerage 
or those of the populace who resided in more rural areas. The extant evidence yields a 
relatively short list of names of merchants in London who paid financial penalties at 
this time. This may have been, in part, a consequence of the king having less leverage 
over the merchants than he did over the peerage and therefore he took his opportunity 
to hold individual merchants in bond when they were exposed to legal scrutiny.  
 
The literary sources of the reign can be misleading. The most voluminous extant 
chronicles are written by Londoners, the most substantial example being The Great 
Chronicle. This thesis has demonstrated that these accounts of the fiscal oppressions of 
the Londoners are frequently quoted by historians without qualification or cross-
reference with other sources. The overwhelming impression given is that the 
persecution of prominent Londoners was arbitrarily focused on rich merchants with the 
aim of obtaining a portion of their riches. This thesis argues that those who became the 
focus of prosecution had merited legal investigation and the majority cannot be seen to 
have been entirely innocent of some wrong-doing. 
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The intimacy of the Crown-City relationship made it impossible for changes to be made 
by the Crown without them having a profound effect upon the City. The relationship 
had always been a multi-tiered, interdependent one that functioned on many levels, 
economic, social and political. The breadth of the ties between the two entities was 
such that the relationship cannot be categorised as a patronage-arrangement or 
partnership, though it contained elements of both, but was instead unique within the 
English polity. It was far from being a relationship of equals: the City’s self-
government was crown-sponsored, and whilst the king had the ability to command 
obedience (though it was not always sensible to do so), the City, when it desired the 
king’s cooperation, could only approach the monarch as a petitioner. The reign of 
Henry Tudor did not change any of this. The relationship remained equally important 
to both participants. The monarch needed his capital, and London’s location, function 
as entrepôt for the kingdom and consequent concentration of wealth made it impossible 
for an effective capital to be located elsewhere, as Richard II discovered when he 
moved his court to York in 1392.5 The changes wrought in the reign, rather, prepared 
the way for further change and erosion of City liberties that were to take place under 
the rule of Henry’s son and grandchildren. 
 
Henry’s relationship with his capital was not characterised by innovation. Like Edward 
IV before him, Henry attempted to enforce the law and extinguish practices of 
smuggling and customs fraud which had become problematic. Henry’s solvency meant 
that he was able to do this without worry that he was biting the feeding hand. Where 
Henry differed from his father-in-law is in his ability to recognise and utilise an 
opportunity when it was presented to him, and his patience in awaiting for such 
opportunities. When the City, or its inhabitants, attempted to circumvent royal 
authority, as it did in 1486-7 and again in 1505, the Crown was forced to act decisively, 
and ultimately had little choice but to curtail the privileges the City had been 
accumulating in the course of the previous century. The City had metaphorically given 
Henry both a stick to beat it with and the reason to use it. 
                                                 
5 Saul, Richard II, 259 & n.86, 343; Barron, ‘The Quarrel of Richard II with London’, 178, 199 and 
‘Richard II and London’, 150-3. 
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To return to John Fisher: his claim that the king had felt remorse on his deathbed was 
a tacit acknowledgement that the government was aware that the realm’s subjects felt 
themselves to have been subject to an unaccustomed harshness of rule. Yet though lip-
service was paid to the commencement of a new reign free from the oppressions of the 
last, no effort was made to change the direction, policies or even the personnel of the 
government, with the exception of the removal of the unfortunate Empson and Dudley. 
Henry VII himself became the ultimate scapegoat. His efforts in re-establishing the law 
and royal prerogative made him unpopular as men paid long-forgotten fees and dues 
that their immediate forbears had not. The government of his son benefitted, and was 
not censured for continuing, and developing, the policies instituted by Henry Tudor, 
whilst the old king himself became enshrined in history as the avaricious bean-counter, 
more interested in his account books than courtly entertainment. 
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Appendix: The Aldermen of London, 1485-1509. 
 
 
Name Company 
Dates as 
Alderman 
Sheriff Mayor MP 
M / 
W* 
K* Ex* Died 
Acheley, 
Roger 
Draper 1504-1521 1504 1511  2x   1523 
Ailwyn, 
Nicholas 
Mercer 1496-1506 1494 
1499 
1491 
1491 1x   1506 
Astry, Ralph Fishmonger 1485-94 1485 1493   1494  1494 
Aylmer, 
Lawrence 
Draper 1504-1524 1501 1508  4x 1497 1524  
Billesdon, 
Robert 
Haberdasher 1471-1492 1473 1483   1486  1492 
Boteler, 
William 
Grocer 1507-1534 1507 1515  8x 1516  1534 
Bradbury, 
Thomas 
Mercer 1502-1510 1498 
1509 
1495  
1495 1x   1510 
Breteyn, 
Thomas 
Ironmonger 1483-1485 1484      1485 
Brice,  
Hugh 
Goldsmith 1476-96 1475 1485  3x 1485  1496 
Broke,  
John 
Grocer 1488-1502 1489   4x  1502 1511 
Broun,  
John 
Mercer 1470-1498 1472 1480  4x 1486  1498 
Browne, 
William 
Mercer 1500-1508 1491 1507  2x   1508 
Browne, 
William 
Mercer 1505-1514 1504 1513  2x   1514 
Capell, 
William 
Draper 1485-1515 1489 
1503 
1510 
1491 
1512 
1514 
7x 1486  1515 
Chawry, 
Richard 
Salter 1481-1509 1481 1494 1497    1509 
Clopton, 
Hugh 
Mercer 1485-1496 1486 1491 1483 1x   1496 
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Surname Company 
Dates as 
Alderman 
Sheriff Mayor MP 
M / 
W* 
K Ex* Died 
Colet, 
 Henry 
Mercer 1476-1505 1477 
1486 
1495 
1487 
1489 
4x 1486  1505 
Copynger, 
William 
Fishmonger 1505-1513 1506 1512     1513 
Cote,   
Henry 
Goldsmith 1490-1505 1490   4x   1513 
Don,  
Angel 
Grocer 1506       1506 
Drope,  
Robert 
Draper 1468-1487 1469 1474  2x   1487 
Exmew, 
Thomas 
Goldsmith 1508-29 1508 1517  2x 1518  1529 
Fabyan, 
Robert 
Draper 1494-1503 1493   2x  1503 1513 
Fenkill,  
John 
Draper 1485-99 1487  
1483 
1484 
3x 1486  1499 
Fitzwilliam, 
William 
Merchant 
Taylor 
1504-11 1506   1x 1515 1511 1534 
Gardyner, 
Richard 
Mercer 1469-1490 1469 1478 1478    1490 
Graunger, 
Thomas 
Skinner 1503-10 1503   2x   1510 
Grove,  
Roger 
Grocer 1505-9 1505   1x   1509 
Haddon, 
Richard 
Mercer 1499-1516 1496 
1506 
1513 
 2x 1497  1516 
Hardyng, 
Robert 
Goldsmith 1483-1490 1478   3x  1490 1504 
Hawes, 
Christopher 
Mercer 1506-1508 1503   1x   1508 
Hawes, 
John 
Mercer 1501-10 1500   2x  1510 1517 
Hill,  
Thomas 
Grocer 1473-1485 1474 1484  3x 1484  1485 
Horn, 
William 
Salter 1480-1496 1476 1487   1487  1496 
Issak,  
William 
Draper 1487-1503 1488   5x  1503 1518 
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Surname Company 
Dates as 
Alderman 
Sheriff Mayor MP 
M / 
W* 
K Ex* Died 
Jennings, 
Stephen 
Merchant 
Taylor 
1499-1523 1498 1508  1x 1509  1523 
Johnson, 
Robert 
Goldsmith 1506-7 1506      1507 
Kebyll,  
Henry 
Grocer 1502-1517 1502 1510  3x   1517 
Kneseworth, 
Thomas 
Fishmonger 1503-13 1495 1505     1513 
Martyn, 
William 
Skinner 1483-1505 1483 1492  5x 1494  1505 
Mathew,  
John 
Mercer 1482-1499 1482 1490  1x   1499 
Mirfyn, 
Thomas 
Skinner 1509-23 1511 1518  5x   1523 
Monoux, 
George 
Draper 1507-41 1509 1514 1523 6x  1541 1544 
Northland, 
Thomas 
Grocer 1481-85 1483   1x   1485 
Nynes, 
Nicholas 
Merchant 
Taylor 
1501-4 1502   1x   1504 
Pemberton, 
Hugh 
Tailor 1491-1500 1491  1487 1x   1500 
Percyvale, 
John 
Merchant 
Taylor 
1485-1503 1486 1498  1x 1487  1503 
Purchase, 
William 
Mercer 1492-1502 1492 1497  1x  1502 1503 
Rawson, 
Richard 
Mercer 1476-1485 1476   2x   1485 
Rede, 
Bartholomew 
Goldsmith 1498-1504 1491 1502  1x 1503  1504 
Remyngton, 
William 
Fishmonger 1485-1511 1487 1500     1511 
Rest,  
John 
Grocer 1508-1523 1510 1516  3x   1523 
Revell,  
Robert 
Grocer 1490-1 1490      1491 
Shaa,  
Edmund 
Goldsmith 1473-1488 1474 1482  1x 1483  1488 
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Surname Company 
Dates as 
Alderman 
Sheriff Mayor MP 
M / 
W* 
K Ex* Died 
Shaa,  
John 
Goldsmith 1496-1503 1496 1501 
1495, 
1503 
1x 1497  1503 
Shore,  
Richard 
Draper 1504-10 1505   1x   1510 
Stede,  
William 
Grocer 1504-6 1500   2x   1506 
Stokker, 
John 
Draper 1479-1485 1477   1x   1485 
Stokker, 
William 
Draper 1470-1485 1473 1485  1x 1471  1485 
Swan,  
John 
Tailor 1483-92 1485   1x   1492 
Tate, 
John 
Mercer 1485-1515 1485 
1496 
1514 
  1497  1515 
Tate,  
Robert 
Mercer 1479-1500 1481 1488 
1483, 
1491 
3x   1500 
Tilney,  
Robert 
Grocer 1485-1499 1488   3x   1499 
Warde, 
John 
Grocer 1478-1501 1479 1485 
1478, 
1485, 
1495 
6x   1501 
Warner, 
John 
Armourer / 
Grocer 
1503-1511 1494   2x   1511 
Welbeck, 
William 
Haberdasher 1492-1504 1492     1504 1510 
White, 
William 
Draper 1482-04 1482 1489 1489 5x   1504 
Wood, 
Thomas 
Goldsmith 1496-1504 1491   3x   1504 
Wylford, 
James 
Merchant 
Taylor 
1500-1511 1499   1x  1511 1527 
Wyndout, 
Thomas 
Mercer 1499-1500 1497  1497 1x   1500 
Wynger, 
John 
Grocer 1498-1505 1493 1504  3x   1505 
 
 
 
* ‘M/W’   – Served as Master or Warden of Company 
* ‘K’   – Knighted  
* ‘Ex’  – Exonerated or discharged from Office 
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